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shawa
CNO
Joined: 03 Sep 2004
Posts: 2004
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 Posted: Sun Aug 14, 2005 9:21 pm Post subject: 9/11 Kean-Hamilton Statement on ABLE DANGER |
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After several days of totally conflicting statements, they finally got their 'sheet' together.
The official response:
| Quote: | Kean-Hamilton Statement on ABLE DANGER
Thomas H. Kean and Lee H. Hamilton, former Chair and Vice Chair of the
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11
Commission),in response to media inquiries about the Commission’s
investigation of the ABLE DANGER program, today released the following
statement:
On October 21, 2003, Philip Zelikow, the executive director of the 9/11
Commission, two senior Commission staff members, and a representative of the executive branch, met at Bagram Base, Afghanistan, with three individuals doing intelligence work for the Department of Defense. One of the men, in recounting information about al Qaeda’s activities in Afghanistan before 9/11, referred to a DOD program known as ABLE DANGER. He said this program was now closed, but urged Commission staff to get the files on this program and review them, as he thought the Commission would find information about al Qaeda and Bin Ladin that
had been developed before the 9/11 attack.
He also complained that Congress, particularly the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), had effectively ended a human intelligence network he considered valuable.
As with their other meetings, Commission staff promptly prepared a memorandum for the record. That memorandum, prepared at the time, does not record any mention of Mohamed Atta or any of the other future hijackers, or any suggestion that their identities were known to anyone at DOD before 9/11. Nor do any of the three Commission staffers who participated in the interview, or the executive branch lawyer, recall hearing any such allegation.
While still in Afghanistan, Dr. Zelikow called back to the Commission
headquarters in Washington and requested that staff immediately draft a document request seeking information from DOD on ABLE DANGER. The staff had also heard about ABLE DANGER in another context, related to broader military planning involving possible operations against al Qaeda before 9/11.
1 |
pdf 4 pages cont'd at:
http://www.9-11pdp.org/press/2005-08-12_pr.pdf
_________________
“I love the man that can smile in trouble, that can gather strength from distress, and grow brave by reflection. ‘Tis the business of little minds to shrink; but he whose heart is firm, and whose conscience approves his conduct, will pursue his principles unto death.” (Thomas Paine, 1776) |
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kate
Admin
Joined: 14 May 2004
Posts: 1891
Location: Upstate, New York
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| Posted: Mon Aug 15, 2005 3:24 am Post subject: |
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closing statement...emphasis mine
| Quote: | | The Commission did not mention ABLE DANGER in its report. The name and character of this classified operation had not, at that time, been publicly disclosed. The operation itself did not turn out to be historically significant, set against the larger context of U.S. policy and intelligence efforts that involved Bin Ladin and al Qaeda. The Report’s description of military planning against al Qaeda prior to 9/11 encompassed this and other military plans. The information we received about this program also contributed to the Commission’s depiction of intelligence efforts against al Qaeda before 9/11. |
Are they implying that a mention of Atta wasn't historically significant? There's a whole lot of souls that would take exception to that statement.
maybe I need to read that whole darn statement again...read between the lines or something,, I must be missing something. Seems like nothing but a whitewash 
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shawa
CNO
Joined: 03 Sep 2004
Posts: 2004
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| Posted: Mon Aug 15, 2005 9:21 am Post subject: |
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Somebody's lying.
Now that Kean and Hamilton have got their 'sheet' together and produced a more coherent statement of the dismissal of the Able Danger group's testimony, we are supposed to say ok that's the end of it.
In the last couple of days, slurs have been cast on Rep. Curt Weldon that he is a "kook" or an "alarmist". So who do we believe??
I will take the word of the Special Ops soldiers over the CYA politicians anyday!!!
An interesting report in a Bergen N.J. newspaper cited by Jim Geraghty:
| Quote: | TKS [ jim geraghty reporting ]
DID THE BERGEN RECORD BREAK SOMETHING HERE?
Mike Kelly, a columnist for the Bergen Record of New Jersey, had Curt Weldon’s staff arrange an interview with a member of Able Danger.
He uncovers a few tidbits we haven't heard before:
For a year before the 9/11 attacks, the Wayne Inn was home to Mohammed Atta, the al-Qaida mastermind behind the hijacking plot that killed almost 3,000 people...
A former member of the military intelligence team told me in an interview that it had enough data to raise suspicions. "But we were blocked from passing it to the FBI."
[b]The connect-the-dots tracking by the team was so good that it even knew Atta conducted meetings with the three future hijackers. One of those meetings took place at the Wayne Inn. That's how close all this was - to us and to being solved, if only the information had been passed up the line to FBI agents or even to local cops.
The story begins a year before the attacks. A top-secret team of Pentagon military counter-terror computer sleuths, who worked for a special operations commando group, was well into a project to monitor al-Qaida operations.
The 11-person group called itself "Project Able Danger." Think of them as a super-secret Delta Force or SEAL team. But instead of guns, they relied on advanced math training as their key weapons. And instead of traditional spying methods or bust-down-the-door commando tactics, the Able Danger group booted up a set of high-speed, super-computers and collected vast amounts of data.
The technique is called "data mining." The Able Danger team swept together information from al-Qaida chat rooms, news accounts, Web sites and financial records. Then they connected the dots, comparing the information with visa applications by foreign tourists and other government records.
From there, the computer sleuths noticed four names - Atta, Marwan al-Shehhi, Khalid al-Mihdar and Nawaf al-Hazmi.
All four turned out to be hijackers. Atta and al-Shehhi took a room at the Wayne Inn. They rented a Wayne mail drop, too, and even went to Willowbrook Mall. Al-Mihdar and al-Hazmi took rooms at a motel on Route 46 in South Hackensack.
What is interesting about this information now is that a CIA team, working separately from the Able Danger Team, had set its sights on al-Mihdar and al-Hazmi. The two were already on a CIA terror watch list and still had managed to obtain U.S. visas.
The CIA feared al-Mihdar and al-Hazmi might try to slip into the United States. But the CIA lost track of them after they left a terror meeting in Malaysia in early 2000 for Bangkok. Worse, the CIA waited until the summer of 2001 to tell the FBI that two suspected terrorists had visas to enter the United States - and might be here…
By mid-2000, the Able Danger team knew it had important information about a possible terrorist plot. Because of a peculiar series of computer links that went through Brooklyn, the team began referring to the four future hijackers as the "Brooklyn cell." Their movements and communications were raising too many suspicions.
But there’s an interesting wrinkle at the end:
Perhaps just as alarming, even the Able Danger team understood its limits. When lawyers blocked Able Danger's request to approach the FBI, the team simply went back to its work and kept quiet - even after the 9/11 attacks occurred.
Why? If the Able Danger team was so concerned about U.S. security, why didn't it approach Congress or even the press to sound an alarm?
When I posed that question in my interview with the Able Danger team member, he fell silent. Listening on a speaker phone, a congressional staffer interrupted: "Have you ever seen what happens to whistleblowers?"
Again, the Able Danger member had no answer.
Back in my wire service days, I used to cover Washington for the Bergen Record. I never dealt with Kelly, but my understanding is that he’s been at the paper for nearly three decades, and been a columnist about half that time. He’s no green rookie. And I can say from my experience with the Record that the editors were not lackadaisical. The North Jersey communities they cover were hard hit by 9/11. I doubt the editors would permit a columnist to quote an unnamed source, throwing out allegations as explosive as this, if they didn’t find him credible. If he gave off any whiff of nuttiness, I have a feeling this column would have been written quite differently.
In my previous post, I had stated that the accounts of Weldon’s guy and the 9/11 Commission were so different that this can’t be a simple misunderstanding – somebody’s lying. And an account with a lot of details (like the Commission’s Friday release) tends to seem more plausible than a vague one. Well, this account offers a lot of details. Anybody in North Jersey want to contact the Wayne Inn? They remember anybody who looked like Atta staying a year? Do they still have their pre-2001 guest records?
It still would be helpful if any one of these eleven guys in Able Danger could come forward and answer these questions publicly, not just with print reporters. I realize they have careers to think of, but as the tag line for “Patriot Games” said, “Truth needs a soldier.”[/b] |
http://tks.nationalreview.com/archives/072966.asp
_________________
“I love the man that can smile in trouble, that can gather strength from distress, and grow brave by reflection. ‘Tis the business of little minds to shrink; but he whose heart is firm, and whose conscience approves his conduct, will pursue his principles unto death.” (Thomas Paine, 1776) |
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shawa
CNO
Joined: 03 Sep 2004
Posts: 2004
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| Posted: Mon Aug 15, 2005 10:48 am Post subject: |
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Kate wrote
| Quote: | | The Commission did not mention ABLE DANGER in its report. The name and character of this classified operation had not, at that time, been publicly disclosed. The operation itself did not turn out to be historically significant, set against the larger context of U.S. policy and intelligence efforts that involved Bin Ladin and al Qaeda. |
Me thinks Curt Weldon will take that statement as a challenge!!!
Operation Able Danger is his 'pet puppy'!!
I had no idea who Weldon was when this story broke, so I researched and found that he was first IMPRESSED with this small group's work back in the late nineties and has been pushing it ever since. It had another name back then (I can't remember what the acronym was, maybe LEWA or something similar. I'll have to go back and look for it).
For all the dispersions cast on Weldon, IMHO unlike most politicians, he is a TRUE PATRIOT who's greatest concern is the national security of our country. The Commissioner's statement has thrown the ball back to Weldon's court. From all that I've read, he is a BULLDOG and I look for him to hold hearings and take testimony UNDER OATH.
_________________
“I love the man that can smile in trouble, that can gather strength from distress, and grow brave by reflection. ‘Tis the business of little minds to shrink; but he whose heart is firm, and whose conscience approves his conduct, will pursue his principles unto death.” (Thomas Paine, 1776) |
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shawa
CNO
Joined: 03 Sep 2004
Posts: 2004
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| Posted: Mon Aug 15, 2005 1:13 pm Post subject: |
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I found it. It was called LIWA. This is Weldon speaking on the House floor on May 21, 2002.
An extremely interesting read!!
| Quote: | Congressional Record: May 21, 2002 (House)
Page H2820-H2834
DEFENDING PRESIDENT BUSH REGARDING KNOWLEDGE OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001,
THREAT, AND DETAILING UPCOMING TRAVEL TO RUSSIA, UZBEKISTAN, CHINA, AND NORTH KOREA
~SNIP~
But Mr. Speaker, as I said on September 11 on CNN live at 12 noon
from the roof of a church across from the Capitol, on that day the
government did fail the American people. Now, the President did not
fail the American people, but the government failed the American
people.
I am going to document for our colleagues today, and for the American
public and the media, steps that we took in the years prior to
September 11 when our agencies and the government did not respond. This started back in the Clinton administration and continued during the
Bush administration.
In fact, Mr. Speaker, during the late 1990s, I chaired the Committee
on Research for our national security, which meant that my job was to
oversee about $38 billion a year that we spend on cutting-edge
technology for the military.
One of those projects that I helped get additional funding for was
the Information Dominant Center that the Army was standing up down at
Fort Belvoir, technically known as the LIWAC. This Land Information
Warfare Assessment Center was designed to monitor on a 24-hour-a-day
basis 7 days a week all of our military classified systems, those
systems used to run the Army. Each of our services was in the process
of standing up an entity like the one that the Army stood up at Fort
Belvoir.
Back in 1997, as I was supporting increased funding for this
capability, I was amazed in two trips that I took to Fort Belvoir that
the Army was not just able to maintain security over their information
systems, but they were able to use new software tools and high-speed
computers to do what is commonly called ``profiling,'' to take vast
amounts of information about the classified and unclassified
information and process it and analyze it so that a picture could be
drawn and a threat could be developed, proliferation could be
monitored.
{time} 2310
Now, this was back in 1997. In fact, I had a chance to use these
capabilities and I think this story, more than any other, underscores
the inabilities of our agencies on September 11 to really understand
the threat that was emerging.
[[Page H2821]]
As you might recall, back in 1997 we had gotten into a war in Kosovo
to remove Milosevic from power. All of Congress was not supportive of
~SNIP~
I told them all the information. When I got done, Mr. Speaker, I
said, Now, do you want to know where I got my data from? They said,
Yeah, you got it from the Russians. I said, No. They said, Well, then
you got it from Kric. I said, No. I said, Before I went over there I
had the Army's information dominant center run a profile for me of
Dragomir Kric.
The FBI and the CIA in 1997 said to me, what is the Army's
information dominant center? The FBI and the CIA had no knowledge that
our military was developing a capability that would be able to do
massive data mining of information to allow us to do a profile of a
person or an event that was about to happen.
We took that model, based on that lesson which infuriated me as a
Member of Congress to be asked to brief the CIA and the FBI, and
working with people in the intelligence agencies, I developed a plan.
This plan was to create a national collaborative center.
Back in 1997, Mr. Speaker, the national collaborative center where
there were articles written, published in the media, technical media
here was called the NOAH, N-O-A-H. It stands for National Operations
and Analysis Hub. The function of the NOAH would be to have all 32
Federal agencies that have classified systems have a node of each of
those systems in one central location managed by one of their
employees, and when tasked by the national command authority, the
President or the National Security Council, their data would be entered
into a massive computer using new software tools like STARLITE and
SPIRES and six others that are used by the private sector to do data
mining.
In addition to classified information systems, they would also run
through massive amounts of unclassified data, newspaper stories,
magazine story, TV broadcasts, radio broadcasts. A person cannot do
that manually, but they can do it through high-speed computers, as the
Army did for me in developing the profile of Kric.
We took this plan and we said to the intelligence community, this is
what we need to have to be prepared for threats in the 21st century,
because the threats we are going to see over the next several decades
will not come only from one nation state, they will come from terrorist
organizations. We need to be able to pool all this data together and be
able to profile it, analyze it and then come back with a true picture
of what may be about to occur.
Mr. Speaker, this was in 1997. I briefed John Hamre. Dr. John Hamre was then the Deputy Secretary of Defense. I said, John, you have got to go down to Fort Belvoir and see this facility; it is amazing. He went
down twice. He called me back and he said, Curt, it is amazing what
they are doing there. This profiling worked, and they could do it
because unofficially some other secret lines were running through Fort
Belvoir that the Army could unofficially access. So it really was an
official process.
He said, But you know, Curt, I cannot get to where you want to go
because the CIA and the FBI will not cooperate and neither will the
other agencies. He said, So I have a suggestion for you. Why do you not
host a meeting in your office? I will come and you invite my
counterparts at the FBI and the CIA.
So, Mr. Speaker, in my office, in 1998, I had the Deputy Secretary of
Defense, the Deputy Director of the CIA and the Deputy Director of the
FBI, four of us met for 1 hour. We briefed them on the NOAH. We talked
about the need for a national collaborative center, national data
fusion center; and the response was, We do not need to do that right
now, we are doing our own systems in our own agencies; so thank you for your recommendations, and we are trying to share but not the way you want because that is too bold. That is too aggressive. This was 1998, Mr. Speaker.
Not satisfied with that, we held hearings. We did briefings for our
colleagues; and in two consecutive defense bills, I put language in the
bill that basically said the Defense Department and our intelligence
agencies had to create a national collaborative center. So it became a
part of the law; but Mr. Speaker, the agencies refused. They
[[Page H2823]]
said we do not need to do that, we do our job very well.
Each of them does their job very well, but the problem is the threats
in the 21st century will be seen from a number of different sources. It
may be information coming from the Customs Department or from the
Defense Intelligence Agency or from the NSA or from the CIA or the FBI
or Commerce, State and Justice, all of which have classified systems;
or it may come from some public statements in articles in other
countries. We can only have the capability to understand all of that if
we have a national fusion center.
{time} 2230
We did not have that capability before September 11. That is why I
stood up on September 11, at 12 p.m. in the afternoon and said, ``Today
our government failed the American people.'' Because, Mr. Speaker, we
knew what we should have done. We knew what we could have done. And we did not do it.
In fact, Mr. Speaker, I firmly believe that if we would have
implemented the NOAH, which John Hamre offered to pay for with DOD
dollars, back when we first recommended it, I am convinced we could
have stopped or known about and prevented September 11 from ever
happening.
Let me give an example. CIA information on terrorism, combined with
what the FBI knew about training pilots and open-source information on
remarks by al Qaeda, would have helped the intelligence community and
enforcement agencies focus better on the threat. For example, in August
of 2000, an al Qaeda member had been interviewed by an Italian
newspaper and reported that al Qaeda was training kamikaze pilots. The
intelligence community and enforcement agencies, however, do not read
open-source information. Yes, they read all the classified stuff, but
this interview in 2000 was in an open-source newspaper account in
Italy.
If we would have had a fusion center, all of that data would have
been processed, and in very real quick time, through massive high-speed
computers, and we would have seen the linkages between what was
occurring. But with each agency doing its own thing, it is impossible
to see the linkages. And that is why when President Bush before
September 11 got a bit of information from the CIA and a bit from the
FBI, and something else, and nothing from open sources, there is no way
he could have foretold what was about to occur.
If we would have had the NOAH in place, an idea that was developed
with the intelligence community, an idea that was briefed to the FBI,
briefed to the CIA and briefed to the Defense Department, I think we
could have done something to prevent al Qaeda.
~SNIP~
In fact, Mr. Speaker, there is another interesting development that
occurred. After the Army showed the capability of the LIWAC model at
Ft. Belvoir, other services began to take interest. Special forces
command down in Florida contacted the Army and said, hey, we hear you
are doing some neat things. We want to build a mini version of what you
are doing down at our headquarters.
I did not find out about this until October of 2001, after the attack
on the trade center. A year before, special forces command developed
their own mini version of a data processing or collaborative center
with very limited capabilities. But what they did, Mr. Speaker, they
did a profile of al Qaeda 1 year before 9-11.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Issa). The gentleman from Pennsylvania
(Mr. Weldon) is recognized to continue until midnight.
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, here is the chart, the unclassified chart of what special forces command had 1 year before 9-11. Interesting. The entire al Qaeda network is identified in a graphic
chart with all the linkages to all the terrorist groups around the world.
In fact, Mr. Speaker, I was told by the folks who developed the
capability for special forces command that this chart and the briefing
that was supposed to be given to General Shelton, Chairman of our Joint
Chiefs, had a recommendation to take out 5 cells of bin Laden's
network. Mr. Speaker, this was 1 year before 9-11. This was not during
President Bush's administration. This occurred in the fall of the
remaining term of President Bill Clinton.
The key question I have been trying to get at is why was this 3-hour
briefing, which I also got, I got General Holland to bring his briefers
up from Florida with special forces, I went in the Pentagon, went in
the tank, and they gave me the briefing, as much as they could give me,
because part of it is being used for our operational plan, why was that
3-hour briefing with the recommendations to take out 5 cells of bin
Laden's network condensed down to a 1-hour brief when it was given to General Hugh Shelton in January of 2001? And why were the
recommendations to take out 5 cells not followed up on? That is the
question we should get answered, Mr. Speaker.
Because 1 year before 9-11, the capability that special forces built
actually identified to us the network of al Qaeda. And they went beyond
that and gave us recommendations where we could take out cells to
eliminate their capability. So for those pundits out there sitting in
their armchairs criticizing President Bush, they have it all wrong.
[b]Facts are a tough thing to refute, and the fact is that back in 1997,
we told the administration at that time what to do. In 1998, we briefed
the agencies. In 1999, we put language in a defense bill. In 2000, we
put language in a defense bill. In 2000, special forces command built
another mini version of that capability. And in 2000 they briefed
General Shelton telling him to take out 5 cells of bin Laden's network.
All of that activity could have prevented or helped to prevent 9-11
from ever occurring. I challenge my colleagues, Mr. Speaker, to review
the facts. I challenge the media to report the truth.
We still do not have a national collaborative center. That capability
still does not exist. We are getting there, but it has been a long
road. I briefed our Homeland Security Director Tom Ridge, with the
gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Burton), chairman of the Committee on
Government Reform, about 4 months ago. He agreed with us, but he has
not yet been able to achieve this new interagency collaborative center,
and that is an indictment of our government that the American people
deserve to be outraged over.
We need this kind of capability in the 21st century, because these
bits of pieces of information have to be pieced together, both
classified and unclassified, so that our analysts can get the clear
picture of what may be about to occur against our people and our
friends.
So, Mr. Speaker, I seek to clarify the charges against the President
and to answer them, and I encourage my colleagues to learn more about
the need for a national collaborative center, a national data fusion
center or, as I call it, a national operations and analysis hub.[/b]
Mr. Speaker, I will enter into the Record the documentation from as
far back as 1998, 1999, and 2000 with our recommendations to implement
this kind of capability: |
Read More at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2002_cr/h052102.html
_________________
“I love the man that can smile in trouble, that can gather strength from distress, and grow brave by reflection. ‘Tis the business of little minds to shrink; but he whose heart is firm, and whose conscience approves his conduct, will pursue his principles unto death.” (Thomas Paine, 1776)
Last edited by shawa on Wed Aug 17, 2005 4:13 am; edited 1 time in total |
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SBD
Admiral
Joined: 19 Aug 2004
Posts: 1022
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| Posted: Mon Aug 15, 2005 2:12 pm Post subject: |
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| SBD wrote: | | Quote: | June 21, 2005 Tuesday
COMMITTEE HEARING
INTELLIGENCE, INFORMATION SHARING, AND TERRORISM RISK ASSESSMENT SUBCOMMITTEE
HOUSE HOMELAND SECURITY COMMITTEE
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE ROBERT R. SIMMONS (R-CT) HOLDS HEARING ON OPEN-SOURCE INFORMATION SHARING
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE ROBERT R. SIMMONS (R-CT), CHAIRMAN
WASHINGTON, D.C.
WELDON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing, a very important hearing.
And thank each of you for testifying.
I want to walk my colleagues through a case study that I think is very appropriate for this hearing, and I want to take my colleagues back to 1999. I was then chairman of the Defense Research Subcommittee. We were standing up information dominance centers for each of the services, and the information dominant center of the Army, called the LIWA, the Land Information Warfare Assessment Center, was headquartered at Fort Belvoir. They were also linked with SOCOM down in Florida, which was doing amazing work and using the same model that the Army was using. They were bringing together disparate systems of classified data, including open-source data, which the CIA was not using at that time, to understand emerging transnational threats.
John Hamre was the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and I asked him to go down and look at this capability because I was increasing the funding for it and he did, and he said, "You're right, Congressman."
We put together a brief, a nine-page briefing, which I'd like to enter into the record.
SIMMONS: Without objection, so ordered.
WELDON: This brief in 1999 called for the creation of a national operations and analysis hub, the policymakers tool for acting against emerging transnational threats and dangers to U.S. national security. And the concept was to bring together 33 classified systems managed by 15 agencies, including open-source data to do massive data mining and using tools like Starlight and Spires and other cutting-edge software technologies to be able to give us the kind of information to understand emerging threats.
John Hamre said, "I agree with you, Congressman, and I'll pay the bill. The Defense Department will foot the bill for this, and I don't care where the administration wants to put it, at the White House, the NSC, wherever, but you've got to convince the FBI and the CIA because they have a large part of this data."
So at John Hamre's suggestion, on November 4 of 1999, almost two years before 9/11, we had a meeting with the deputy directors of all three agencies. I went over the brief, and the CIA said, "Well, Congressman, that's great, but we don't need that capability. We're doing something called CI-21, and we feel we have enough capability and we don't need that extra capability that you're talking about.
Well, at the time, the Army and SOCOM, passed by General Shelton and General Schoomaker, who was Commander of SOCOM, were doing a classified program called, "Able Danger," which has not yet been discussed in the open, and I don't know why the 9/11 Commission didn't go into it, because Able Danger was focused on Al Qaida. Able Danger was a classified project of SOCOM and our Army looking at the cells of Al Qaida worldwide so that we'd have actionable information to take out those cells.
What I didn't realize was that they had actually produced a chart until two weeks after 9/11. Now, Mike unfold the chart. This chart was taken by me in a smaller form to Steve Hadley two weeks after 9/11. Now, it's difficult for my colleagues to see even though I've had it blown up, but hold it up, Mike.
This chart identifies the major Al Qaida cells, and if you look to the chart in the center to the left, there's the picture of Mohammad Atta. What the military did in 1999 and 2000 through the use of open-source data, and this is not classified what I'm showing you, they identified the Mohammad Atta cell in New York and identified two of the other three terrorists.
What I have since learned, and I have two -- Mr. Chairman, if we want to do a classified hearing on this, I have two military personnel who will come in and testify who were involved with this. But SOCOM made a recommendation to bring the FBI in and take out the Mohammad Atta cell. And the lawyers, I guess within SOCOM or within DOD, said, "You can't touch Mohammad Atta, because he's here on a green card, as are the other two suspected terrorists. And they were also concerned about the fallout from WACO.
So now we have obtained through an open-source capability that the CIA did not want to pursue, "We don't need that." When I took this chart to Steve Hadley and opened it up in the White House he said to me, "Congressman, where did you get this chart from?" I said I got it from the military, special forces command of that Army.
This is what I've been telling you we need to fuse together our classified systems. And Steve Hadley, the Deputy to the National Security Advisor, said, "I've got to show this to the man." I said, "The man?" He said, "The president of the United States." I said, "You mean don't have this kind of capability?" He said, "Absolutely not, Congressman."
So he took the chart and he gave it to the president of the United States.
In 2003, George Bush announced the TTIC, the Terrorism Threat Integration Center. The TTIC is identical to what we proposed in 1999 but the CIA told us, "Trust us. We know better. We know how to do this kind of capability. We know how to do this emerging threat." They didn't produce that chart. It was done by military capabilities to the Army's Information Dominant Center and through special forces command, tasked by General Shelton and General Schoomaker.
Now, to add further insult to injury, bring out the next chart. This is the capability that's now available but I've been told it's not capable of being produced through the NCTC, the National Counterterrorism Center.
This is Al Qaida today worldwide. Every one of those little dots is a person or a cell, and every one of them are identified. This is a worldwide global depiction of where Al Qaida is today, the key cells that are threatening us, their linkages to other nations, their linkages to terrorist attacks. This information is all obtained through open-source information. I have been told by the military liaison to the NCTC that the NCTC could not produce this today.
Mr. Chairman, this is something that this subcommittee has to pursue is I've been told that at the NCTC we have three separate distinct entities and the stovepipes are still there. For the life of me I cannot understand why there is resistance among the people who are paid to do our intelligence to fuse together information to give us a better understanding of emerging threats. This comprehensive capability is now being pursued by naval intelligence under a new task force that I hope will be picked up by John Negroponte who I gave a brief to two weeks ago.
Open-source intelligence has been extremely valuable and can be extremely valuable. I'm not convinced yet that we're there. |
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shawa
CNO
Joined: 03 Sep 2004
Posts: 2004
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| Posted: Tue Aug 16, 2005 2:59 am Post subject: |
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It appears this is a STEAMED member of the Able Danger Team posting late Friday night as ANON in a response to Jon Holdaway at Intel Dump.
Holdaway seems to recognize him as the real thing.
(H/T Just One Minute)
Whaddaya think???
Anon's post is about halfway down the page:
| Quote: | (link)Anon (www):
OK smart guys - with your "smell tests" and "Thats just flat out wrong" opinions shown above - I hope you don't mind, but let me clear up a few things - I was there and I lived through the ABLE DANGER nightmare.
First - yes - The lawyers involved in this (and similar projects) did interpret the 9-11 terrorists as "US persons" - so while you can second guess them all you want - but that was their "legal" call as wrong as it was and is. Unfortunately, the chain of command at SOCOM went along with them (and this, I expect, will be a topic that will become more clear in the near future).
And lawyers of the era also felt that any intelligence officer viewing open internet information for the purpose of intelligence collection automatically required that any "open source" information obtained be treated as if it was "intelligence information"...does this sound like idiocy to you? It did to me - and we fought it - and I was in meetings at the OSD level, with OSD laywers, that debated this - and I even briefed the DCI George Tenet on this issue relating to an internet project.
And yes, Virgina - we tried to tell the lawyers that since the data identified Atta and the others as linked to Al Qaeda, we should be able to collect on them based on SecState Albright's declaration of Al Qaeda as transnational terrorist threat to the US...well the lawyers did not agree...go figure...so we could not collect on them - and for political reasons - could not pass them to the FBI...I know because I brokered three meetings between the FBI and SOCOM to allow SOCOM to pass the informaton to the FBI. And, sadly, SOCOM cancelled them every time...
Oh - and as to your opinion that ABLE DANGER was a precursor to the IDC - you are flat out wrong - and obviously not keeping up with what is coming out in the press. ABLE DANGER partnered with LIWA/IDC to use the LIWA/IDC capability to obtain the data on Atta and the other 9-11 terrorists. I brokered the relationship...
And - wrong again on the IDC using only "classified" databases - IDC used 2.5 terabytes (a whole hell of a lot of data) - all open source - to identify Atta and the others that have been identified. Classified data bases were only use to "confirm" the links subsequent to the open source data runs.
Oh - and DATA MINING is not overt or clandestine - it just "is" - it is something that is done with either open source or classified information. ABLE DANGER used an array of both open and close databases...
So...good try, gentlemen - good to see there is intellectual riggor here...but before you start doubting the story, perhaps you need to do better research.
8.12.2005 11:27pm
(link)Jon Holdaway (mail) (www):
Anon,
Sounds like you and I might have crossed paths somewhere or at least know some of the same people.
However, your story (while making sense based on my experiences) makes some serious allegations. You've posted as "anon" for obvious reasons and haven't left an email. In order to verify your creds, I'd like you to email me or contact me in some way.
BTW, I agree with everything you say. My original comments of skepticism are waning because much more has come out. The problem is that skepticism over the story is changing to frustration that DOD lawyers that should have known better about the rules of passing information to FBI didn't and they should have. This is the bigger story. |
http://www.intel-dump.com/posts/1123659720.shtml
_________________
“I love the man that can smile in trouble, that can gather strength from distress, and grow brave by reflection. ‘Tis the business of little minds to shrink; but he whose heart is firm, and whose conscience approves his conduct, will pursue his principles unto death.” (Thomas Paine, 1776) |
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MrJapan
PO1
Joined: 27 Sep 2004
Posts: 465
Location: Chiba, Japan
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| Posted: Tue Aug 16, 2005 12:10 pm Post subject: |
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| Will this get the press it needs though? |
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shawa
CNO
Joined: 03 Sep 2004
Posts: 2004
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| Posted: Wed Aug 17, 2005 2:49 am Post subject: |
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Looks like it's getting press coverage. Is the 'Anonymous' post above from the Intel Dump the source for this Washington Times Story??
From anon:
| Quote: | First - yes - The lawyers involved in this (and similar projects) did interpret the 9-11 terrorists as "US persons" - so while you can second guess them all you want - but that was their "legal" call as wrong as it was and is. Unfortunately, the chain of command at SOCOM went along with them (and this, I expect, will be a topic that will become more clear in the near future).
And lawyers of the era also felt that any intelligence officer viewing open internet information for the purpose of intelligence collection automatically required that any "open source" information obtained be treated as if it was "intelligence information"...does this sound like idiocy to you? It did to me - and we fought it - and I was in meetings at the OSD level, with OSD laywers, that debated this - and I even briefed the DCI George Tenet on this issue relating to an internet project.
And yes, Virgina - we tried to tell the lawyers that since the data identified Atta and the others as linked to Al Qaeda, we should be able to collect on them based on SecState Albright's declaration of Al Qaeda as transnational terrorist threat to the US...well the lawyers did not agree...go figure...so we could not collect on them - and for political reasons - could not pass them to the FBI...I know because I brokered three meetings between the FBI and SOCOM to allow SOCOM to pass the informaton to the FBI. And, sadly, SOCOM cancelled them every time... |
Statements seem to match up.
Like I said earlier, SOMEONE'S LYING, and I'll take the word of the soldier over the CYA politicians!!
http://insider.washingtontimes.com/articles/normal.php?StoryID=20050815-115920-6161r
| Quote: | Fears of backlash kept pre-9/11 data from FBI
By Audrey Hudson
THE WASHINGTON TIMES
August 16, 2005
Pentagon lawyers, fearing a public-relations "blow back," blocked a military intelligence unit from sharing information with the FBI that four suspected al Qaeda terrorists were in the country prior to the September 11 attacks, after determining they were here legally, a former Defense Department intelligence official says.
Members of an intelligence unit known as Able Danger were shut out of the September 11 commission investigation and final report, the official said, despite briefing commission staff members on two occasions about the Mohamed Atta-led terrorist cell and telling them of a lockdown of information between the Defense Department and the FBI.
The intelligence official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, said Pentagon lawyers "were afraid of a blow back" -- similar to the public's response to the FBI-led assault on the Branch Davidian compound in Waco, Texas, which left more than 70 people dead -- and decided to withhold the information from the FBI.
The official said the decision was made at the Army's Special Operations Command (SoCom) headquarters in Tampa, Fla.,which concluded that Atta, the ringleader of the September 11 hijackers, and the others were in the country legally and thus had the same legal protections as U.S. citizens.
"If something went wrong, SoCom felt it could get blamed," the official said.
But Pentagon officials have said they have uncovered no specific intelligence data from the Able Danger unit concerning an Atta-led terrorist cell, other than a few intelligence analyses that mention his name, and September 11 commission Chairman Thomas H. Kean and Vice Chairman Lee H. Hamilton disputed the source of the information.
Mr. Kean and Mr. Hamilton said in a joint statement that the military source of the accusation "could not describe what information had led to this supposed Atta identification" and that no other information placed three other September 11 hijackers with Atta in a purported terror cell.
Accusations that commission staffers were briefed on the Able Danger operation but ignored the information in the final report came from Rep. Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania Republican, who said potential political fallout was one reason he was given for the information not being turned over to the FBI.
" How could a top-secret operation against al Qaeda not be mentioned in the 9/11 document?" he said. "It's outrageous. It looks like someone at the staff level decided not to pursue that information."
The intelligence official said he tried to broker meetings between the FBI and the Special Operations Command to turn over information that Able Danger had uncovered, including that hijackers Marwan Al-Shehhi, Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhamzi were with Atta in the United States.
Able Danger was created in 1999 by SoCom to track al Qaeda cells worldwide.
The intelligence official said he was interviewed in October 2003 by members of the September 11 commission staff, including Executive Director Philip Zelikow, and sought to arrange a follow-up meeting that the staff had requested when he returned from Afghanistan in January 2004, but was rebuffed.
"They took good notes and scribbled the entire time I talked. Two staffers took four to five pages of notes each. Other members from Special Ops Command also were in attendance," he said, adding that he was "shocked" in January 2004 when the staff members told him, "We don't need to talk to you."
Mr. Weldon said he wants to know "who made the decision and why was it never mentioned in the final document. ... It would have changed the completion on the final 9/11 report."
• Jerry Seper contributed to this report. |
_________________
“I love the man that can smile in trouble, that can gather strength from distress, and grow brave by reflection. ‘Tis the business of little minds to shrink; but he whose heart is firm, and whose conscience approves his conduct, will pursue his principles unto death.” (Thomas Paine, 1776) |
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shawa
CNO
Joined: 03 Sep 2004
Posts: 2004
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| Posted: Wed Aug 17, 2005 7:21 am Post subject: |
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Lots more information provided in this interview. I'm really wondering if the Pentagon is doing the covering up. In his floor speech in 2002, (see previous post) Weldon describes the CHART of al Qaida members uncovered by Able Danger (including Atta and his cell) was presented to General Shelton a year before 9/11. The Able Danger officers say Atta's name was there, but the 9/11 Commission says there was no mention of Atta in any of the material they requested from the Pentagon.
| Quote: | August 16, 2005
Officer Says Pentagon Barred Sharing Pre-9/11 Qaeda Data With F.B.I.
By PHILIP SHENON
WASHINGTON, Aug. 16 - A military intelligence team repeatedly contacted the F.B.I. in 2000 to warn about the existence of an American-based terrorist cell that included the ringleader of the Sept. 11 attacks, according to a veteran Army intelligence officer who said he had now decided to risk his career by discussing the information publicly. The officer, Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer, said military lawyers later blocked the team from sharing any of its information with the F.B.I.
Colonel Shaffer said in an interview that the small, highly classified intelligence program known as Able Danger had identified by name the terrorist ringleader, Mohammed Atta, as well three of the other future hijackers by mid-2000, and had tried to arrange a meeting that summer with agents of the F.B.I.'s Washington field office to share the information.
But he said military lawyers forced members of the intelligence program to cancel three scheduled meetings with the F.B.I. at the last minute, which left the bureau without information that Colonel Shaffer said might have led to Mr. Atta and the other terrorists while the Sept. 11 plot was still being planned.
"I was at the point of near insubordination over the fact that this was something important, that this was something that should have been pursued," Colonel Shaffer said of his efforts to get the evidence from the intelligence program to the F.B.I. in 2000 and early 2001.
He said he learned later that lawyers associated with the Defense Department's Special Operations Command had canceled the F.B.I. meetings because they feared controversy if Able Danger was portrayed as a military operation that had violated the privacy of civilians who were legally in the United States. "It was because of the chain of command saying we're not going to pass on information - if something goes wrong, we'll get blamed," he said.
The Defense Department did not dispute the account from Colonel Shaffer, a 42-year-old native of Kansas City, Mo., who is the first military officer associated with the so-called data-mining program to come forward and acknowledge his role.
At the same time, the department said in a statement that it was "working to gain more clarity on this issue" and that "it's too early to comment on findings related to the program identified as Able Danger." The F.B.I. referred calls about Colonel Shaffer to the Pentagon.
The account from Colonel Shaffer, a reservist who is also working part-time for the Pentagon, corroborates much of the information that the Sept. 11 commission has acknowledged that it received about Able Danger last July from a Navy captain who was also involved with the program but whose name has not been made public.
In a statement issued last week, the leaders of the Sept. 11 commission said the panel had concluded that the intelligence program "did not turn out to be historically significant." The statement said that while the commission did learn about Able Danger in 2003 and immediately requested Pentagon files about the program, none of the documents turned over by the Defense Department referred to Mr. Atta or any of the other hijackers.
Colonel Shaffer said that his role in Able Danger was as the program's liaison with the Defense Intelligence Agency in Washington, and that he was not an intelligence analyst. The interview with Colonel Shaffer on Monday night was arranged for The New York Times and Fox News by Representative Curt Weldon, the Pennsylvania Republican who is vice chairman of the House Armed Services Committee and a champion of data-mining programs like Able Danger.
Colonel Shaffer's lawyer, Mark Zaid, said in an interview that he was concerned that Colonel Shaffer was facing retaliation from the Defense Department - first for having talked to the Sept. 11 commission staff in October 2003 and now for talking with news organizations.
Mr. Zaid said that Colonel Shaffer's security clearance had been suspended last year because of what the lawyer said were a series of "petty allegations" involving $67 in personal charges on a military cellphone. He noted that despite the disciplinary action, Colonel Shaffer had been promoted this year from the rank of major.
Colonel Shaffer said he had decided to allow his name to be used in news accounts in part because of his frustration with the statement issued last week by the commission leaders, Thomas H. Kean and Lee H. Hamilton.
The commission said in its final report last year that American intelligence agencies had not identified Mr. Atta as a terrorist before Sept. 11, 2001, when he flew an American Airlines jet into one of towers of the World Trade Center in New York.
A commission spokesman did not return repeated phone calls for comment. A Democratic member of the commission, Richard Ben Veniste, the former Watergate prosecutor, said in an interview today that while he could not judge the credibility of the information from Colonel Shaffer and others, the Pentagon needed to "provide a clear and comprehensive explanation regarding what information it had in its possession regarding Mr. Atta."
"And if these assertions are credible," he continued, "the Pentagon would need to explain why it was that the 9/11 commissioners were not provided this information despite request for all information regarding to Able Danger."
Colonel Shaffer said that he had provided information about Able Danger and its identification of Mr. Atta in a private meeting in October 2003 with members of the Sept. 11 commission staff when they visited Afghanistan, where he was then serving. Commission members have disputed that, saying they do not recall hearing Mr. Atta's name during the briefing and that the terrorist's name did not appear in documents about Able Danger that were later turned over by the Pentagon.
"I would implore the 9/11 commission to support a follow-on investigation to ascertain what the real truth is," Colonel Shaffer said in the interview this week. "I do believe the 9/11 commission should have done that job: figuring out what went wrong with Able Danger."
"This was a good news story because, before 9/11, you had an element of the military - our unit - which was actually out looking for Al Qaeda," he continued. "I can't believe the 9/11 commission would somehow believe that the historical value was not relevant."
Colonel Shaffer said that because he was not an intelligence analyst, he was not involved in the details of the procedures used in Able Danger to glean information from terrorist databases. Nor was he aware, he said, which databases had supplied the information that might have led to the name of Mr. Atta or other terrorists so long before the Sept. 11 attacks.
But he said he did know that Able Danger had made use of publicly available information from government immigration agencies, from internet sites and from paid search engines such as Lexis Nexis.
"We didn't that Atta's name was significant" at the time, he said, adding that "we just knew there were these linkages between him and these other individuals who were in this loose configuration" of people who appeared to be tied to an American-based cell of Al Qaeda.
Colonel Shaffer said he assumed that by speaking out publicly this week about Able Danger, he might effectively be ending his military career and limiting his ability to participate in intelligence work in the government. "I'm proud of my operational record and I love what I do," he said. "But there comes a time - and I believe the time for me is now -- to stand for something, to stand for what is right." |
New York Times
_________________
“I love the man that can smile in trouble, that can gather strength from distress, and grow brave by reflection. ‘Tis the business of little minds to shrink; but he whose heart is firm, and whose conscience approves his conduct, will pursue his principles unto death.” (Thomas Paine, 1776) |
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BuffaloJack
Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy
Joined: 10 Aug 2004
Posts: 1637
Location: Buffalo, New York
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| Posted: Wed Aug 17, 2005 4:52 pm Post subject: |
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http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/08/17/terror/main781949.shtml
The link above will take you to a CBS article concerning Able Danger. Once there you can click on the link to the video and watch Lt Col Shaffer's interview.
Yeah, I know it's CBS and how can you believe anything they say, but the video statement by Lt Col Shaffer is in his own words without any means of CBS changing it to fit their own agendas.
_________________
Swift Boats - Qui Nhon (12/69-4/70), Cat Lo (4/70-5/70), Vung Tau (5/70-12/71) |
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