SwiftVets.com

[ASPB]

Call sign: Boston strangler
May 13th, 2004


Thomas Wright was one of John F. Kerry's fellow Swift boat officers in Vietnam. Since Wright outranked Kerry, he was Kerry's sometime boat group Officer-in-Charge, so Wright had occasion to observe Kerry’s behavior and attitudes, and the circumstances surrounding his early departure from the war zone. The intervening years have not dimmed his memories.

When the Swift boats of Coastal Division 11 sailed into harm’s way from their Phu Quoc Island base of An Thoi, for missions along the rivers of Vietnam’s southwesternmost Kien Giang and An Xuyen provinces, they communicated by radio. When they did, boat captains adopted distinctive, often humorous call signs for identification purposes. Eldon Thompson was “Mary Poppins,” William Schachte was “Baccardi Charlie,” James T. Grace was “Twiggy,” and Tom Wright was “Dudley Do-Right.” When John Kerry radioed another Swift boat, he used the call sign, “Boston Strangler.”

Lieutenant Thomas W. Wright heard that call sign frequently. As OIC (Officer-in-Charge) of PCF-44, he operated with LT (j.g.) Kerry’s 94 Boat on a fairly regular basis. A 1966 graduate of the University of North Carolina’s NROTC program, Wright had served as communications officer aboard the destroyer USS Robert A. Owens before beginning Swift boat training in November 1967. He had already served for eight months with Qui Nhon’s Coastal Division 15 when the monsoon season forced its boats to be shifted to the more protected, and more challenging waters off An Thoi. He decided to extend his tour and follow his disciplined, veteran crew to the new base. As the relatively senior lieutenant there, he was the OTC, or Officer-in-Tactical Command for the majority of the 3-to-6-boat missions. On most of them he commanded 44 Boat.

The rivers and canals of Kien Giang and An Xuyen provinces were the targets of Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Vietnam, Rear Adm. Elmo Zumwalt’s aggressive SEALORDS operations. Looking back after all these years, Tom Wright, now a retired Commander, recalls: “We planned missions locally to try to dominate the area and disrupt the enemy’s movements. We faced significant challenges every day, every night. We would respond to intelligence reports as appropriate. It took great imagination and determination to work effectively in the rivers, and we remained deployed until material damage and casualties reduced our effectiveness. We would then rotate back to An Thoi for repair and re-arming.”

For Tom Wright and most other Swift boat officers, there were two commandments: 1. Protect the crews. 2. Win. As for Tom Wright’s 44 Boat; “we won every engagement, start to finish. I got the crew home; a few nicks, but we made it.”

Working with call sign “Boston Strangler” became problematical. “I had a lot of trouble getting him to follow orders,” recalls Wright. “He had a different view of leadership and operations. Those of us with direct experience working with Kerry found him difficult and oriented towards his personal, rather than unit goals and objectives. I believed that overall responsibility rested squarely on the shoulders of the OIC or OTC in a free-fire zone. You had to be right (before opening fire). Kerry seemed to believe there were no rules in a free-fire zone and you were supposed to kill anyone. I didn’t see it that way.”

In Wright’s view, it was important that the enemy understood that Swift boats were a competent, effective force that could dominate his location. To do that, you also had to control the people and their actions; to have them accept Swift boat crews and their authority. You couldn’t achieve that by indiscriminate use of weapons in free fire zones.

It got to a point where Wright told his divisional commander he no longer wanted Kerry in his boat group, so he was re-assigned to another one. “I had an idea of his actions but didn’t have to be responsible for him.” Then Wright and like-minded boat officers took matters into their own hands. “When he got his third Purple Heart, three of us told him to leave. We knew how the system worked and we didn’t want him in Coastal Division 11. Kerry didn’t manipulate the system, we did.”

As for medals, Commander Wright holds strong views: “No one was recognized for completely overwhelming the enemy with skill, courage and bravery. No one wanted a Purple Heart because it meant we had made a mistake. We made sure our crews were recognized, but no one took pride in a Purple Heart. Everyone who served is equally important, regardless of rank or awards.

John B. Dwyer is a military historian, and Vietnam veteran, who served in the Fourth Infantry Division
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[War Dog]

[DougReese]

[nakona]

I need the source for that story, because I want to post it elsewhere.
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13F20P

[DougReese]

[JN173]

[Me#1You#10]

As I stated in an earlier thread on this article, there is one paragraph that I had difficulty reconciling. However, after subsequently becoming aware of John Kerry's sequence of unit changes, the reference to 2 independent periods of service and allegations of improper Kerry activity within each period alleged by Lt. Wright becomes clear.

[DougReese]

[ASPB]

Doug,

I believe "boat group" as used in the article relates to what we called in Riverine "Task or Mission" groups. This title would normally be assigned to a subgroup of a river or coastal division established for a specific mission or action. It would have a OTC or POTC (officer or petty officer in tactical control) in charge of the operation. Given that Kerry was junior in rank and experience it's unlikely he would have often been assigned as OTC.

Some accounts of the "Silver Star" mission that you were on with him indicate that he was the OTC. This seems unlikely. Might be worth asking Barry about this too.

Tom

And another thing: I read it weeks ago but posted it here today because it seemed that some participants weren't aware of it.

edited to correct writer's name
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[DougReese]

[JN173]

[ASPB]

[DougReese]

[cgc]

First of all Thank You ASPB for the information and quote from CMDR Wright. I do not need to verify, write old friends, search the internet, or try an find a way to dispute what CMDR has said about John Kerry. For I would trust CMDR Wright's word. On the subject of free fire zones, If fire was received from a free fire zone it was immediatly returned, In many cases we "found" fishing boats, or small basket boats in free fire zones, it was not the custom to just open fire and start shooting people, It was the norm to try and get them rounded up and give them the once over. If they passed the so what test, usually they was shooed away and strongly discouraged from being in the area. In some cases the bottoms of a couple boats had a hole put in them to further discourage their return. In the case of a bad ID or Boat Log, they could be run in to a base for further questioning. In my year In Country, we only shot one time at some guy who we caught on the beach in a free fire zone who was running up the dune with a gun. Also we dropped a couple grenades on a swimmer who wouldn't willingly come aboard that we found swimming in a free fire zone. We did get him aboard and he had mega-dollars (P) in a money type belt. But I don't remember any cowboy behaviour by any of the crews when it came to free fire zones.
cgc 68/69

[PhuCat to Phu Quoc]

Maybe those other Swifties misunderstood Kerry, maybe Kerry's call sign was "Boston Straggler"
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I'm a U.S. Navy Vietnam War vet against John Kerry
Phu Cat to Phu Quoc 1969-1970

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