SwiftVets.com

[sore loser]

[sore loser]

[sore loser]

[Paul]

“There has been discussion recently about the impact of the antiwar movement. Democrats suffer from the delusion that Kerry, etc. affected the U.S. conduct of the war which isn't true.” {jalexson}

It’s not a “delusion” at all that the antiwar movement, in the U.S. and around the world, had substantial effects upon the US conduct of the U.S. involvement in the undeclared war, or conflict if one prefers, in Vietnam, conducted 1961 through 1975 in addition to having substantial effects and consequences post-75 through to today.

In fact, it had direct, substantial and concrete affects upon the U.S. policies and thereby substantial effect upon U.S. policies, strategies and tactics at points-in-time over the course of the entire period. The affects differed in proportion and effectiveness (from the anti-war movement perspective) at differing times over the period of time 1961 through 1975, but it most certainly did effect the US conduct and efforts in Vietnam.

As to mention of the Democrats, then, in fact, from most of what I’ve seen, it’s precisely the affects upon U.S. policies, on our society and on the U.S. armed forces, that many in such as the Kerry campaign, and some others, not only Democrats, are now trying to downplay.

There’s nothing new about “anti-war pacificist" movements over the course of the 20th century. Hence the elements needed for the fundamental structure of the Vietnam anti-war movement within the United States being in place within the nation even prior to our involvement in Vietnam, it’s rapid organization in the early ‘60s following the sending of US troops beginning in 1961, it’s first rallies back as early as 1962, and its time-tested tactics that it immediately employed and that were further developed upon. Hence the current movement moving all the faster still today.

The anti-war movements between the two world wars most certainly exerted concrete affects on governmental policies, both in the United States and even more so in many European nations, many of them long-term right through to the present.

This is precisely why in the spring of 1964, while in the process of relieving General Harkins as commanding General of MACV (CG MACV 1962-64), and during Secretary of Defense McNamara’s visit to the Republic of Vietnam, General Westmoreland expressed his concern at the “staying power” of the United States given the US policy of containment and of stopping aggression:

"This is going to be a long, drawn-out war the way it's being fought. And getting resources in Washington is already like pulling teeth. The thing that is worrying me . . . is the staying power of the American public."

As he himself has documented, General Westmoreland repeated this concern about the staying power of the US population and the importance of it specifically to Secretary of Defense McNamara and President Johnson in 1967. He further pointed out his belief that north Vietnamese would continue their fierce determination regardless.

The General observed that an increasing proportion of the American population was becoming wearied by the ongoing war and the growth of the anti-war movement was already showing consequences on the morale and will of portions of the American civil population (even as early as 1967, prior to the overt order-of-magnitude burst in anti-war public activities that occurred around the world in 1968) and further warning that all combined with the policies imposed upon our armed forces in the conduct of the war, indicated a prolonged US involvement in Vietnam.

General Westmoreland pointed in particular to the substantial effects of the anti-war movements between the two world wars in the United States that he, like many from his generation who served in the US armed forces, military or naval forces, were personally and intimately familiar with the consequences of due to their effects on popular opinion and govenment policy.

Prior to the 1947 formation of the Department of Defense, creating the Department of the Air Force and placing it and the Departments of the Army and the Navy subservient to the single cabinet-level post, the US armed forces were organized under the two cabinet-level posts of the Department of War (over the US military forces of the army and army air corps) and the Navy Department (over the US naval forces of the navy and Marine Corps).

Examples of the pre-WWII impact in the form of what today we would refer to as “political correctness” due to the movements between the wars can be found in numerous examples in the Department of War.

The Navy Department back then was not as impacted. In the 1930s, the US Naval services provided its weapons systems labels based on more functionally descriptive basis and had for example, both fighters (for fighter aircraft) and tanks (from the WWI introduction and label given at the time).

In contrast, the War Department did not officially have fighter aircraft or tanks. Rather, our military services under the Department of War had Pursuit Aircraft (hence the old “P” designations of air corps and air force fighters – P-6, P-40 and so forth . . . ) and armored track-driven vehicles that mounted a gun. This was driven PR considerations to de-emphasize the offensive nature of some weapons systems recasting them in a more “defensive” sounding terminology.

[As an aside, it was not until Secretary of Defense McNamara and his "whiz kids" did away with the old systems and standardized the designations in 1962 that all of the branches of our Armed Forces began to use the same designation system for aircraft. In their virtually psychotic pre-occupation with “standardization” they even started out advocating standardizing the aircraft themselves. . . however, they did finally learn that the laws of physics DEMAND different designs between naval carrier-based planes and Air Force land-based planes. . . ].

However interesting, the 1930s War Dept "political correctness" is a rather trivial example relative to far more substantial examples of concrete affects upon American, and especially European governments and their armed forces, that resulted from the movements in the period between the two world wars, particularly where the effects on such as France and Great Britain are concerned and the bad consequences of those effects.

General Westmoreland pointed to the specific and sound example regarding the effects of the 1930s anti-war pacifist movements of the near-defeat in the US Congress in the enacting of a national peace-time conscription at a time when the United States government was building our armed forces in response to the deteriorating situation around the world in the late 1930s; an act that passed in our Congress by only one vote. An example he includes in his memoirs as well.

More directly pertinent to the ultimate effect upon US involvement in Vietnam due to the concrete affects of such as the anti-war movement (domestic and international), is General Westmoreland’s statement that:

“Indeed, the US was defeated psychologically and hence politically on our home front and diplomatically by a clever enemy. The US was not defeated on the military battlefield.”

I'm only quoting General Westmoreland so frequently here because his name was used to justify an extremely questionable premise that. In the reference to his statements about the period between the two world wars, then I further believe that his observations were, and remain, sound and are easily defended.

At any rate, this is not a new lesson. Vietnam Veterans are not the first to have experienced it or for those who have learned from the experience, the first to address it either. Between the two World Wars numerous WWI Veterans in Europe were protesting the bad affects that the anti-war movements were exerting upon national policies, particularly in western European nations. Among the "tools" of the movements, the anti-war novel pushed aggressively by the anti-war pacifist movements of the time, "All Quiet On the Western Front," was particularly objected against by numerous WWI Veterans who pointed out publicly that it was nothing more substantial than the distorted false propaganda anti-war rag that it truly is, as they warned of it's demoralizing impact upon young readers. Something to ponder given that it's now pretty much required reading in our own country, at least high school level and above.
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Paul

[sore loser]

[sore loser]

[Paul]

“What the movement did, according to one of its leaders David Horowitz, was encourage the North Vietnamese to keep fighting even though they had no chance to win as long as the U.S. was involved.” {jalexson}

Hi Jalexson:

Truth to tell, beyond obviously disagreeing about lack of effect upon US conduct of the war in Vietnam, and upon a great deal else through to today, and with no intention at all to be derogatory, but what was written in this post makes no sense. Most obviously, if the anti-war pacifist movements affect upon the US conduct of the war is a "delusion", as claimed, then how in the world can one who makes this claim at the same time, in the same post, claim that they had the effect of prolonging the war?


Anyway, this statement at the top above is probably a key statement to the entire post. However, it’s an extremely ambiguous statement, particularly in the context of the statement that “There has been discussion recently about the impact of the antiwar movement. Democrats suffer from the delusion that Kerry, etc. affected the U.S. conduct of the war which isn't true.”

The self-serving rationalization of former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara made in 1995 is in no way impressive (rather the opposite—it is shameful). The same is true of countless others made by former government officials, back then and since, and is equally true of those such as David Horowitz, Jane Fonda, and John Kerry, among plenty of others from the Vietnam anti-war pacifist movements who went on to achieve fame and success as 'rank capitalists;. . .

Most certainly, the self-contradictory claims fail to serve to shed any useful insights upon the US involvement in Vietnam, especially 1961 through 1975, and upon US policies since. Mostly they only serve to continue to obscure a great deal, I believe, even if unintentionally on the parts of some of them.

At any rate, what in the world does the statement “What the movement did . . . was encourage the North Vietnamese to keep fighting even though they had no chance to win as long as the U.S. was involved” mean as presented here?

Since the statement is ambiguous, but the polemic regarding the supposed four separate wars, quite inaccurate, is not, and since this post contains highly questionable hypotheses and false implications (which, as is only fair after this kind of statement, I will address in follow on posts), particularly regarding the affects of the anti-war movements, then allow me to ask plainly:

Is it seriously meant to be implied or suggested here that the only affect due to the Vietnam anti-war pacifist (awp) movements was to serve as some kind of “cheer leaders” for individual Vietnamese peasants and north Vietnamese leaders involved the Soviet-backed, Soviet-PRC supplied North Vietnamese offensive against the RVN begun in the 1950s (prior to the introduction of the involvement of US combat forces on the ground beginning in 1961), during the time that US forces were fighting in Vietnam, in short, mere “moral support”?

If so, then:

Is it meant to be implied or suggested that the Soviet-backed, Soviet-PRC supplied, North Vietnamese effort during the American involvement in Vietnam was somehow dependant upon this mere “moral support”

If so, then this quite substantially trivializes the subversive role of the anti-war pacifist movements during the Vietnam conflict.

Further:

Is it seriously meant to be implied or suggested that the effects of the awp movement’s ceased following the withdrawal of US ground forces from south Vietnam in 1972 and following the cease fire obtained in the ’73 Paris Accords?

If so, then what of it if then young Mr. Kerry met with the north Vietnamese delegates in Paris?

Is it seriously meant to be implied or suggested that the effects of the awp movement’s die not extend beyond the 1973 Paris Accords?

If so,

Is it seriously meant to be implied or suggested that the awp movement had no effect whatsoever upon the US Congress passing the 1974 Case-Church Amendment to the FY 74 appropriations act that prohibited any funding "to finance directly or indirectly combat activities by US military forces in or over or from off the shore of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia?”

Is it seriously meant to be implied or suggested that the awp movement had no effect upon the failure of the United States of America to even raise a public protest, never mind a national response, when the Soviet-backed North Vietnamese Government began its small test violations of the cease fire established in the 1973 Paris Accords with the Soviet-PRC rebuilt conventional forces that were then used in the final gross violation of that cease fire in the April 1975 North Vietnamese Offensive that overran and conquered the RVN, thereby winning the war?

Is it seriously meant to be implied or suggested that the awp movements had no effect upon the post-75 US as the Communist Vietnamese armed forces waged their subsequent offensives that conquered Laos?

Is it seriously meant to be implied or suggested that the awp movements had no effect upon the post-75 US as the PRC-Backed Kmer Rouge waged their subsequent offensives and conquered of Cambodia?

Is it seriously meant to be implied or suggested that the awp movements had no effect upon the post-75 US as the Soviet-backed Vietnamese armed forces invaded PRC-Backed Cambodia?

Is it seriously meant to be implied or suggested that the awp movements had no effect upon the post-75 US policies toward the Vietnamese and Laotians citizens fleeing their nations in the post-Commnist Vietnamese conquest of these nations and the first of any such Diasporas in their long histories, not even forming an official policy of any kind until 1979?

Is it seriously meant to be implied or suggested that the awp movements had no effect upon the initial, and for years weak to the point of insignificant, post-75 US silence regarding "Re-education camps" in Vietnam, "Seminars" in Laos and genocide in Cambodia?

Is it seriously meant to be implied or suggested that the awp movements had no effect upon formal post-75 US government postions on and policies toward Communist governed Vietnam, right through to the present day?

If none of this is meant to be implied or suggested, then precisely what is meant by the statement:

“What the movement did, according to one of its leaders David Horowitz, was encourage the North Vietnamese to keep fighting even though they had no chance to win as long as the U.S. was involved.” {jalexson}

Especially within the context of the "4 wars" polemic at the start of this string and the additional statement of “There has been discussion recently about the impact of the antiwar movement. Democrats suffer from the delusion that Kerry, etc. affected the U.S. conduct of the war which isn't true.”{jalexson} in this post?

Frankly, if any of what is being asked about above is meant to be implied or suggested, then quite frankly, not only would I strongly point out that it is wrong, but, worse, in effect, this would all be only another variation on the same theme of the nonsense claimed by many former members of the anti-war movements themselves, including Senator Kerry, of their activities constituting only disagreeing with or questioning of US national policy but not contributing to active subversion of the US efforts in southeast Asia. The old false propaganda, or “useful idiot” belief, that their versions are used to rationalize their activities as having constituted the true “service” to our nation.

Another Bad Affect of, with effects due to, the awp movements.
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Paul

[Paul]

“Westmoreland accurately predicted in November, 1967, on Meet The Press that the U.S. would likely begin turning the war over to the ARVN's within two years and begin withdrawing troops, which is what happened.” {jalexson}

Actually, General Westmoreland “predicted” nothing such as the US’ “likely begin turning the war over to the ARVN's within two years and begin withdrawing troops.”

Most certainly, General Westmoreland in no way predicted in 1967 the details of the US policy change that would occur via the “Vietnamization” policy first stated publicly about two years later by President Nixon in November 1969, nor could he possibly have been able to predict it in 1967. And the implementation of the policy of Vietnamization as called for by President Nixon is in actuality “what happened” 1969 through 1972.

Further, and this also address the inaccuracy of the claim of a total withdrawal of US support or involvement as a result of the cease fire obtained via the 1973 Paris Accords made in the original "4 wars" post. Most certainly General Westmoreland "predicted" nothing of the kind found in the "4 wars" polemic nor did he EVER advocate anything of the kind, either in 1967, or since.

As early as 1967, General Westmoreland did personally advocate the turning of the war effort over to the government of the RVN.

At the same time, then and ever since, including post-75, General Westmoreland has always rightly pointed out that turning the primary responsibility for the war effort over to the government of the Republic of Vietnam would not have meant a complete withdrawal of all U.S. military and economic support to the RVN which would only result in their unavoidable defeat by the Soviet-backed, Soviet-PRC supplied and armed North Vietnamese government and its armed forces.

To the contrary, then and since he has consistently pointed out that U.S. support of the RVN, economic and limited military (even if limited to necessary periodic air support and the basing of such as Division size US combat forces in the region, such as in Okinawa, as concrete support and viable deterrent to Communist aggression against the RVN) would have been required by the US for the RVN to successfully maintain it’s existence and assume the role of conducting the primary role in the war effort primary resisting the Soviet-backed, Soviet-PRC supplied North Vietnamese offensive against the RVN that had been waged steadily by north Vietnam since the 1950s.

General Westmoreland most certainly never predicted in 1967, nor EVER even remotely advocated the kind of abandonment of the RVN by the United States in the years following the 1973 cease fire obtained in the 1973 Paris Accords, either the 1974 Congressional mandated decrease in economic aid or the failure of the US to respond at all to the north Vietnamese violation of the '73 cease fire.

Just the same, I've seen some very bad caricatures in articles and editorials being circulated about this period of US involvement in Vietnam, particularly beginning about 2002 (by various individuals, some currently serving in our own armed forces and numerous among the so-called “neo-conservatives” or various of their supporters), in which it’s stated that General Westmoreland had either failed to recognize, or at least failed to ever advocate, the need to build up the armed forces of the Republic of Vietnam during his service as commanding General of MACV (1964 through 1968) and claiming that the need was supposedly first recognized and later “corrected” by his successor as Commanding General of MACV, General Abrams (CG MACV 68-72).

So, I’m glad to at least see it being pointed out that General Westmoreland most certainly did advocate building up the armed forces of the Republic of Vietnam and turning the primary war effort over to the Government and armed forces of the Republic of Vietnam.

At any rate, General Westmoreland’s account of what he advocated while serving as commanding General of MACV in ’67 and then later advocated (and how) in 1969 after his 1968 advancement to Chief of Staff following the assuming of CG MACV by General Abrams in 1968, is I believe much better stated so as to give a clearer picture than is this statement:

“In November of 1967, I had urged the Johnson Administration to plan on turning the war over to the Vietnamese and put money and effort in the preparing for that. I briefed the President, Secretary McNamara and the Congressional Armed Services Committee on the concept without success and discussed it in a talk I made at the National Press Club.

After Mr. Nixon was elected and before taking office, I called several times on President Eisenhower at Walter Reed hospital. On one occasion he asked me if I had any advice that he could pass on to Mr. Nixon. My response was ‘yes’ and I gave him a copy of my talk to the National Press Club in November of 1967. ‘Ike’ thought well of my concept and said he was going to give a copy of the speech to the President elect. I must assume that he did.”
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Paul

[Paul]

“Had it not been for Kerry and friends, the U.S. involvement in Vietnam would have ended much earlier. The final outcome might have still been the same because of weaknesses in the South Vietnamese military leadership and the likelihood that the Democrats would have defeated Nixon on economic issues in 1972(instead of losing on the war issue) and would have decided not to aid the South Vietnamese if the North invaded.”{jalexson}

First. It's only to point out the obvious that this is wildly hypothetical. Further, I believe that it is also an unsustainable and indefensible hypothesis, itself highly dependant upon numerous other wild hypotheses, including the speculation on a Democratic defeat of President Nixon in the 1972 elections—something so complex due to the many variables and assumptions required to even begin setting up a model for consideration that it could not possibly be realistically hypothesized upon at this point in time.

Personally, before jumping off into SWAGs and wild hypotheses such as this, I prefer to first keep to the facts of what actually did or did not occur.

And this, does give WAY TOO MUCH credit to even the potential effects possible due to either the young Mr. Kerry or the anti-war movement -- again to point out the contradiction in the post of claiming “affects” due to the anti-war pacifist movements as "delusional" while simultaneously claiming the effects of the awp movements having prolonged the war. . .

I don't argue the untenable premise that the awp movement was not able to negatively and substantially effect US conduct of the war. Only against the equally untenable premise that it was responsible for pro-longing the US involvement in the war.

The asymmetric tactic of False Propaganda is effective due to the destructive results that it yields in dividing and breaking down. To have prolonged the war effort would have required positive effects of building up and sustaining the effort. False propaganda can be effectively employed in starting a war but will never be effective in an effort of sustaining a war all by itself over a long term. Not even as an unintended effect or consequence.

November '67-November '69

For all of the particular major modifications of tactics and new operations due to the results of the north Vietnamese Tet Offensive and the following so-called mini-Tet Offensive in 1968, then MACV policies and tactics within the RVN and the policies and tactics of the CIC Pacific Strategic Air Campaign remained fundamentally unchanged due to government policies that overruled the proposals of military and naval leadership 1967 through late 1969.

As to 1967, then of course, the number of additional US combat troops requested by General Westmoreland in 1967 was reduced by our civilian leaders by more than 200,000.

Further, his formal request in 1967 to conduct offensives into Cambodia and Laos for the purpose of neutralizing the north Vietnamese logistical support bases was also denied by our national leaders due to the US policy of not sending US main force units beyond the borders of the Republic of Vietnam for fear of escalating the geographic area of the involvement of US combat forces and risking intervention by such as the People’s Republic of China People’s Liberation Army forces.

As later demonstrated, General Westmoreland’s suggestion to modify the US government policy of restraining US main unit activities to within the confines of the RVN was more than prudent and a very sound tactical and strategic suggestion, even within the context of US policy of US ground forces not to advance into north Vietnam.

From its base in Laos, supplied via the network of jungle trails known collectively as the “Ho Chi Minh Trail” which had first begun to be established in the 1950s during the period of the Laotian Crisis, the north Vietnamese were able to provide logistical support to their war effort in south Vietnam via the Western Highlands into the Piedmont region and from there throughout the provinces of the Republic of Vietnam, north and south. From the deep water supplied port in Cambodia, supplied via cargo ships (eastern Block, Soviet, PRC, and even of western European nations who were US allies in the Cold War) transiting south Vietnamese rivers, the north Vietnamese were able to provide logistical support of their war effort in the southern provinces of south Vietnam, both the III and IV Corps regions, but especially in the III Corps area, including such as War Zones C and D and the region surround the capitol city, Saigon.

Because of the Tet Offensive, the troops request of 1967 was not needed in 1968. Following the devastating losses suffered by the north Vietnamese during the Tet Offensive and later the mini-Tet, then US forces on the ground were sufficient for the conduct of the 1968 and 1969 US offensives that further drove the Vietnamese main force units, NVA and VC, out of the RVN.

In commenting on the change in tactical situation immediately following the Tet & so-called mini-Tet Offensives of 1968, and on the overall strategic situation that resulted due the change, General Westmoreland has probably stated correctly:

“Yet even with the handicap of graduated response [of the Strategic Air Campaign which was independent of MACV command and under CiC Pacific], the war still could have been brought to a favorable end following defeat of the enemy's TET offensive in 1968. The US had in RVN at that time the finest military force - though not the largest - ever assembled. The build-up of troops and the logistical support base were slow in coming, but at last they were there ready for decisive action. Had the President allowed a change in strategy and taken advantage of the enemy's weakness to enable the command to carry out operations planned over the preceding 2 years in Laos and Cambodia and north of the DMZ, along with intensified bombing and the mining of Haiphong Harbor, the NV doubtlessly would have been broken. [emphasis mine] But that was not to be. Press and television had created an aura not of victory but of defeat, which, coupled with the vocal anti-war elements, profoundly influenced timid officials in Washington. It was like 2 boxers in a ring, one having the other on the ropes, close to a knock out, when the apparent winner's second inexplicably throws in the towel.” [emphasis mine].

Obviously, unlike yourself, General Westmoreland saw the affect within our media due to the activities of those within the media who opposed the US involvement in Vietnam as having a very substantial effect upon our national policies, well before such as John Kerry even became a new up and comer within the anti-war movement.

As with so many others, before and since, General Westmoreland correctly pointed out the problem of our nation's failing to make a formal declaration of a state of war, or to even engage in annual debate and ratification of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, as the fundamental problem in this regard.

The awp movements subversive pro-Hanoi activities were not able to be treated as un-constitutional and the media coverage in the RVN was not able to be censored.

As already noted, the turning over to the armed forces of the Government of the RVN the primary war effort accompanied by the withdrawal of US ground forces was not a “prediction” by General Westmoreland in 1967 but actually the consequences of the change in US policy under President Nixon, formally announced in November 1969 as the “Vietnamization” policy.
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Paul

[Paul]

The anti-war movement did absolutely NOTHING to prolong US involvement in Vietnam, neither during the administration of President Nixon, nor at any other time in the course of active US armed forces involvement in the RVN, 1961 - 1972, including the period of materiel-support and limited naval and air forces involvement of 1972 or materiel-financial support involvement beyond 1972: Right up until the Soviet-PRC rebuilt north Vietnamese armed forces officially ended the formal US involvement when they ended the existence of the US-abandoned ally, the former Republic of Viet Nam, in April 1975, and the US continued it's new DO Nothing About It policy in response.

Between 1969 and 1972 US ground forces were reduced from over 500,000 to about 70, 000 in the RVN at the time of the 1972 north Vietnamese Easter Offensive launched in March; mostly support personnel and no US combat troops.

During the steady withdrawal of American troops of 1969 through 1972, the anti-war pacifist movements steadily, and stupidly, accused President Nixon of “prolonging" and "escalating" the war itself particularly during the military offensives into Laos and Cambodia for the purpose of destroying the north Vietnamese logistical support bases mentioned in the previous post.

The claim is obviously quite wrong and quite unjust, for all of its continuing to be repeated by many of them today, including Senator Kerry.

Destruction of the north Vietnamese bases in Laos and Cambodia was a quite prudent and sensible undertaking if one wished to facilitate the successful withdrawal of US Forces from the RVN.

Withdrawal from a theatre of operations in the middle of ongoing hostilities such as those on the scale in Vietnam at that point in time is far easier said than done.

It's not a new lesson learned. It's an overt lesson learned recorded in the official USMC histories regarding such as the infinitely smaller insurgency that was driven to far provinces of the nation, but never defeated, in Nicaragua in 1928.

This is actually quite “classic” and part of military tactics that the Brits and the Royal Army excelled at over the centuries – withdrawal of military forces from an active battlefield or theatre - an orderly retreat.

Contrary to another misperception regarding the US Armed forces withdrawal from in the RVN, another bad effect due to the awp movements that persists through to this day, due to the images of Saigon, April 1975, the United States armed forces made an orderly withdrawal from the battlefield that was the former Republic of Vietnam. American soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines withdrew like the professionals that the majority of them were.

For a similar but different reason that the operations were proposed by General Westmoreland in 1967, the operations in Laos and Cambodia of the 1970s that destroyed the north Vietnamese logistical bases, if nothing else served to retard the north Vietnamese offensive capabilities against the RVN and to secure the flanks of US forces during their withdrawal.

As demonstrated in the 1972 Easter Offensive, after the rebuilding of north Vietnamese conventional forces by the Soviets and People’s Republic of China, it left the north Vietnamese only one option for an invasion route at that point in time – a frontal assault, straight down the middle through the DMZ.

And withdrawal of US military and naval forces proceeded steadily during this entire period while the military and naval efforts were transferred to the armed forces of the RVN.

It was the ARVN combat ground and air forces with the assistance of US air support that stopped the north Vietnamese Easter Offensive. US combat troops had already been withdrawn.

The remaining US ground forces were withdrawn well before the signing of the ’73 Paris Accords.

The post-73 abandonment of our allies in southeast Asia by the United States began with the ’74 Case-Church Amendment to the FY 74 appropriations act preventing the United States from providing necessary and US promised support to the Republic of Vietnam.

It was further underscored when the United States failed to respond to the measured test violations of the ’73 cease fire by the north Vietnamese.

By the time of the April ’75 offensive, then as General Westmoreland has so aptly stated:

“The United States had paralyzed itself.”

In the mid ‘80s, General Westmoreland spoke out again regarding the US defeat by the north Vietnamese when CBS aired it’s special, the “Westmoreland Trial.”

“Let me answer in the words of the senior military officer of the Vietnamese communist army. General Dung who explained it to Walter Cronkite when he was sent by CBS, hopefully to get helpful information for CBS, during the trial of my case against his network. General Dung said:

‘Our war was an all-out war. Victory was measured politically, diplomatically as well as militarily. Our objective was to defeat the will of the United States.’

Indeed, the US was defeated psychologically and hence politically on our home front and diplomatically by a clever enemy. The US was not defeated on the military battlefield.” [emphasis mine]

Or, as one Australian Vietnam Vet I’ve seen has stated it, 'Americans were not defeated by the north Vietnamese on the battlefield but on their television sets at home in the US.'

It’s an apt summary.

But only a summary. In the end, the United States was defeated by the policies of our own government leaders, that were imposed over the overruled plans of our military leaders at the time and that resulted in an effort with so many limitations imposed upon our military and naval forces in the RVN that they were forced into a box and to fight an enemy at times and conditions of his choosing. It is a testament to the skills of the men who served and died inside the Republic of Vietnam that they were so extraordinarily successful, tactically speaking.

The contraints placed upon US forces involved in the subsequently worthless Strategic Air Campaign that dropped an extraordinary tonnage of ordnance, but in it’s formally “graduated” stipulation and subsequent limitations on targets and numerous official US cease fires stipulated by our civilian leaders (that overruled the tactical and strategic recommendations of our General and Flag Officers) the tonnage was both stupidly and ineffectually used.

Further, the restrictions placed upon our armed forces by our civilian leaders leaving north Vietnamese ports open (so long as a non-NVN flagged vessel was in port, which after the policy was publicly announced, at least one always was), and by allowing the north Vietnamese logistical base in Laos established in the 1950s campaign of the north Vietnamese offensive and the base supplied by the deepwater port in Cambodia free to operate, ensured the loss of the logistical war and the ability of the north Vietnamese to sustain conventional, guerilla and terrorist offensives against the south thereby providing the fuel for the false propaganda war waged against us, itself indefensible against due to the failure of the US to make a formal declaration of war.

The results of the civilian government imposed restrictions and policies in a conflict with a determined enemy ensured that a prolonged war was unavoidable, difficult to sustain even without the element of false propaganda so that even the question of the ability to succeed under such restrictions was a reasonable one to be asked.

Ultimately it all served to combine to lead to the defeat of the United States by the Soviet-backed and Soviet-PRC supplorted North Vietnam.

While the numerous caricatures are neither honest nor forthright, I do believe that the new variety are becoming increasingly "transparent." Judging from the many nonsense articles and editorials seeking to use Vietnam in caricature form, then I’ve wondered if its all not possibly demonstrative of the new “information warriors” we keep hearing about. I honestly believe that there are people today who stupidly think that a “propaganda war” is all “psyops” PR and can be conducted independently of the implementation of sound military and naval doctrine and tactics. God help us. But that's an aside here and another topic.
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Paul

[Paul]

"The final outcome might have still been the same because of weaknesses in the South Vietnamese military leadership" {jalexson}

There's no question whatsoever about the final outcome for the former Republic of Vietnam being defeated by the north Vietnamese if the United States withdrew all necessary support as the US effectively did beginning in '74 with the economic reductions and restrictions and then did completely in '75 after north Vietnam violated the ’73 cease fire, and there never was, before or after.

It was not due to the so-called "weaknesses in the South Vietnamese military leadership" another useful bit of north VN propaganda.

With the amount of materiel support being provided to north Vietnam by the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, especially given the post-72 increases, and the effects of the very sophisticated north Vietnamese Offensive against the RVN waged over the course of the 1950s through to the 1970s, there was no question or doubt regarding the outcome of American abandonment of the RVN; neither on the part of US military commanders or civilian leaders nor that of the north Vietnamese, before or after 1975 (obviously for post-75).

“What the movement did, according to one of its leaders David Horowitz, was encourage the North Vietnamese to keep fighting even though they had no chance to win as long as the U.S. was involved.” {jalexson}

It is true that north Vietnam had no chance of winning in southeast Asia “as long as the U.S. was involved.”

Hence the purpose of the subversive efforts by the anti-war pacifist movements within our media, within our government, within our armed forces (and within other national and local media and governments around the world) in the first place.

No such compex international effort would be worth the trouble to even begin forming in the first place, never mind sustaining, if it only yielded "moral support" alone.

It all most certainly did have substantial impact and concrete affects and was quite successful in its role of undermining the US efforts in southeast Asia and resulting in the US', and that of our other allies involved in the ’73 cease fire, abandonment of our anti-Communist allies in the Indochina region of southeast Asia, pre and post 1975.

Again, since General Westmoreland was brought up, then to quote General Westmoreland since he’s stated it well and quite accurately,

“Indeed, the US was defeated psychologically and hence politically on our home front and diplomatically by a clever enemy.”

The anti-war pacifist movements in the United States and around the world formed a part of the Soviet-backed Soviet-PRC supplied North Vietnamese invasion of the RVN employing the asymmetric tactic of false propaganda and millions quite literally became “puppets” of that clever enemy.

The United States armed forces were not dealt a single major tactical defeat by the armed forces north Vietnam against them. An extraordinary accomplishment in the course of world military or naval history.

And that includes either the regular north Vietnamese military or naval forces employing conventional and guerilla tactics, or the “VC” insurgent forces in the RVN employing conventional, guerilla tactics, or by any of the north Vietnamese forces that conducted the asymmetric tactic of terrorism, among a number of other asymmetric tactics, including awp movement false propaganda produced from within our armed forces and the tactic of the facilitation of supply to and use of illegal narcotics from within our own armed forces.

The United States of America did experience a Strategic defeat in Vietnam and Indochina by north Vietnam, and that based upon our own standards as reason for our involvement.

The asymmetric tactics of the “Puppets” achieved substantial affects and were quite effective in undermining American will and "staying power," thereby negatively impacting official US policies which undermined US efforts in Vietnam and all of Indochina and resulted in the withdrawal not only of US forces by '72 but even more importantly the with-holding of necessary US materiel and military support promised to and needed by our anti-Communist allies in Indochina.

As a young naval officer who had been to Vietnam, then in the late '60s and early '70s John Kerry was a real plum and asset to the awp movements. However, at the time, he was an "up and comer" and a low level "puppet" of the movements.

The awp movement did yield concrete affects that effectively resulted in the weakening of US resolve and the impact of US policy leading to the US abandonment of the RVN and its subsequent unavoidable defeat by conventional north Vietnamese military forces in the April '75 offensive and also in the '75 and subsequent Vietnamese military offensives in Laos and PRC-backed Kmer Rouge in Cambodia.

The Unitred States was defeated by the Commnists in Indochina. They won. The United States, and our anti-Communist allies that we abandoned, LOST. Bad effects and consequences, of numerous kinds, due to, and resulting from, the activities of the awp movements of the 1960s/70 continue to have impacts through to this day, including cutlural ramifications and effects.
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Paul

[one more captins mast]

If the gov. will rel. the Igloo white operation and the info on the

results of the B-52 effect on the "things " repersented by the

dots on the screens, (men, material, ect a great deal of the

Russian empire's wealth) then it could be it would be that

some would be more able to "see" . notwithstanding some

must look with their backs turned.
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the strange mr aj

[LimaCharlie]

There are a lot of very intellectual words being thrown around on this thread to explain history.

Could it be possible that life is really very simple? The KISS principle.

Could it be there has been an anti-war movement in the U.S. since the 1600’s that varies from 45% to 55% of the voting public?

Could it be the U.S. anti-war movement has extended, delayed, or hampered every war beginning with the Revolutionary?

Could it be the U.S. was unprepared and delayed getting into WWII, due to the anti-war movement after WWI, until the Japanese forced us to get involved?

Could it be John Kerry and Jane Fonda encouraged the anti-war movement to swell over the 50% mark, causing us to abandon South Viet Nam after winning every battle?

Could it be Europe’s anti-war movement has held a super majority since WWII?

Could it be Sadam was a bad guy who said he had WMD and the rest of the world agreed he was a bad guy with WMD?

Could it be Sadam was aiding and abetting terrorists and just needed to be taken out because he said he had WMD and had demonstrated it by using it on his own people?

Could it be John Kerry is again encouraging the anti-war movement to swell over the 50% mark in the U.S.?

Could it be there are a lot of people in the U.S. that really believe we are not in WWIII with the terrorists and if we had a better CIA Director, this would go away?

Could it be the U.S. will pull out of Iraq, because of the rising anti-war movement, leaving it worse off than before like South Viet Nam.

Could it be the anti-war movement are appeasers?

Could an appeaser be someone that feeds the tiger at the door, hoping it won’t eat them.

Could it be the tiger will eat you when you run out of food.

Could it be John Kerry is merely an appeaser? Or is John Kerry a Communist Collaborator?

Could it be John Kerry and Jane Fonda along with the current crop of Hollywood and Intellectual Elite appeasers are just useful fools? Or is John Kerry the real Manchurian Candidate and he really did script his Viet Nam service?

Could it be as simple as there will always be bad guys in the world that need to be taken out to preserve society?

Could it be there will always be good guys to stand up to the bad guys?

Could it be there will always be appeasers to vilify and second guess those good guys and give excuses for those bad guys?

Cops, firemen, and military. Love them while they are saving you. But, can’t they just disappear and leave you alone until you need them again?
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I was going to become an anarchist, but they had too many rules.

[Paul]

[Paul]