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Reconstruction Time Line of 13 March 1969 incident
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NavyChief
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Joined: 12 Aug 2004
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Location: Boise, Idaho

PostPosted: Thu Sep 30, 2004 7:02 am    Post subject: Reconstruction Time Line of 13 March 1969 incident Reply with quote

Here's something I put together yesterday. This may be helpful for many with questions about 13 March 1969:

TIME LINE


13 Mar 1969

1500-1530

Mine explodes under PCF-3 and lifts it approximately 3-6 feet out of the water. A huge flash and boom followed by the boat covered in a large fountain of water and debris. PCF-23, PCF-43, and PCF-51 unleash all guns into sides of the river banks for approximately 45 seconds. PCF-3 wanders aimlessly downstream. PCF-94 leaves other PCF's while moving down river at high speed.

1500-1530

PCF-51: LTjg Thurlow immediately goes to aid PCF-3, leaping aboard and assessing condition of the wounded. He begins to render first aid to the crew. All seven crew members are injured (including two in water). Many of them are in shock and the boat is still out of control. PCF-51 backs off and provides cover fire. Thurlow tries to shut down engine. Main helm is inoperable. Thurlow moves to assist forward gunner and PCF-3 strikes a sandbar, throwing Thurlow from the boat. PCF-51 moves forward and retrieves Thurlow. Once aboard, he radios for MEDEVAC and Damage Control Team from USS WASHTENAW COUNTY (LST-1166). Thurlow returns to PCF-3 and once again administers first aid to the wounded crew members. After making the wounded comfortable, he again starts damage control procedures to save the boat from sinking. Thurlow and a couple of the recovered crew members manage to keep the boat's flooding under control until PCF-94 arrives to attach a line to PCF-3 and pull it off the sandbar.

{edited} Breaking it down further into Chief's notes:

(1) 45 - 120 secs after mine detonates under PCF-3, PCF-51 takes evasive manuevers and all gunners open fire on river banks in anticipation of heavy ambush
(2) 30 - 60 secs to get to PCF-3 and jump aboard
(3) 80 - 300 secs to assess condition of 5 crew members (two were thrown overboard), and begin applying first aid to wounded
(4) 10 - 30 secs to try and shut down engines from pilot house or secondary helm position
(5) 10 - 60 secs to move to forward gunner and begin first aid
(6) 30 - 120 secs PCF-3 strikes sandbar and Thurlow is thrown from boat. Tries to recover and PCF-51 sees Thurlow in the water and comes forward to save him. Boat pulls up and gets ahold of Thurlow and pulls him into the boat.
(7) 30 - 120 secs Thurlow radios for MEDEVAC, gives situation report, describes condition of wounded crewmembers, requests Damage Control Team, giving coordinates of where all this is happening.
[8] 50 - 300 secs returns to PCF-3, administering first aid again. Makes the wounded comfortable as possible and goes below to assess damage to boat. Sees 5 inch crack in hull and a host of other problems that endanger the boat's survivability. Begins damage control procedures to save the boat.
(9) PCF-94 returns to pick up Rassmann and immediately goes to PCF-3 to assist.

Using extremely conservative times in my above, this would equate to between: 3 mins 45 secs to 18.5 minutes before Kerry shows up.


1500-1630

PCF-23: Approximately 30 yards behind PCF-3 when hit by mine. Brings boat back full and veers to the right. PCF-23 unleashes firepower into the river banks. Observes PCF-3 wandering aimlessly downriver but spots two wounded Sailors from PCF-3 in the water. PCF-23 begins rescue operations of two wounded Sailors. Once wounded aboard, PCF-23 moves down river to assist PCF-3. Spots Rassmann in the water and moves towards him to pull him out. PCF-94 returns and picks up Rassmann first. PCF-23 pulls alongside other swift boats and puts two wounded Sailors on PCF-43 for MEDEVAC. Both PCF- 23 and PCF-43 begin exiting river when PCF-23 meets Damage Control Team on LCVP coming from USS WASHTENAW COUNTY. PCF-23 transfers Damage Control Team and P-250 Pump (used to pump out water) aboard and goes back into river where PCF-94 has pulled PCF-3 off sandbar and in process of towing her out of the river.

1500-1630

PCF-94: Moving to the right side of river to pass fishing weir when mine detonated under PCF-3. PCF-94 observed heavy black smoke and all boats under fire from automatic weapons and small arms fire from both banks. PCF-94 observes firing at boats for about 5000 meters (3.1 miles). Additionally two other mines observed by PCF-94. PCF-94 eyewitness observes, "almost simultaneously, another mine detonating close aboard PCF-94 wounding Kerry in the right arm and knocking 1LT Rassmann into the water. PCF-51 immediately goes to PCF-3 while PCF-94 provides cover fire. Shortly after Kerry is informed of man overboard, he turns his boat around to assist Rassmann, who was at this time receiving sniper fire from the river banks. Kerry pulls Rassmann onto boat while gunners provide suppressing fire. Kerry then directs his boat to PCF-3 and attaches a line to pull it off the sandbar". PCF-94 readies PCF-3 for towing operation out of river.

1500-1630

PCF-43: PCF-43 moves in behind PCF-94 to clear fishing weir when mine detonates under PCF-3. PCF-43 unleashes firepower into the river banks. Eventually pulls alongside PCF-3 and transfers wounded aboard for MEDEVAC. Exits river with PCF-23 escorting and heads towards USS WASHTENAW COUNTY.

1700

PCF-3 (under tow), PCF-23, PCF-51 and PCF-94 (towing) exit SONG BAY HAP RIVER mouth. Once in the Thailand Bay, LTjg Kerry, dead NUNG soldier, and MSF advisor cross-deck to PCF-23, after exiting river.


1630-1800

PCF-43 takes wounded PCF-3 crew to USCGC SPENCER for medical treatment.

1700-1800

PCF-23 arrives at USS WASHTENAW COUNTY and drops off dead NUNG soldier and MSF advisor(s) and takes Kerry to USCGC SPENCER for medical treatment.

1800

PCF-3 (under tow), PCF-51 and PCF-94 arrive at USS WASHTENAW COUNTY (LST-1166). End of Market Time mission time.

1800-1900

PCF-23 arrives at USCGC SPENCER to drop off Kerry for medical treatment.

1800-2200

USCGC SPENCER ceases Market Time Patrol duties and conducts four hours of medical services for PCF-3 crew members and Kerry.

1830-2100

PCF-51 OINC, LTjg Thurlow as CTE 194.5.4.4 and OTC of mission, makes report to An Thoi, CDR Lonsdale via voice/radio; exhausted goes to his rack to sleep.

1900-?

LTjg Kerry's medical record is annotated as, "13 March 1969, 1900 hours, United States Coast Guard Cutter Spencer. "John Kerry, LTJG, USNR-In firefight approx 3 hours ago, pt was a) thrown against bulkhead sustaining injury (contusion) to R forearm. b) sustained small piece of shrapnel in L upper buttock." Kerry's current doctor noted that, "his exam at that time revealed localized bruising of his right medial forearm and of his buttock from the shrapnel with some localized bruising. An x-ray of his forearm did not reveal evidence of fracture. He was treated with a tetanus shot, topical dressing (butt wound) and an ace bandage and advised to apply warm soaks to his right forearm.

1900-2100

PCF-23 returns to USS WASHTENAW COUNTY. LTjg Chenoweth goes to his rack to sleep.

1900-2300

PCF-94 departs USS WASHTENAW COUNTY and arrives at USCGC SPENCER.

2200-2400

PCF-43 returns wounded to USS WASHTENAW COUNTY (LST-1166) for MEDEVAC to unknown hospital(s). USCGC SPENCER unable to conduct MEDEVAC due to lack of landing pad for helicopters.

2300-2310

PCF-3 crew members' casualty reports are sent from USCGC SPENCER to USS KRISHNA [ARL-38], An Thoi [ZYO RHMCSAA]. USS KRISHNA sends further to SECNAV office and other addressees, utilizing Cam Ranh Bay Coastal Squadron One message circuit: RHMCSAA. LTjg Kerry's Casualty Report does not go out with the rest of the wounded.

2320

TE 194.5.4.4/1 sends 13 March 1969 Market Time Spot Report from USCGC SPENCER to CTG 115.4 (CDR Lonsdale, An Thoi) via the Philippines/Thailand Strategic message circuit: RUMFSBB (Coast Guard Squadron Three Headquarters, Subic Bay message circuit). Spot Reports are normally sent by the CTE/OTC, this one was not. Boat designator 1 of Task Element drafted and sent this report - LTjg Kerry.

2330-?

LTjg Kerry goes to his rack and goes to sleep.


14 MARCH 1969

0600-0800

Non-MEDEVAC crew members of PCF-3 (under tow), crew members of PCF-51 and PCF-93 (LTjg Chenoweth and crew's normal boat. They had to use PCF-23 the previous day due to problems with PCF-93), eat breakfast and prepare return trip to An Thoi.

0800

PCF-51 (attaches tow lines to PCF-3) and PCF-93 (on one engine) depart USS WASHTENAW COUNTY (LST-1166) en route An Thoi base.

0800-1000

PCF-94 departs USCGC SPENCER.

0800-1030

PCF-3, PCF-51 and PCF-93 returning to An Thoi base. PCF-93 loses steering and must continue on independently. Arrives in An Thoi at 1725 and is placed on skids for examination and repairs at 1805.

1100-1400

PCF-94 arrives at An Thoi base, Coastal Division 11. Placed on skids for examination and repairs.

1300-1600

PCF-3 and PCF-51 arrive at An Thoi base, Coastal Division 11.

1530

LTjg Kerry's Casualty Report is sent from Naval Support Activity, An Thoi to SECNAV office and other addressees, via the Central South Pacific strategic message circuit: RUHGSAA. First mention of mine exploding close aboard PCF-94 and wounding Kerry in the butt with shrapnel.

1725

PCF-93 arrives at An Thoi base, Coastal Division 11.

2055

Boat Casualty Report for PCF-94 is sent by USS KRISHNA [ZYO RHMCSAA]to CTF 115 and other addressees, utilizing Cam Ranh Bay Coastal Squadron One message circuit: RHMCSAA. Boat is deemed not fit for Market Time Surveillance and estimated time to repair is four days.

2100

Boat Casualty Report for PCF-51 is sent by USS KRISHNA [ZYO RHMCSAA]to CTF 115 and other addressees, utilizing Cam Ranh Bay Coastal Squadron One message circuit: RHMCSAA. Boat is deemed not fit for Market Time Surveillance and estimated time to repair is two days.

2350

Commander Coastal Division 11 (LCDR Elliott), An Thoi sends first status message regarding damage to PCF-3. Report not yet available.

15 MAR 1969

1230

LCDR Elliott drafts PCF-3 Situational Casualty Report and it is sent from USS KRISHNA, utilizing Cam Ranh Bay Coastal Squadron One message circuit.

16 MAR 1969

Kerry flies to Cam Ranh Bay from An Thoi.

17 MAR 1969

Kerry requests transfer out of Vietnam via CDR Horne, Commanding Officer Coastal Squadron One.

Kerry's 3rd Purple Heart is approved by Naval Support Activity, Saigon.

Kerry is placed on Staff duty with Coastal Squadron One, pending orders to stateside.

23 MAR 1969

LCDR Elliott signs Bronze Star recommendations for LTjg Kerry, LTjg Thurlow and RD1 Lambert. George Elliott has stated for the record that he included the language of all boats being under fire in all of the recommendations based on Kerry's After-Action Report.

1 APR 1969

LTjg Kerry is detached from Coastal Squadron One, Cam Ranh Bay and leaves Vietnam for Admiral's aide in Broklyn NY.


Last edited by NavyChief on Fri Oct 01, 2004 3:37 am; edited 5 times in total
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ncoic6
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PostPosted: Thu Sep 30, 2004 12:15 pm    Post subject: Reply with quote

Chief:

That is a useful timeline. Each element must have documentation behind it, if available.

The timeline makes some asertions:

1.) Can we conclusively show from the documents that Thurlow was CTE 194.5.4.4 and OTC of the mission?

2.) How do we know that Thurlow reported to An Thoi, after mission, via/voice radio?

and raises some questions:

1.) since PCF 3 hit the mine, did that, in and of itself, require an AAR, by the TE of PCF3 or a surrogate?

2.) why would the VC/NVA mine one open end of the weir, but not the other?

3.) When PCF 23 went for Rassmann was it heading downstream, was PCF 94 heading upstream?

4.) Why didn't Chenoweth et al get a bronze star for pulling PCF3 crewmen out of the water? (if everyone was under fire)
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RiflemanDD730
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PostPosted: Thu Sep 30, 2004 3:24 pm    Post subject: Reply with quote

Chief, great job as usual.

Does the boat casualty report for PCF-94 (4 Days) tend to support Kerry's claim of a second mine?
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subsailor 2
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PostPosted: Thu Sep 30, 2004 5:12 pm    Post subject: PCF 94 damage Reply with quote

The damage was not caused by a mine. As a submarine officer I was a submarine weapons expert (torpedoes, missiles, etc.) and I now teach such topics as a faculty member at the Naval Postgraduate School. The bent and chipped screws are indicative of hitting an underwater object such as the downstream moorings for a fishing weir. Kerry probably cut to the left a little early as they passed the weir to port.
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subsailor 2
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PostPosted: Thu Sep 30, 2004 5:12 pm    Post subject: Reply with quote

To Navy Chief: BZ
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NavyChief
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PostPosted: Thu Sep 30, 2004 5:19 pm    Post subject: Reply with quote

ncoic6 wrote:
Chief:

That is a useful timeline. Each element must have documentation behind it, if available.


Documentation available are:

(1) Diaries (excerpts)
(2) 131620Z MAR 69 SPOT REPORT
(3) 13-14 MAR 69 PERSONNEL CASUALTY REPORTS
(4) 14-15 MAR 69 BOAT CASUALTY REPORTS (PCF 3, 51, 94)
(5) 13 Mar 69 CTF 115.4 Daily Summary
(6) 13 Mar 69 CTF 115 JIFFY OPREP/Naval Surface Operations
(7) 01 Jan 69 CTF 115.4 OPORD 101-69
[8] COMNAVFORV JAN, FEB, MAR Summaries
(9) Awards recommendations
(10) Awards citations

Quote:
The timeline makes some asertions:

1.) Can we conclusively show from the documents that Thurlow was CTE 194.5.4.4 and OTC of the mission?


(1) Thurlow was the senior PCF OINC for this mission.
(2) Thurlow states he was the OTC, thus CTE
(3) Thurlow states he planned the operation

Quote:
2.) How do we know that Thurlow reported to An Thoi, after mission, via/voice radio?


(1) Thurlow states he made a verbal report. Since An Thoi was more than 160 Kilometers away, I assume he didn't stand on the deck of the LST and try to shout his report. Cool

(2) Operational order required a report to CDR Lonsdale (Commander, 4th Coastal Zone) -- all naval vessels operating in IV Zone were subject to CDR Lonsdale's operational authority.

Quote:
and raises some questions:

1.) since PCF 3 hit the mine, did that, in and of itself, require an AAR, by the TE of PCF3 or a surrogate?


(1) Mines sighted or detonating required a SPOT REPORT at a minimum.

Quote:
2.) why would the VC/NVA mine one open end of the weir, but not the other?


(1) PCF-23 (LTjg Chenoweth) had just passed through the area approximately 3 hours earlier and was sitting at the mouth of the RACH DONG CUNG Canal -- about 2 1/2 kms away. Chances are the VC were trying to not alert him and were able to mine the closest fishing post. Other mines may have been placed but did not go off, or simply weren't there. Only one VC was spotted in the area and captured -- no signs of others. There may have been a small contingent of VC involved in this operation but they bugged out. An ambush of the magnitude described by Kerry's AAR would have required at a minimum a Battalion of VC in the DELTA. This NEVER happened!

(2) As to the motivation of the VC's action? No clue.

Quote:
3.) When PCF 23 went for Rassmann was it heading downstream, was PCF 94 heading upstream?


(1) PCF-23 was heading down river at the time it spotted Rassmann.

(2) PCF-94 was returning up river from it's high speed run downriver.

Quote:
4.) Why didn't Chenoweth et al get a bronze star for pulling PCF3 crewmen out of the water? (if everyone was under fire)
[/quote]

(1) That's the point. They weren't under fire. Kerry's AAR was pushed upon LCDR Elliot that something heroic happened on that mission that required medals. The problem is, Thurlow's actions were certainly heroic -- Kerry's were cowardice. But Thurlow didn't write the history for the mission - Kerry did.

- Chief
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NavyChief
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PostPosted: Thu Sep 30, 2004 5:22 pm    Post subject: Reply with quote

RiflemanDD730 wrote:
Chief, great job as usual.

Does the boat casualty report for PCF-94 (4 Days) tend to support Kerry's claim of a second mine?


It could, except that PCF-94 was involved in an ambush on 12 Mar 69. Two out of three mines were detonated in close proximity to PCF-51, PCF-23, and PCF-94 on that mission. LTjg Rood (PCF-23) was wounded with shrapnel in his eye. Additionally, the boats took B-40 rocket rounds and Automatic weapons fire. This is where PCF-51 was hit by three .30 cal bullets.

Additionally, Kerry wrote in his diary that water was splashing into the pilothouse on the morning of 13 March 69 from a blown out window from the 12 Mar ambush.

- Chief
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ncoic6
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PostPosted: Thu Sep 30, 2004 6:25 pm    Post subject: Reply with quote

Chief:

You make a tight case.
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Hondo
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PostPosted: Thu Sep 30, 2004 6:37 pm    Post subject: Reply with quote

Wondered what the map work was leading to - or more to come, perhaps?

Well done, Chief!
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DADESID
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PostPosted: Thu Sep 30, 2004 9:03 pm    Post subject: Reply with quote

Chief,

A minor point, but I think the 2320, 13 March entry should read "Coast Guard Squadron THREE", and not "....Squadron ONE."

CGC Spencer was a Squadron Three cutter, and that Squadron's Admin Commmander was in Subic.

I could be wrong about how the Comms were serviced, but I'd be surprised if Squadron One's Comms were serviced through Subic.
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NavyChief
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PostPosted: Thu Sep 30, 2004 10:59 pm    Post subject: Reply with quote

DADESID wrote:
Chief,

A minor point, but I think the 2320, 13 March entry should read "Coast Guard Squadron THREE", and not "....Squadron ONE."

CGC Spencer was a Squadron Three cutter, and that Squadron's Admin Commmander was in Subic.

I could be wrong about how the Comms were serviced, but I'd be surprised if Squadron One's Comms were serviced through Subic.


Good catch. SPENCER was Coast Guard Squadron Three. The WPBs were Coast Guard Squadron One with a liaison office at Saigon, COMNAVFORV offices and the WHECs were Squadron Three. However, the Headquarters were still at Subic Bay, PI. On 1 October 1967, Commander, Task Unit (CTU) 70.8.6 (Squadron Three) consolidated with CTU 70.8.5 (Navy Escort Squadron). The new unit was designated CTU 70.8.5, commanded by the senior Coast Guard Officer, and given the additional duty as "Commander, Cruiser-Destroyer Group Seventh Fleet Representative, Subic. One of the more important support missions of Squadron Three was to provide supply logistic support to PCFs on patrol. They provided medical, refueling, ammunition, sleeping quarters, and message handling support.

This is what confused me before when I saw USS BRUSH (DD 745) using the RUMFSBB routing indicator. Now I know that USS BRUSH was part of the Cruiser-Destroyer Group Seventh Fleet, commanded by the same guy as in charge of Coast Guard Squadron Three. Of course, they would use the same circuit -- it was being routed through the same communications center in Subic.

R = Strategic Station
U = United States
M = Philippines/Thailand
F = Fleet Broadcast
SBB = designated routing indicator for specific units

Ref:
Quote:
U.S. Coast Guard Squadron Three. (Subic Bay, Philippines: Headquarters, U.S. Coast Guard Squadron Three, 1972(?)20 pp. illus


Ref:
Quote:
www.USCG.mil On 12 June 1965 Coast Guard Squadron One came under the authority of the Navy when it changed operational control to Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet (CINPACFLT). The Coast Guardsmen of Squadron One were given orientation and refresher training at Subic Bay Naval Base. While the cutters prepared for their voyage to Vietnam, Squadron One established a liaison office at the Headquarters of Chief, Naval Advisory Group in Saigon to help resolve any problems.


Ref:
Quote:
US Coast Guard Historical Monograph Program by PAO Division, USCGC Washington DC 1975:


- Chief
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DADESID
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PostPosted: Thu Sep 30, 2004 11:10 pm    Post subject: Reply with quote

Chief,

Wow...

You do have your stuff together.

Thanks for the lesson.
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Tom Poole
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PostPosted: Thu Sep 30, 2004 11:50 pm    Post subject: Reply with quote

Another great job chief. Just wanted you to know I'm still here.
NavyChief wrote:
...PCF-94 observes firing at boats for about 5000 meters (3.1 miles). Additionally two other mines observed by PCF-94. PCF-94 eyewitness observes, "almost simultaneously, another mine detonating close aboard PCF-94 wounding Kerry in the right arm and knocking 1LT Rassmann into the water. PCF-51 immediately goes to PCF-3 while PCF-94 provides cover fire....

To save my sanity, please tell me you included the quoted part to show how they may have seen some things but also how patently unbelievable their observations are to someone analyzing the whole picture.
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NavyChief
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PostPosted: Fri Oct 01, 2004 3:08 am    Post subject: Reply with quote

Tom Poole wrote:
Another great job chief. Just wanted you to know I'm still here.
NavyChief wrote:
...PCF-94 observes firing at boats for about 5000 meters (3.1 miles). Additionally two other mines observed by PCF-94. PCF-94 eyewitness observes, "almost simultaneously, another mine detonating close aboard PCF-94 wounding Kerry in the right arm and knocking 1LT Rassmann into the water. PCF-51 immediately goes to PCF-3 while PCF-94 provides cover fire....

To save my sanity, please tell me you included the quoted part to show how they may have seen some things but also how patently unbelievable their observations are to someone analyzing the whole picture.


I wanted to be fair to both sides of the arguement.

But, yes. I can see a major problem with the observations made by PCF-94. They don't jive with the other boats' recollections or the reconstructed, factual timeline.

Can you imagine how much time PCF-51 (Thurlow specifically) spent doing all the things he did before Kerry showed up?

Kinda makes Kerry's version of the story ridiculous in this light, doesn't it?

- Chief
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Navy_Navy_Navy
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PostPosted: Fri Oct 01, 2004 3:12 am    Post subject: Reply with quote

I'm no heavy-lifter, so I could be off-base, but I like having the 94's crew statements in there - they are stark in their contrast to what everyone else said.
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