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SBD
Admiral
Joined: 19 Aug 2004
Posts: 1022
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 Posted: Sat Jul 02, 2005 2:29 pm Post subject: Is this really true?? |
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A friend of mine gave me a book to read titled "The Shadows of Power", The Council on Foreign Relations and The American Decline. The book seems to have its' historical facts in order, but I just can't allow myself to believe that it true so I thought I would ask all of you if these were the "Rules of Engagement" during the Vietnam War.
| Quote: | From page 122 section titled "Mismanaging the War"
In Vietnam, as in Korea, extraordinary restrictions were placed on the U.S. military. These, known as the "Rules of Engagement," were not declassified until 1985, when twenty-six pages in the Congressional Record were required to summarize them.
The Airforce was repeatedly refused permission to bomb those targets the the Joint Chief of Staff seemed important.
U.S. Troops were given a general order not to fire at the Vietcong until Fired Upon.
Vehicles more than two hundred yards off of the Ho Chi Mihn Trail could not be bombed. (Enemy supply trucks, forewarned of approaching planes, had only to temporarily divert off the trail to escape destruction.
A North Vietnamese MIG could not be struck if spotted on a runway; only if airborne and showing hostile intent.
Surface to Air missile sites could not be bombed while under construction, only after they became operational.
Enemy forces could not be pursued if they crossed into Laos or Cambodia. This gave the Communist a safety sancuary just 50 miles from Saigon. Even the brief incursion into Caambodia authorized by Nixon in 1970 was hamstrung by a variety of rules and regulations authored in Washington. Lieutenant General Ira C Eaker observed:
Our political leaders elected to fight a land war, where every advantage lay with the enemy, and to employ our vast sea and air superiority in very limited supporting roles.
"Suprise", perhaps the greatest principle of war...was deliberately sacraficed when our leaders revealed our strategy and tactics to the enemy. |
SBD |
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Essayons
Seaman Apprentice
Joined: 05 Apr 2005
Posts: 81
Location: Philadelphia area
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| Posted: Sat Jul 02, 2005 3:27 pm Post subject: |
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SBD,
I can only address “U.S. Troops were given a general order not to fire at the Vietcong until Fired Upon.”
As far as the 9th Infantry Division and the 199th Light Infantry Brigade was concerned, this is totally untrue!
I served with the 9th ID and worked with the 199th LIB for a few months (1968/69). The area covered was from north of Saigon, III Corp, and all of the Mekong Delta, IV Corp.
We used snipers, recon-by-fire and, at night, there were free-fire zones. Mad-minute was used to check weapons. All the preceding where used judiciously – most of the time. There were standing orders (restrictions) regarding when and where they were used.
Cambodia was off limits to us.
Some, not all, of the other points sound incorrect to down right absurd but you will need some pilots to comment.
Regards,
Dick
_________________
Essayons - Let us try - the code of the Army Engineer. Sappers First, the code of the Combat Engineer. |
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LewWaters
Admin
Joined: 18 May 2004
Posts: 4042
Location: Washington State
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| Posted: Sat Jul 02, 2005 3:40 pm Post subject: |
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Having never seen the documents they speak of, I can't really speak about them. But, the following is an accurate copy of a card we were given in the Army pertaining to our Helicopters.
| Quote: | Firing Rules For Armed Helicopter Engagement
Fire Only When;
1. Under control with direct radio contact of the designated control agency
2. You can visually identify target or target marker
3. Friendly or civilian positions are positively identified
4. Defending yourself against ground fire and;
a. You can visually identify source
b. You can positively orient strike against source
c. The fire is of such intensity to warrant counter-action
REMEMBER!
1.When in doubt hold your fire!
2. Always know the positive location of friendlies! |
_________________
Clark County Conservative |
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rbshirley
Founder
Joined: 07 May 2004
Posts: 394
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| Posted: Sat Jul 02, 2005 5:30 pm Post subject: |
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| Essayons wrote: | I can only address “U.S. Troops were given a general order not
to fire at the Vietcong until Fired Upon.”
As far as the 9th Infantry Division and the 199th Light Infantry Brigade
was concerned, this is totally untrue! |
This ROE was probably modified sometime after the Tet Offensive of 68.
It certainly was in effect in 1967 for Swift Boats.
I sat next to Admiral Hoffmann in St. Louis, and he indicated that, with the
blessing of ComUSMACV, the ROE for the Navy was changed from "not
until fired upon" to "in imminent danger of attack by enemy forces." More
sensible, but still much more restrictive than the total freedom to shoot at
anyone and/or anything without provocation that the Kerry followers tried
to put forward in 1971 and during the campaign last year.
In addition to the the stated rules for the North and the Ho Chi Minh trail,
it was also forbidden to interfere in any way with any water borne vessels
outside the twelve mile limit from South Vietnam. This meant that enemy
vessels could move with impunity in both the South China Sea and in the
Gulf of Thailand to move troops, arms and material into Cambodia. It was
then just a short trip from the ports of Cambodia into the Mekong Delta
area west of Saigon.
On one occasion that I am personally aware of, this restriction was also
further tightened by Com NavForV to non-interference until only five miles
from shore for a known North Vietnamese armed resupply vessel that had
been tracked by US forces from the North out to the Paracels and back to
the shores of Vietnam: See Sa Ky Victory
This is just plain crazy. Giving your enemy free passage to transport men,
arms and material into an area of conflict is pure folly. This is the one lesson
from Vietnam that evidently has not been entirely learned, or at least given
sufficient attention, in the current Iraq situation.
BTW. My favorite ROE cartoon: Whats wrong with this picture?
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Essayons
Seaman Apprentice
Joined: 05 Apr 2005
Posts: 81
Location: Philadelphia area
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| Posted: Sat Jul 02, 2005 10:35 pm Post subject: |
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rbshirley and SBD,
Thanks guys for taking up most my afternoon! Only kidding but I spent a few hours trying to educate myself regarding the Vietnam Rules of Engagement and found that the Air Force/Navy air had some very severe restrictions – some of which I had been aware of and others that where an eye opener.
Lew,
I cannot speak for helicopter ROEs because I ain’t got a clue. But I do have personal experience with Cobra gunships which came to my aid during an ambush. There were no “markers” and there was no time to verify that friendlies were not in the area. Not trying to pick an argument with you – just telling it the way it happened. See below for the detail.
The only restrictions (ROEs) that I was aware of (1968/89) was that if we took sniper fire from a ‘ville, we could NOT return fire.
The following is an excerpt from LT COL Loper (15th Engineer BN CO) that took place in late 1967:
Road and Bridge Reconnaissance -
One overcast morning we set out, myself with driver and shotgun, the S3, S2, and recon section, and probably some others, Company CO's etc., in three or four jeeps with ACAV's from the 2/47 Inf providing security. It was eerily quiet as we drove down the road, which had not seen a vehicle since the French departed 12 years before. The only sign of life were elephant and other large animal droppings that littered the road. The Armored Cavalry (ACAV) commander asked permission to clear his weapons and do a bit of recon by fire. I gave him the okay and in minutes the calm was shattered by the ACAV's machine guns and not being one to hesitate I told our guys to unload a magazine into the bushes as well. In less than a minute I had a call on the radio from the FSPB asking what was going on, were we in a firefight or what. I replied that we were just doing a little recon by fire. The order came back to knock it off, we were giving away our presence to the VC, as if they did not know we were there!
Notice that there is NO indication that the 9th ID had ROEs that restricted recon-by-fire.
Back to the ambush and the Cobra gunships: This took place in March 1969. I am in contact with my then CO and the Squad Leader who was there as I was. This action took place along the Kinh Xang (French built canal) that bordered the 9th ID base camp (Dong Tam) on the west side. (please note that this is the same canal that the Flipper – Kerry - got lost on when trying to get to the 1968 Bob Hope show – which he claims he never got to).
Should anyone believe Kerry missed the Navy Turning Basin at Dong Tam due to it being hidden, just look at the map - it is the wide open area immediately to the right after entering the Kinh Zang! http://15thengineer.50megs.com/Web-MapDongTamClose.jpg Duh!
The Kinh Zang was known as ambush alley. We were clearing jungle that the VC/NVA used to mortar/rocket Dong Tam. We were ambushed and Cobra gunships immediately responded. The dust-off was problematic but was successful.
Two weeks earlier we were “attacked” by a unit of the Mobile Riverine Force (Navy and 9th ID 2nd Brigade) as they returned to Dong Tam. They came down (south) the canal with each boat (Alpha/Tango, etc.) blowing off small arms rounds that ricocheted off our equipment. No one was hit and the next day a major showed up to apologized to me.
All of the above is meant to show that ROEs are “guidelines” and that the realities of war dictate what really happens. Civilians can set rules in place – warriors fight to win – civilians be damned! They ain’t got a clue!
Regards,
Dick
_________________
Essayons - Let us try - the code of the Army Engineer. Sappers First, the code of the Combat Engineer. |
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SBD
Admiral
Joined: 19 Aug 2004
Posts: 1022
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| Posted: Sun Jul 03, 2005 12:09 am Post subject: |
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Thanks for the personal insight, we owe all of you our gratitude and thanks for fighting against communism. It makes what I am reading that much harder to swallow because it is becoming clearer to me now that America never intended to win this war.
Page 123 "The Shadows of Power"
[quote]David Rockefeller, president of Chase Manhattan bank, briefed President Johnson today on his recent meeting with Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev of Russia.
Rockefeller told Johnson that during the two hour talk, the RED leader said the United States and the Soviet Union "should do more trade." Khrushchev, according to Rockefeller, said he would like to see the United States extend long-term credits to the Rushians.
On October 7, 1966---with the war now at full tilt---Johnson stated:
We intend to press for legislative authority to negotiate trade agreements which could extend most-favored-natiion tarriff treatment to European Communist states. We will reduce export controls on East-West trade with respect to hundreds of non-strategic items.
Six days later the New York Times told its readers:
The United States put into effect today one of President Johnson's proposals for stimulating East-West trade by removing hundreds of export restrictions.
Among the "non-strategic items" cleared for export were:
Petroleum, aluminum, scrap metal, synthetic rubber, tires, air navigation equipment, ground and marine radar, rifle cleaning compounds rocket engines, etc etc...
Did the Johnson Administrations's easing of restrictiions influence the flow of goods from Warsaw Pack to nations in hanoi?
Two weeks after the announcement, the New York Times reported (October 27, 1966)The Soviet Union and it's allies agreed at the conference of their leaders in moscow last week to grant North Vietnam assistance.
Bombing the Ho Chi Minh Trail to interdict the enemies supplies made no sense when we were inriching the supplies. Trade that would have been labeled Treason during World War II, was now being called"building Bridges". This along with the combat restriction, were two of the reasons why we could not defeat tiny North Vietnam, whereas it had taken us less than four years to overcome the combined might of German and Japanese empires.
SBD
Last edited by SBD on Sun Jul 03, 2005 8:03 am; edited 1 time in total |
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Tacan70UDN
PO2
Joined: 05 Sep 2004
Posts: 392
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| Posted: Sun Jul 03, 2005 12:20 am Post subject: |
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| Quote: | The Airforce was repeatedly refused permission to bomb those targets the Joint Chief of Staff seemed important.
U.S. Troops were given a general order not to fire at the Vietcong until Fired Upon.
Vehicles more than two hundred yards off of the Ho Chi Mihn Trail could not be bombed. (Enemy supply trucks, forewarned of approaching planes, had only to temporarily divert off the trail to escape destruction.
A North Vietnamese MIG could not be struck if spotted on a runway; only if airborne and showing hostile intent.
Surface to Air missile sites could not be bombed while under construction, only after they became operational.
Enemy forces could not be pursued if they crossed into Laos or Cambodia. This gave the Communist a safety sancuary just 50 miles from Saigon. Even the brief incursion into Caambodia authorized by Nixon in 1970 was hamstrung by a variety of rules and regulations authored in Washington. |
ROE, like everything else, depended on when and where you were. They evolved and changed, sometimes daily. Concerning the points above, from my viewpoint:
* I do not know for a fact that the Air Force was not allowed to bomb targets the JCS deemed important; someone who had senior staff experience would have to answer that. However, targets were VERY tightly controlled and had to be approved in advance (except for targets of opportunity and troops in contact, where other stringent rules applied). It is probably safe to say that some fixed targets considered important by the military were not approved for political reasons.
* I cannot answer the question about ROE for troops on the ground.
* Rules for operation over the Ho Chi Minh Trail (HCMT) in Laos changed greatly over the years. At one point, I believe prior to Nov, 1968, it is true that trucks more than 200 meters off the HCMT could not be hit unless validated by procedures in place at the time. However, truckparks and storage areas, those areas the trucks would most likely pull into, were frequently on validated target lists and could be hit. After 1 Nov '68, with better equiment and techniques and the implementation of Commando Hunt (Igloo White aka McNamara Wall), rules for the bulk of the HCMT were changed considerably, and through-put of enemy trucks was drastically reduced. At one point in early 1969, 82-percent of the traffic coming in the top of the HCMT never made it into South Vietnam proper.
* It is my understanding that while I was in SEA (68/69), MiGs could not be hit on the ground. That may have changed in later years.
* It is also my understanding that SAM sites under construction could not be attacked until they were operational. Again, that may have changed in later years.
* Whether or not "hot pursuit" across the borders into Laos or Cambodia were authorized, I cannot say. I am aware that Prairie Fire teams were inserted into Laos to locate enemy positions and at times act as forward air controllers for aerial attacks on same. There was frequent air activity over Laos. At the time I was in SEA, there was no air activity, to my knowledge, over Cambodia.
My comments reflect only my memories of my time in SEA for the operating areas I was in with the Air Force. The ROE for other operational areas and other time frames were likely different. In other words, ROE for the entire war in SEA was a "moving target", and general statements are usually not correct for things as a whole. Books could be written on the subject, and only after an intense study of the rules as published and changed.
Were our hands tied to a large degree? In my opinion, most definitely. It was definitely extremely frustrating. Such was the "Land of Oz". |
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JN173
Commander
Joined: 10 May 2004
Posts: 341
Location: Anchorage, Alaska
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| Posted: Sun Jul 03, 2005 3:09 am Post subject: |
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Pursuit across the Cambodian border was defintely verboten in Jan. 1966.
_________________
A Grunt
2/503 173rd Airborne Brigade
RVN '65-'66 |
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SBD
Admiral
Joined: 19 Aug 2004
Posts: 1022
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| Posted: Sun Jul 03, 2005 8:02 am Post subject: |
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I found the Rules of Engagement that were submitted into the Congressional Record. They seem to back up the theory that the military had their hands tied and that they were unjustly made to be at fault for not having a winning strategy.
You can read all of them at the SwiftBoat Archives Site by following this link and choosing The Vietnam Rules of Engagement category from the left menu.
SBD |
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MrJapan
PO1
Joined: 27 Sep 2004
Posts: 465
Location: Chiba, Japan
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| Posted: Sun Jul 03, 2005 9:49 am Post subject: Re: Is this really true?? |
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| SBD wrote: | A friend of mine gave me a book to read titled "The Shadows of Power", The Council on Foreign Relations and The American Decline. The book seems to have its' historical facts in order, but I just can't allow myself to believe that it true so I thought I would ask all of you if these were the "Rules of Engagement" during the Vietnam War.
| Quote: | From page 122 section titled "Mismanaging the War"
In Vietnam, as in Korea, extraordinary restrictions were placed on the U.S. military. These, known as the "Rules of Engagement," were not declassified until 1985, when twenty-six pages in the Congressional Record were required to summarize them.
The Airforce was repeatedly refused permission to bomb those targets the the Joint Chief of Staff seemed important.
U.S. Troops were given a general order not to fire at the Vietcong until Fired Upon.
Vehicles more than two hundred yards off of the Ho Chi Mihn Trail could not be bombed. (Enemy supply trucks, forewarned of approaching planes, had only to temporarily divert off the trail to escape destruction.
A North Vietnamese MIG could not be struck if spotted on a runway; only if airborne and showing hostile intent.
Surface to Air missile sites could not be bombed while under construction, only after they became operational.
Enemy forces could not be pursued if they crossed into Laos or Cambodia. This gave the Communist a safety sancuary just 50 miles from Saigon. Even the brief incursion into Caambodia authorized by Nixon in 1970 was hamstrung by a variety of rules and regulations authored in Washington. Lieutenant General Ira C Eaker observed:
Our political leaders elected to fight a land war, where every advantage lay with the enemy, and to employ our vast sea and air superiority in very limited supporting roles.
"Suprise", perhaps the greatest principle of war...was deliberately sacraficed when our leaders revealed our strategy and tactics to the enemy. |
SBD |
I can recommend a good book for you to read:
"Every Man a Tiger"
Written by Tom Clancy and REt. General Chuck Horner..
Has much detail from the Vietnam War up to the Gulf War.
Much of what you mentioned was also mentioned in their book.
(also a good read)
MJ |
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Tacan70UDN
PO2
Joined: 05 Sep 2004
Posts: 392
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| Posted: Sun Jul 03, 2005 10:17 pm Post subject: |
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| SBD wrote: | I found the Rules of Engagement that were submitted into the Congressional Record. They seem to back up the theory that the military had their hands tied and that they were unjustly made to be at fault for not having a winning strategy.
You can read all of them at the SwiftBoat Archives Site by following this link and choosing The Vietnam Rules of Engagement category from the left menu. |
SBD - Thanks for posting this. Reading what is in the link pretty much confirms my comments previously that the ROE changed depending on date and location, thus, a "moving target".
I am not about to "defend" the ROE as I experienced it, but it should be recognized that they were put in place with good intentions, primarily to limit damage, death and injury to friendly/neutral peoples and also to reduce the possibility of a much larger conflict with esp. the Chinese and Russians and their clients the Warsaw Pact countries. They were not put in place to cause us to lose the war, though in my opinion they made it next to impossible for us to win. I think I would describe this as possibly bad decisions by good people. The unintended consequences were to hog-tie us in the war zone and prevent us from fully using our capabilities to stop things once and for all. And in the long run, not only we, but our allies in SEA suffered terribly.
Remember that (loosely paraphrased) war is an extension of political means, and when politics fails in the geo-political realm, the military is usually called upon to perform. Like most everyone else that served in SEA, I saw only my tiny part of the overall "big picture". Despite some research with the now unclassified documents and other sources, I know I still don't appreciate fully the "big picture". Each of us who went to SEA saw only a small slice of the "reality". That being said, I still can't fully understand why some of the ROE were the way they were while I was there, or afterwards.
It appears in the documents in the link that the information provided is extracted, that is, not the complete documents. The three CHECO reports dealing with ROE from the beginning of the war until the end have been declassified and are available if you can find them. Anyone interested in the topic should look for them. I have a source for the CHECO report on ROE from 1960-1965 (86 pp). I'm not sure if it is appropriate to post this information on the board. If someone wants to acquire a copy, PM me and I'll give you the URL to a source. |
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SBD
Admiral
Joined: 19 Aug 2004
Posts: 1022
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| Posted: Mon Jul 04, 2005 2:07 am Post subject: |
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| Tacan70UDN wrote: | | SBD wrote: | I found the Rules of Engagement that were submitted into the Congressional Record. They seem to back up the theory that the military had their hands tied and that they were unjustly made to be at fault for not having a winning strategy.
You can read all of them at the SwiftBoat Archives Site by following this link and choosing The Vietnam Rules of Engagement category from the left menu. |
SBD - Thanks for posting this. Reading what is in the link pretty much confirms my comments previously that the ROE changed depending on date and location, thus, a "moving target".
I am not about to "defend" the ROE as I experienced it, but it should be recognized that they were put in place with good intentions, primarily to limit damage, death and injury to friendly/neutral peoples and also to reduce the possibility of a much larger conflict with esp. the Chinese and Russians and their clients the Warsaw Pact countries. They were not put in place to cause us to lose the war, though in my opinion they made it next to impossible for us to win. I think I would describe this as possibly bad decisions by good people. The unintended consequences were to hog-tie us in the war zone and prevent us from fully using our capabilities to stop things once and for all. And in the long run, not only we, but our allies in SEA suffered terribly.
Remember that (loosely paraphrased) war is an extension of political means, and when politics fails in the geo-political realm, the military is usually called upon to perform. Like most everyone else that served in SEA, I saw only my tiny part of the overall "big picture". Despite some research with the now unclassified documents and other sources, I know I still don't appreciate fully the "big picture". Each of us who went to SEA saw only a small slice of the "reality". That being said, I still can't fully understand why some of the ROE were the way they were while I was there, or afterwards.
It appears in the documents in the link that the information provided is extracted, that is, not the complete documents. The three CHECO reports dealing with ROE from the beginning of the war until the end have been declassified and are available if you can find them. Anyone interested in the topic should look for them. I have a source for the CHECO report on ROE from 1960-1965 (86 pp). I'm not sure if it is appropriate to post this information on the board. If someone wants to acquire a copy, PM me and I'll give you the URL to a source. |
Hi Tacan70UDN,
Thanks for your insight in this matter. I just wanted to let you know that what I posted regarding the Rules of Engagement are from the Congressional Record. I think only the first and last CHECO reports were put into the record.
I know that you said that these rules had good intentions, but I can't see the good intention of not being allowed to bomb an aircraft on a runway, or a truck parked just off the road. From what I am reading, Johnson supplied the Soviets who in turn supplied North Vietnam. All of Johnson's advisors were for the war, then all of a sudden, the entire clan said the war should stop and we should get out. Needless to say, they shocked Johnson who was so rattled, he did not run for the Presidency when Kennedy's term was up. I always wondered why he never ran, now I know why.
SBD |
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SBD
Admiral
Joined: 19 Aug 2004
Posts: 1022
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| Posted: Mon Jul 04, 2005 2:09 am Post subject: Re: Is this really true?? |
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| MrJapan wrote: | | SBD wrote: | A friend of mine gave me a book to read titled "The Shadows of Power", The Council on Foreign Relations and The American Decline. The book seems to have its' historical facts in order, but I just can't allow myself to believe that it true so I thought I would ask all of you if these were the "Rules of Engagement" during the Vietnam War.
| Quote: | From page 122 section titled "Mismanaging the War"
In Vietnam, as in Korea, extraordinary restrictions were placed on the U.S. military. These, known as the "Rules of Engagement," were not declassified until 1985, when twenty-six pages in the Congressional Record were required to summarize them.
The Airforce was repeatedly refused permission to bomb those targets the the Joint Chief of Staff seemed important.
U.S. Troops were given a general order not to fire at the Vietcong until Fired Upon.
Vehicles more than two hundred yards off of the Ho Chi Mihn Trail could not be bombed. (Enemy supply trucks, forewarned of approaching planes, had only to temporarily divert off the trail to escape destruction.
A North Vietnamese MIG could not be struck if spotted on a runway; only if airborne and showing hostile intent.
Surface to Air missile sites could not be bombed while under construction, only after they became operational.
Enemy forces could not be pursued if they crossed into Laos or Cambodia. This gave the Communist a safety sancuary just 50 miles from Saigon. Even the brief incursion into Caambodia authorized by Nixon in 1970 was hamstrung by a variety of rules and regulations authored in Washington. Lieutenant General Ira C Eaker observed:
Our political leaders elected to fight a land war, where every advantage lay with the enemy, and to employ our vast sea and air superiority in very limited supporting roles.
"Suprise", perhaps the greatest principle of war...was deliberately sacraficed when our leaders revealed our strategy and tactics to the enemy. |
SBD |
I can recommend a good book for you to read:
"Every Man a Tiger"
Written by Tom Clancy and REt. General Chuck Horner..
Has much detail from the Vietnam War up to the Gulf War.
Much of what you mentioned was also mentioned in their book.
(also a good read)
MJ |
Thanks Mr Japan, I will pick it up next time I'm out and about.
SBD |
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JN173
Commander
Joined: 10 May 2004
Posts: 341
Location: Anchorage, Alaska
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| Posted: Mon Jul 04, 2005 2:42 am Post subject: |
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| SBD wrote: | Needless to say, they shocked Johnson who was so rattled, he did not run for the Presidency when Kennedy's term was up. I always wondered why he never ran, now I know why.
SBD |
At the end of Kennedy's term in the fall of 1964 LBJ ran against AUH2O! 
It was the '68 election he dropped out.
_________________
A Grunt
2/503 173rd Airborne Brigade
RVN '65-'66 |
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SBD
Admiral
Joined: 19 Aug 2004
Posts: 1022
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| Posted: Mon Jul 04, 2005 8:28 am Post subject: |
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Thanks for clearing that up, I should have known my history a little better. Isn't it interesting that Goldwater is the one submitting the Rules of Engagement into the record.
SBD |
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