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VILLAGE VOICE - Kerry and the POW/MIA Issue
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Jette
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Joined: 06 Aug 2004
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PostPosted: Sun Aug 15, 2004 9:46 pm    Post subject: VILLAGE VOICE - Kerry and the POW/MIA Issue Reply with quote

When John Kerry's Courage Went M.I.A.
by Sydney H. Schanberg
February 24th, 2004

Senator John Kerry, a decorated battle veteran, was courageous as a navy lieutenant in the Vietnam War. But he was not so courageous more than two decades later, when he covered up voluminous evidence that a significant number of live American prisoners—perhaps hundreds—were never acknowledged or returned after the war-ending treaty was signed in January 1973.

The Massachusetts senator, now seeking the presidency, carried out this subterfuge a little over a decade ago— shredding documents, suppressing testimony, and sanitizing the committee's final report—when he was chairman of the Senate Select Committee on P.O.W./ M.I.A. Affairs.

Over the years, an abundance of evidence had come to light that the North Vietnamese, while returning 591 U.S. prisoners of war after the treaty signing, had held back many others as future bargaining chips for the $4 billion or more in war reparations that the Nixon administration had pledged. Hanoi didn't trust Washington to fulfill its pro-mise without pressure. Similarly, Washington didn't trust Hanoi to return all the prisoners and carry out all the treaty provisions. The mistrust on both sides was merited. Hanoi held back prisoners and the U.S. provided no reconstruction funds.

The stated purpose of the special Senate committee—which convened in mid 1991 and concluded in January 1993—was to investigate the evidence about prisoners who were never returned and find out what happened to the missing men. Committee chair Kerry's larger and different goal, though never stated publicly, emerged over time: He wanted to clear a path to normalization of relations with Hanoi. In any other context, that would have been an honorable goal. But getting at the truth of the unaccounted for P.O.W.'s and M.I.A.'s (Missing In Action) was the main obstacle to normalization—and therefore in conflict with his real intent and plan of action.

Kerry denied back then that he disguised his real goal, contending that he supported normalization only as a way to learn more about the missing men. But almost nothing has emerged about these prisoners since diplomatic and economic relations were restored in 1995, and thus it would appear—as most realists expected—that Kerry's explanation was hollow. He has also denied in the past the allegations of a cover-up, either by the Pentagon or himself. Asked for comment on this article, the Kerry campaign sent a quote from the senator: "In the end, I think what we can take pride in is that we put together the most significant, most thorough, most exhaustive accounting for missing and former P.O.W.'s in the history of human warfare."

What was the body of evidence that prisoners were held back? A short list would include more than 1,600 firsthand sightings of live U.S. prisoners; nearly 14,000 secondhand reports; numerous intercepted Communist radio messages from within Vietnam and Laos about American prisoners being moved by their captors from one site to another; a series of satellite photos that continued into the 1990s showing clear prisoner rescue signals carved into the ground in Laos and Vietnam, all labeled inconclusive by the Pentagon; multiple reports about unacknowledged prisoners from North Vietnamese informants working for U.S. intelligence agencies, all ignored or declared unreliable; persistent complaints by senior U.S. intelligence officials (some of them made publicly) that live-prisoner evidence was being suppressed; and clear proof that the Pentagon and other keepers of the "secret" destroyed a variety of files over the years to keep the P.O.W./M.I.A. families and the public from finding out and possibly setting off a major public outcry.

The resignation of Colonel Millard Peck in 1991, the first year of the Kerry committee's tenure, was one of many vivid landmarks in this saga's history. Peck had been the head of the Pentagon's P.O.W./M.I.A. office for only eight months when he resigned in disgust. In his damning departure statement, he wrote: "The mind-set to 'debunk' is alive and well. It is held at all levels . . . Practically all analysis is directed to finding fault with the source. Rarely has there been any effective, active follow-through on any of the sightings . . . The sad fact is that . . . a cover-up may be in progress. The entire charade does not appear to be an honest effort and may never have been."

Finally, Peck said: "From what I have witnessed, it appears that any soldier left in Vietnam, even inadvertently, was in fact abandoned years ago, and that the farce that is being played is no more than political legerdemain done with 'smoke and mirrors' to stall the issue until it dies a natural death."



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What did Kerry do in furtherance of the cover-up? An overview would include the following: He allied himself with those carrying it out by treating the Pentagon and other prisoner debunkers as partners in the investigation instead of the targets they were supposed to be. In short, he did their bidding. When Defense Department officials were coming to testify, Kerry would have his staff director, Frances Zwenig, meet with them to "script" the hearings—as detailed in an internal Zwenig memo leaked by others. Zwenig also advised North Vietnamese officials on how to state their case. Further, Kerry never pushed or put up a fight to get key government documents unclassified; he just rolled over, no matter how obvious it was that the documents contained confirming data about prisoners. Moreover, after promising to turn over all committee records to the National Archives when the panel concluded its work, the senator destroyed crucial intelligence information the staff had gathered—to to keep the documents from becoming public. He refused to subpoena past presidents and other key witnesses.

When revelatory sworn testimony was given to the committee by President Reagan's national security adviser, Richard Allen—about a credible proposal from Hanoi in 1981 to return more than 50 prisoners for a $4 billion ransom—Kerry had that testimony taken in a closed door interview, not a public hearing. But word leaked out and a few weeks later, Allen sent a letter to the committee, not under oath, recanting his testimony, saying his memory had played tricks on him. Kerry never did any probe into Allen's original, detailed account, and instead accepted his recantation as gospel truth.

A Secret Service agent then working at the White House, John Syphrit, told committee staffers he had overheard part of a conversation about the Hanoi proposal for ransom. He said he was willing to testify but feared reprisal from his Treasury Department superiors and would need to be subpoenaed so that his appearance could not be regarded as voluntary. Kerry refused to subpoena him. Syphrit told me that four men were involved in that conversation—Reagan, Allen, Vice President George H.W. Bush, and CIA director William Casey. I wrote the story for Newsday.

The final Kerry report brushed off the entire episode like unsightly dust. It said: "The committee found no credible evidence of any such [ransom] offer being made."



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A newcomer to this subject matter might reasonably ask why there was no great public outrage, no sustained headlines, no national demand for investigations, no penalties imposed on those who had hidden, and were still hiding, the truth. The simple, overarching explanation was that most Americans wanted to put Vietnam behind them as fast as possible. They wanted to forget this failed war, not deal with its truths or consequences. The press suffered from the same ostrich syndrome; no major media organization ever carried out an in-depth investigation by a reporting team into the prisoner issue. When prisoner stories did get into the press, they would have a one-day life span, never to be followed up on. When three secretaries of defense from the Vietnam era—James Schlesinger, Melvin Laird, and Elliot Richardson—testified before the Kerry committee, under oath, that intelligence they received at the time convinced them that numbers of unacknowledged prisoners were being held by the Communists, the story was reported by the press just that once and then dropped. The New York Times put the story on page one but never pursued it further to explore the obvious ramifications.

At that public hearing on September 21, 1992, toward the end of Schlesinger's testimony, the former defense secretary, who earlier had been CIA chief, was asked a simple question: "In your view, did we leave men behind?"

He replied: "I think that as of now, I can come to no other conclusion."

He was asked to explain why Nixon would have accepted leaving men behind. He said: "One must assume that we had concluded that the bargaining position of the United States . . . was quite weak. We were anxious to get our troops out and we were not going to roil the waters . . . "

Another example of a story not pursued occurred at the Paris peace talks. The North Vietnamese failed to provide a list of the prisoners until the treaty was signed. Afterward, when they turned over the list, U.S. intelligence officials were taken aback by how many believed prisoners were not included. The Vietnamese were returning only nine men from Laos. American records showed that more than 300 were probably being held. A story about this stunning gap, by New York Times Pentagon reporter John W. Finney, appeared on the paper's front page on February 2, 1973. The story said: "Officials emphasized that the United States would be seeking clarification . . . " No meaningful explanation was ever provided by the Vietnamese or by the Laotian Communist guerrillas, the Pathet Lao, who were satellites of Hanoi.

As a bombshell story for the media, particularly the Washington press corps, it was there for the taking. But there were no takers.

I was drawn to the P.O.W. issue because of my reporting years for The New York Times during the Vietnam War, where I came to believe that our soldiers were being misled and disserved by our government. After the war, military people who knew me and others who knew my work brought me information about live sightings of P.O.W.'s still in captivity and other evidence about their existence. When the Kerry committee was announced (I was by then a columnist at Newsday), I thought the senator—having himself become disillusioned about the Vietnam War, and eventually an advocate against it—might really be committed to digging out the truth. This was wishful thinking.

In the committee's early days, Kerry had given encouraging indications of being a committed investigator. He said he had "leads" to the existence of P.O.W.'s still in captivity. He said the number of these likely survivors was more than 100 and that this was the minimum. But in a very short time, he stopped saying such things and morphed his role into one of full alliance with the executive branch, the Pentagon, and other Washington hierarchies, joining their long-running effort to obscure and deny that a significant number of live American prisoners had not been returned. As many as 700 withheld P.O.W.'s were cited in credible intelligence documents, including a speech by a senior North Vietnamese general that was discovered in Soviet archives by an American scholar.

Here are details of a few of the specific steps Kerry took to hide evidence about these P.O.W.'s.

He gave orders to his committee staff to shred crucial intelligence documents. The shredding stopped only when some intelligence staffers staged a protest. Some wrote internal memos calling for a criminal investigation. One such memo—from John F. McCreary, a lawyer and staff intelligence analyst—reported that the committee's chief counsel, J. William Codinha, a longtime Kerry friend, "ridiculed the staff members" and said, "Who's the injured party?" When staffers cited "the 2,494 families of the unaccounted-for U.S. servicemen, among others," the McCreary memo continued, Codinha said: "Who's going to tell them? It's classified."

Kerry defended the shredding by saying the documents weren't originals, only copies—but the staff's fear was that with the destruction of the copies, the information would never get into the public domain, which it didn't. Kerry had promised the staff that all documents acquired and prepared by the committee would be turned over to the National Archives at the committee's expiration. This didn't happen. Both the staff and independent researchers reported that many critical documents were withheld.


Another protest memo from the staff reported: "An internal Department of Defense Memorandum identifies Frances Zwenig [Kerry's staff director] as the conduit to the Department of Defense for the acquisition of sensitive and restricted information from this Committee . . . lines of investigation have been seriously compromised by leaks" to the Pentagon and "other agencies of the executive branch." It also said the Zwenig leaks were "endangering the lives and livelihood of two witnesses."


A number of staffers became increasingly upset about Kerry's close relationship with the Department of Defense, which was supposed to be under examination. (Dick Cheney was then defense secretary.) It had become clear that Kerry, Zwenig, and others close to the chairman, such as Senator John McCain of Arizona, a dominant committee member, had gotten cozy with the officials and agencies supposedly being probed for obscuring P.O.W. information over the years. Committee hearings, for example, were being orchestrated to suit the examinees, who were receiving lists of potential questions in advance. Another internal memo from the period, by a staffer who requested anonymity, said: "Speaking for the other investigators, I can say we are sick and tired of this investigation being controlled by those we are supposedly investigating."


The Kerry investigative technique was equally soft in many other critical ways. He rejected all suggestions that the committee require former presidents Nixon, Ford, Reagan, and George H.W. Bush to testify. All were in the Oval Office during the Vietnam era and its aftermath. They had information critical to the committee, for each president was carefully and regularly briefed by his national security adviser and others about P.O.W. developments. It was a huge issue at that time.


Kerry also refused to subpoena the Nixon office tapes (yes, the Watergate tapes) from the early months of 1973 when the P.O.W.'s were an intense subject because of the peace talks and the prisoner return that followed. (Nixon had rejected committee requests to provide the tapes voluntarily.) Information had seeped out for years that during the Paris talks and afterward, Nixon had been briefed in detail by then national security advisor Brent Scowcroft and others about the existence of P.O.W.'s whom Hanoi was not admitting to. Nixon, distracted by Watergate, apparently decided it was crucial to get out of the Vietnam mess immediately, even if it cost those lives. Maybe he thought there would be other chances down the road to bring these men back. So he approved the peace treaty and on March 29, 1973, the day the last of the 591 acknowledged prisoners were released in Hanoi, Nixon announced on national television: "All of our American P.O.W.'s are on their way home."





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The Kerry committee's final report, issued in January 1993, delivered the ultimate insult to history. The 1,223-page document said there was "no compelling evidence that proves" there is anyone still in captivity. As for the primary investigative question —what happened to the men left behind in 1973—the report conceded only that there is "evidence . . . that indicates the possibility of survival, at least for a small number" of prisoners 31 years ago, after Hanoi released the 591 P.O.W.'s it had admitted to.

With these word games, the committee report buried the issue—and the men.

The huge document contained no findings about what happened to the supposedly "small number." If they were no longer alive, then how did they die? Were they executed when ransom offers were rejected by Washington?

Kerry now slides past all the radio messages, satellite photos, live sightings, and boxes of intelligence documents—all the evidence. In his comments for this piece, this candidate for the presidency said: "No nation has gone to the lengths that we did to account for their dead. None—ever in history."

Of the so-called "possibility" of a "small number" of men left behind, the committee report went on to say that if this did happen, the men were not "knowingly abandoned," just "shunted aside." How do you put that on a gravestone?

In the end, the fact that Senator Kerry covered up crucial evidence as committee chairman didn't seem to bother too many Massachusetts voters when he came up for re-election—or the recent voters in primary states. So I wouldn't predict it will be much of an issue in the presidential election come November. It seems there is no constituency in America for missing Vietnam P.O.W.'s except for their families and some veterans of that war.

A year after he issued the committee report, on the night of January 26, 1994, Kerry was on the Senate floor pushing through a resolution calling on President Clinton to lift the 19-year-old trade embargo against Vietnam. In the debate, Kerry belittled the opposition, saying that those who still believed in abandoned P.O.W.'s were perpetrating a hoax. "This process," he declaimed, "has been led by a certain number of charlatans and exploiters, and we should not allow fiction to cloud what we are trying to do here."

Kerry's resolution passed, by a vote of 62 to 38. Sadly for him, the passage of ten thousand resolutions cannot make up for wants in a man's character.
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Navy_Navy_Navy
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PostPosted: Sun Aug 15, 2004 9:51 pm    Post subject: Reply with quote

I suspect that this will be the next big wad that hits the fan. Schanberg has GOT IT.

Another facet of the great John Kerry that the pro-Kerry media has completely ignored.

They'd better hurry up and get out in front of it or they're going to lose the fragile little credibility they have left.
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kate
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PostPosted: Sun Aug 15, 2004 10:15 pm    Post subject: Reply with quote

POW/MIA Families Against John Kerry
http://www.powmiafamiliesagainstjohnkerry.com/

they've got some good documents on their site about the
'shredding" of reports issue
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BlueLotus
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PostPosted: Sun Aug 15, 2004 11:14 pm    Post subject: Reply with quote

This article is from February of this year and I am not sure the subject at hand will ever get the investigation and coverage it requires.

It is worth noting, however, that the author of this article is Sydney Schanberg.

Mr. Schanberg is well known for the reporting he and his fellow Cambodian reporter, Dith Pran, did during the defeat of the Lon Nol goverment and the subsequent bloodbath that ensued in the "Killing Fields" of Cambodia when the Khmer Rouge took over.

He is mostly definitely not a conservative columnist.

In fact, I would wager that Schanberg was probably pretty upset back in 1971 with Kerry's idea that we just pull the troops out tomorrow in Vietnam and everything will be hunky-dory for the people of South Vietnam.

He witnessed first hand what happened in Cambodia four years later.
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FreeFall
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PostPosted: Tue Aug 17, 2004 7:35 am    Post subject: Reply with quote

Hard to believe the Village Voice reported this. Other papers need to pick up on this.
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kmudd
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PostPosted: Wed Aug 18, 2004 8:29 pm    Post subject: Reply with quote

Here is another article on the POWs and Kerry

http://www.aiipowmia.com/reports/corry.html
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4moreyears
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PostPosted: Wed Aug 18, 2004 9:46 pm    Post subject: Reply with quote

Ask why McCain wants things hushed up. If he and kerry acted in harmony of the POW/MIA issue and put the $4 billion ahead of American captors...then don't you think that maybe...just maybe McCain has something to hide.

Shame on me for insinuating McCain in such a situation? No! My hypothesis needs to be considered and honestly I can't figure out how McCain was attracted to the dark side of the VVAW co-founder, kerry.
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kerry returned to the United States on July 22, 1971, held a press conference publicly calling on President Nixon... for the surrender of the United States to North Vietnam.
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hanna
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PostPosted: Thu Aug 19, 2004 1:25 am    Post subject: Reply with quote

My goodness. This blows me away. Do you think the bloggers have discussed this or Rush?? ACK, are there any politicians that are HONEST???
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kmudd
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PostPosted: Thu Aug 19, 2004 1:47 am    Post subject: Reply with quote

It is hard to believe McCain would knowly cover up possible living POWs being left in South East Asia.
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forgivenjojo
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PostPosted: Thu Aug 19, 2004 8:06 am    Post subject: Reply with quote

There are alot of things that happen in life that we just cant explain, but sometimes when the evidence is staring you in the face you just have to look back at it. Thirty year ago war hero doesnt give you a license to break the law or bend it so far out of shape that justice remains forever twisted.

I frankly am not impressed with John McCain. He is a war hero from Vietnam. Big Deal. He doesnt stand up for babies that are being murdered everyday (today) in this country. Anyone that has the opportunity to speak out against murder and does not do so in order that his political hide is saved is a COWARD.

While I am ranting about Heros of yesterday. What were the VFW vets thinking today? Only two stood tall and faced the other way during Kerry's speech. Are they all so old that they are more concerned about prescription drug promises and socialized health care that they have lost their will to stand up and fight.


While I am ranting and raving I want to point out some more crap I dont like.

General Tommy Franks. Said he thinks that Kerry is perfectly fit to be commander in chief. I bet he and alot of other officers are afraid if they start really looking into medals and their validity then a whole can of stink might get opened up.

I served in the USAF, four years from 91-95. I remember an incident where I was in Goma Zaire and we were surrounded at night by over head gunfire. Just random tracers over our head. When we got back we got medals (achievement medals) with wording that sounded like we really did something. The only thing we did was not get shot. We just put on our helments, held onto our rifles, and got down.

Anyone here knows that for the most part there are alot of medals given out for heroism when sometimes the situation was not as grand as described. But who wants to stand up against this elaboration, cause you know, it feels good to be a hero for a couple of days. And after that who wants to say guess what, we arent really heroes here after all? NOBODY DOES. All this crap makes us feel good when we tell our families back home about it and the girls we try to impress. We are bombarded by Hollywood ideas of heroism, and then we try and recreate it in not so herooic situations.

You wanna know about who real heroes are. They are dead. And the ones still living, DO NOT WANT TO TALK ABOUT IT.

REAL HEROES DONT TALK. They probably understand that somebody else wasnt so lucky to come back so they move on with their lives. They dont plan for it and make videos of it some thirty years ago when it was just totally odd to even have an 8mm camera during a war. And have your buddies film you. VOMIT VOMIT VOMIT

I am done
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integritycounts
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PostPosted: Thu Aug 19, 2004 8:11 am    Post subject: Reply with quote

Link for original story...may make it easier to read and share

http://www.villagevoice.com/issues/0408/schanberg.php
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kmudd
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PostPosted: Thu Aug 19, 2004 10:17 am    Post subject: Reply with quote

I didn't like McCain campaign finance laws he had passed.They try to limit free speech.
Here is a link frlom World Net Daily about McCain. I hesitate to post it since it is very critial of him.But McCain doesn't mind being critial of anyone who has a honest question of Kerry.

http://www.wnd.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=39892
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kmudd
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PostPosted: Wed Aug 25, 2004 8:37 pm    Post subject: Reply with quote

TRADE WITH VIETNAM:BILL BELL


Congressional Testimony; 6/18/1998




Congressional Testimony

06-18-1998

Statement of Bill Bell Former Chief, U.S. Office for POW/MIA Affairs, Vietnam
Before the Subcommittee on Trade, Committee on Ways and Means June 18,
1998

Mr Chairman, distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for the
opportunity to submit testimony for today's important hearing on U.S.-Vietnam
relations.

Since the initial stages of our government's postwar relations with Vietnam,
government officials responsible for the issue have had a keen awareness
of Hanoi's long range negotiating strategy. An extensive Rand Corporation
analysis of the French experience during that country's postwar development
of relations with Vietnam provides a dramatic illustration of Hanoi's intent:
"Despite the substantial political and economic concessions the French
have made to Hanoi since 1954, France has never received a full accounting
for its missing and dead. The Vietnamese communist government has consistently
circumvented and violated the terms of the 1954 agreement concerning the
accounting for France's missing servicemen. Hanoi's actions clearly demonstrate

that its only interest in the French military graves in Vietnam and the
requests for remains by the families of the deceased is in the economic
and political benefits that the Vietnamese Government can derive from control
of these remains. We should keep this in mind in dealing with Hanoi. We
can anticipate that Hanoi's objective is to obtain increasingly large economic
and political concessions in exchange for piecemeal releases of remains
and information about our missing servicemen."

Obviously our negotiators failed to heed this sound advice. But the reasons
for this incompetence have never been closely examined. Today I will attempt
to outline for your Committee the actual chain of developments that have
motivated our government's postwar relations with Vietnam. Hopefully, a
better understanding of such developments will assist your Committee in
considering President Clinton's recent waiver under the Jackson-Vanik amendment
to the Trade Act of 1974.

As you may recall, prior to 1989 our government's most important issue
concerning Vietnam was the achievement of a viable settlement in war torn
Cambodia. Subsequent to the withdrawal of a politically acceptable number
of Vietnamese forces from that country our focus shifted to the accounting
for our missing and dead from the Vietnam War. At that time the policy
of the Bush Administration dictated that the recovery of missing American
servicemen was a matter of the "highest national priority." This high priority
supported a strategy of strict reciprocity at the national level, and a
high quality investigative effort on the ground in Vietnam. This proactive,
yet cautious approach to addressing the important POW/MIA issue precipitated
Vietnam's realization that no matter how difficult the effort, our persistence
and perseverance would not diminish and only genuine cooperation would
be acceptable by our government. These factors enabled our personnel on
the ground in Vietnam to make considerable progress without large expenditures
of government funds. Trade and commercial ties were never a matter of consideration,
because we were determined not to fall in the same expensive and ultimately
futile rut left by the French.

This strategy meshed well with our long term goal of a full accounting
for our servicemen because Vietnam did not have financial incentive to
retard progress on this important national issue. Moreover, due to the
coincidental collapse of the Soviet Union, Vietnam also realized that significant
economic assistance from its wartime allies would not be forthcoming. These
conditions served to create a rare window of opportunity for our negotiators
to elicit cooperation from Vietnam in not only accounting for our missing
men, but the important human rights aspect as well.

But Vietnamese Communists are well known for several attributes, not the
least of which are cunning, tenacity and a high threshold for pain. During
the war years although the Vietnam Communist Party (VCP) constantly spouted
rhetoric concerning freedom and democracy, its primary goal was reunification
of the country under totalitarian control by the Communist Party. After
accomplishing its initial objective Hanoi's Politburo even

changed the name of the country from a "democratic" to a "socialist" republic.
The word for democracy "dan chu" quickly disappeared from letterheads of
all official government and party correspondence. Dictionaries printed
by the government did not even include the word "da dang" (multi-party).

After reunification Hanoi's design changed to development of the economy
under the continued totalitarian control of the VCP. In assessing the outlook
for reconstruction and development Hanoi's strategists came to the realization
that although genuine cooperation on POW/MIA accounting would hasten the
pace of relations and significant progress on human rights would bring
economic benefits, such cooperation would inherently lead to a weakening
of totalitarian control by (VCP). Faced with this dilemma, Hanoi's leadership
turned to its highest-level decision- making body with responsibility for
military affairs, intelligence, counter-intelligence, foreign policy, economics,
industry and strategic deception, the National Defense Council (NDC), for
salvation. The NDC of Vietnam is modeled on similar organizations of the
People's Republic of China and the former Soviet Union. I believe that
those responsible for safeguarding missile and satellite technology will
not find that thought comforting.

In planning and implementing strategic deception, the most important organ
in the communist system is the Proselytizing Department, which operates
under the authority of the NDC. This department is a very secretive and
subtle organization, and for the U.S. intelligence community, it is perhaps
the least understood element of the Communist apparatus. The basic mission
of the organization is penetration and subversion. During the war years
the Proselytizing Department enjoyed considerable success in exploiting
the anti-war movement in the U.S. and other countries around the world.
Wartime Communist leaders have since expressed the opinion that the proselytizing
effort, both in America and on an international scale, made the most important
contribution toward winning the war.

The concept by which the Proselytizing Department operates is quite simple:
Obtain the active participation of a small segment of the population in
order to gain the passive acceptance of the population as a whole. At the
local level active participation can be obtained through intimidation.
For example, during wartime years when armed propaganda teams were employed,
if a member of a village chief's family were abducted, one of his ears
would be sent to the family. Unless the village chief performed the deed
requested of him by the communist forces, the head of the family member
would soon follow. In dealing with foreign populations, however, active
participation is more often achieved by subtle means. This includes playing
on the emotions of a family whose loved one is being held prisoner-of-war,
or by exploiting character defects, especially monetary greed, or what
in intelligence terms is called "a penchant for wealth." The Proselytizing
Department is also responsible for both agitation- propaganda and the exploitation
of U.S. POWs. This includes the remains and personal effects of American
servicemen killed during the performance of their duties.

By the time of the 1986 Party Congress, Hanoi's National Defense Council
had outlined a plan for development of the economy while feigning cooperation
on POW/MIA and human rights. This plan was veiled as "an opening to the
West" and "renovation," what the Vietnamese call "doi moi." In order to
implement this plan, seasoned cadre from the Proselytizing Department were
gradually transferred to positions dealing with individuals and organizations
in the U.S. involved in commerce, human rights and veterans affairs.

For example, Senior Proselytizing cadre Nguyen Chinh was transferred from
Region 5 in Central Vietnam to Hanoi where he was assigned as the Deputy
Director of Religious Affairs dealing with U.S. officials concerned with
human rights. Cadre Nguyen Hung Tri, who had been one of numerous cadre
responsible for the interrogation and exploitation of American prisoners
in the South, was reassigned as Director of the Export Section of the National
Petroleum Import-Export Department. LTG Tran Van Quang, the former Chief
of the Proselytizing Department, was reassigned as head of the National
Veterans Organization dealing with so- called "Veterans Initiatives" of
the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) and Vietnam Veterans of America (VVA).
Cadre Dang Thuan Hoa, who was also responsible for the interrogation and
exploitation of American prisoners in southern Vietnam during the war,
was reassigned to the Commercial Affairs Office in Ho Chi Minh City dealing
with American businessmen seeking to invest in projects there. Members
of the Proselytizing Department's office in Central Vietnam were transferred
to the State Petroleum Organization and shortly thereafter a plan to build
an oil refinery in that area was announced. Ultimately, hundreds of cadre
from Vietnam's Proselytizing Department were reassigned to positions placing
them in direct contact with Americans in the targeted "influence groups."

After sufficient proselytizing cadre were in place Vietnam still faced
one major obstacle, hard currency to finance the overall operation. Hanoi's
strategists then devised a plan whereby large sums of hard currency could
be collected. By forcing hundreds of thousands of its citizens to flee
the country Hanoi was able to quickly establish a large community of overseas
Vietnamese. Most of those departing under this program were required to
transfer all personal and real property, as well as cash assets, to communist
control. To manage this potential source of future revenue, Hanoi reassigned
its former UN Ambassador in New York and Vice Foreign Minister, Ho Liem
(aka Hoang Bich Son) as Chairman of the Committee for Overseas Vietnamese.
Overseas Vietnamese then began to send money home to support relatives
remaining in Vietnam. Hard currency mailed from the U.S., Canada, France,
England, Australia and other countries back to Vietnam was intercepted
by the communist Party and converted into Vietnamese "dong" at a very unfavorable
rate. overseas Vietnamese seeking to return home for visitation, including
emergency situations, were required to pay exorbitant visa issuance fees
in hard currency to the relevant Vietnamese Embassy prior to commencement
of travel. Unfortunately for the Vietnamese people at home, however, visa
fees are not a problem because they cannot

even acquire a passport to temporarily travel abroad. As a basis for comparison,
in America and other democratic countries, it is far more simple to file
for social security disability than for a Vietnamese citizen to obtain
a passport.

In much the same manner as the French experience on POW/MIA accounting,
to develop yet another source of revenue Hanoi used its Proselytizing Department
to create an illusion of profitable business opportunities, a "last frontier"
if you will, in Vietnam. This skillful deception, which included what appeared
to be very lucrative contracts to be implemented as soon as the Trade Embargo
was lifted, resulted in increased pressure from the business community
on U.S. politicians to rapidly remove the POW/MIA issue as an obstacle
to the development of trade ties, regardless of the actual rate of progress
in accounting for our men. To accomplish this feat, the Proselytizing Department
worked hand-in-hand with key members of the U.S. business community, some
members of Congress and veterans organizations to convince our military
leaders that the best way to resolve the issue was a rapid expansion of
our POW/MIA accounting effort in the field.

This expansion consisted primarily of so-called "activities," which included
field cursory investigations and excavations of crash sites. These "activities"
resulted in the rental of Russian supplied helicopters, real property rentals,
the payment of salaries for cadre of the Proselytizing Department participating
in the endeavor, drivers, laborers, organization fees, landing fees, damages
caused by excavations and a host of other charges. I believe that by simultaneously
exploiting emigration and the accounting for missing American servicemen
Hanoi has managed to accumulate a considerable amount of hard currency.
Such revenue gathering practices continue today as these hearings are being
held, and quite frankly I believe they generate far more funds than what
Export-Import Bank financing could provide.

In 1991 the U.S. Senate established the Senate Select Committee for POW/MIA
Affairs. The Chairman of this Committee, Senator John Kerry appointed his
Legislative Assistant, Ms Francis Zwenig, as the Chief of Staff for the
Committee. During the life of the Committee Senator Kerry worked most closely
with Representative Douglas "Pete', Peterson to authorize funding for the
new, expanded effort to account for missing American servicemen in Vietnam.
As a result of these joint efforts, in January 1992 the Joint Task Force-Full
Accounting was formed by the U.S. Pacific Command. In order to gain acceptance
of the new plan in Vietnam Senator Kerry also coordinated his efforts with
fellow committee member, Senator John McCain (R, AZ).

In implementing Senator Kerry-and Representative Peterson's plan, Ms Zwenig
worked closely with Ms Virginia Foote, the President of the U.S./Vietnam
Trade Council, Allen "Gunner" Kent, former Commander-in-Chief of the Veterans
of Foreign Wars (VFW), and Mr Kenneth Steadman, at that time the Director
of National Security of the VFW. As the Committee moved toward adjournment
it became increasingly obvious that rather than account for missing American
servicemen, the primary goal of the Committee was to remove the POW/MIA
issue from the path of U.S./Vietnam relations.

Members of the Committee pledged to continue to monitor the issue, but
in reality only Senator Bob Smith kept his promise to the MIA family members
and veterans here at home.

During the time that key members of the POW/MIA Select Committee maneuvered
to remove the Trade Embargo, large scale investors in Asia, who would ultimately
become large scale campaign contributors in America began to support the
activities of members of the Committee designed to create investment opportunities
in Vietnam. In 1992, with a one-on-one limousine ride, Presidential candidate
Bill Clinton began his relationship with Mr James Riady, a citizen of Indonesia
and resident alien of the United States. Mr Riady is the son of Mochtar
Riady who heads the multi-billion dollar Lippo Group. Acting on behalf
of the Lippo Group Mr Riady formed a partnership with Mr Jackson Stephens,
Chairman of Stephens Investment Inc., in order to purchase the Worthen
Bank in Little Rock, AR. Mr Riady was subsequently installed as the director
of the bank. Mr Riady then used his position to contribute or loan some
$700,000.00 to President Clinton's campaign. Family friends and business
partners of the Riadys, Ariel and Soraya Wiriadinata, also contributed
$425,000.00 to the Clinton campaign. Rather than explain the source of
these monies by testifying in congressional hearings, the Wiriadinatas
have since returned to Jakarta, Indonesia.

The Worthen Bank in Little Rock also owned the Hong Kong Chinese Bank where
Mr John Huang was employed. Mr Huang was later transferred from Hong Kong
to Los Angeles where he became head of Lippo's affiliate there. Records
since made available to investigating committees of Congress indicate that
in conjunction with his transfer to the U.S. Mr Huang was awarded a $700,000.00
bonus by the Lippo Group. Considering the position held by Mr Huang and
the circumstances of his employment, the alleged bonus has raised questions
regarding the intended purpose of the relatively large amount of cash,
and whether or not it was properly declared for entry into the U.S. Moreover,
in November 1992, China Resources Holding Company, a front organization
for the Intelligence and Security Services of the Communist Party of China,
purchased a controlling interest in the Hong Kong Chinese Bank. This transaction
made available an even larger amount of money to Mr Huang in the U.S.

During his election campaign President Clinton pledged to the American
people that if elected he "would not normalize relations with any country
that is at all suspected of withholding information" on missing Americans.
After the election of President Clinton Mr John Huang was appointed as
a Deputy 7..

Assistant Secretary under Commerce Secretary Ron Brown in a "Top Secret"
trade post. When Mr Huang assumed his new position at the Commerce Department
the very first meeting he held in his new office was oriented toward developing
increased commercial relations with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

Hearings held by the Senate Committee investigating campaign financing
revealed that during the time he worked in the Commerce

Department under Ron Brown, John Huang maintained steady contact with Mr
A. Vernon Weaver, the Vice-President of Stephens Investment in Washington,
D.C. In fact, Mr Huang was provided a cost-free office with telephone,
facsimile and photocopy machine in the Stephens Building across the street
from the Commerce Department. During the same time frame, Secretary Brown
became the subject of a Justice Department investigation concerning allegations
he accepted a $700,000.00 bribe for his assistance in lobbying President
Clinton to lift the Trade Embargo against Vietnam. The reports indicating
that Mr Riady loaned the Clinton campaign $700,000.00, that John Huang
received a $700,000.00 bonus from the Lippo Group, and that former Commerce
Secretary Brown received a $700,000.00 bribe may be coincidental, but considering
the positions of those involved and their relationship to each other, I
seriously doubt that this is the case.

After repeated denials to the press, Secretary Brown did admit to having
three meetings with Mr Nguyen Van Hao, a Vietnamese who was actively lobbying
on behalf of Vietnam to have the Trade Embargo lifted. Mr A. Vernon Weaver
was subsequently appointed as the U.S. Representative to the European Economic
Union. The investigation of Mr Brown was terminated when he died on April
4, 1996 in an airplane crash while on an economic mission to Europe.

After expanded accounting efforts were initiated in Vietnam senior U.S.
officials first began praising Vietnam for its cooperation in accounting
for our missing men during January 1994 when Admiral Charles Larson, at
that time the Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Forces, returned from an inspection
trip to Vietnam. It was Admiral Larson who first stated publicly that Vietnamese
cooperation in accounting for missing Americans was "excellent across all
fronts." Admiral Larson was a four star Admiral at the time and pending
retirement because there were no four star slots available in the U.S.
Navy.

Based on Admiral Larson's assessment, in February 1994 President Clinton
lifted the trade embargo against Vietnam. Amazingly, between the time that
President Clinton made his pledge that he would not normalize relations
with Vietnam until there was a full accounting and the time he lifted the
Trade Embargo only two Americans had been accounted for in Vietnam. Lifting
the embargo opened the door for the multi-billion dollar corporation, Lippo
Group with American business partners, such as Stephens Investment of Little
Rock, AR to conduct business in Vietnam. Mr A. Vernon Weaver, at that time
the Vice-President for Operations in the Pacific Rim of Stephens Investment
and a member of the Board of Visitors at the U.S. Naval Academy was instrumental
in arranging an upgrade of the position of Commandant of the U.S. Naval
Academy from two stars to four stars. Former U.S. Navy officers, Senators
John Kerry and John McCain supported this reorganization. Rather than the
planned retirement, Admiral Larson was quickly transferred to begin a four
year tour at the Naval Academy.

President Clinton then appointed VFW Commander-in-Chief, Allen "Gunner"
Kent of the VFW to a senior position in the Veterans

Administration (VA) . After working on the transition team of former Secretary
Ron Brown at the Commerce Department, Ms Francis Zwenig was appointed as
Vice-President of the U.S. Vietnam Trade Council. Shortly thereafter, the
Council took control of the Mekong Digest, formerly the Vietnam Forum of
the Vietnam Veterans Against the War. A friend of both President Clinton
and Senator John Kerry and fellow anti-war activist from Georgia, Mr Charles
Searcy, was appointed as a humanitarian aid representative for Vietnam,
on a project jointly funded by the U.S. Government and the Vietnam Veterans
of America Foundation headed by Mr Robert Muller, also a well-known anti-war
activist. Vietnam then announced that it would issue its first real estate
license to Senator John Kerry's cousin, Mr Stuart Forbes, CEO of the Boston-
based Colliers International. Representative "Pete" Peterson was appointed
by President Clinton as Ambassador to Vietnam. Senator John McCain became
Chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee.

Mr John Huang, was ultimately appointed as Vice- Chairman of the national
fund-raising committee of the Democratic Party. Mr Huang's fund raising
efforts included a visit by Vice President Gore to a Buddhist Temple in
California headed by Vietnamese born Summa Ching Hai, a long time associate
of both Huang and Little Rock, AR restaurant owner Charlie Trii. Highly
classified documents of the Vietnam Communist Party (VCP), recently declassified
in the National Archives, indicate that the Religious Proselytizing Department
of the VCP, code named V.417, successfully infiltrated cadre into the Buddhist
Sect in the former Republic of Vietnam during the 1960's. According to
the Chairman of the Washington, D.C., Maryland and Virginia Vietnamese
Association, some of the cadre mentioned in the documents have since arrived
in the U.S. as refugees. These same cadre, currently in leadership positions
in the Buddhist Sect in California, now profess to be staunch anti-communists.
Testimony from members of the staff at the temple involved in the fund-
raising, as well as numerous others involved, indicate that those participating
in the scheme of Huang were well aware that the sole purpose of the visit
by the Vice President was to raise money for the Clinton-Gore campaign.
In fact, the only person involved who has publicly claimed to be unaware
that the event was a fund raiser is Vice President Gore himself.

Although considerable questions remain unanswered some of the key people
involved, Mr John Huang, Admiral Larson, Ms Virginia Foote, Ms Francis
Zwenig or Mr A. Vernon Weaver have never testified in Congress. More recently
the Justice Department has authorized the appointment of an additional
Special Counsel to investigate allegations of illegal business transactions
between Labor Secretary Alexis Herman and Vanessa Weaver. Hopefully, this
investigation will uncover additional leads for Congressional Committees
to follow in the days ahead.

Contrary to the glowing assessments by the Clinton Administration, MIA
family member organizations have maintained that Vietnam could rapidly
account for many more missing servicemen if it made the political decision
to do so. I believe that there is ample evidence in U.S. files that Vietnam
does possess this capability. Against opposition by MIA family member

organizations and major veterans organizations, including the American
Legion, Vietnam Veterans of America, the National Vietnam Veterans Coalition,
American Veterans, and the Disabled American Veterans, President Clinton
recently waived the Jackson- Vanik Act in order to provide monetary benefits
to Vietnam. Such benefits include Export-Import Bank financing and Overseas
Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) insurance. obviously, both important
steps are directed at obtaining Most Favored Nation (MFN) trading status
for Vietnam.

During my tour as Chief of the U.S. Office for POW/MIA Affairs in Hanoi
I was constantly mindful of the French experience in Vietnam. I was also
painfully aware of the plight of some 70 million Vietnamese citizens regarding
basic human rights. Relying on a wealth of information contained in U.S.
Government files and based on my own experiences in dealing with Vietnam
over many years I carefully evaluated the actual level of cooperation rendered
by Vietnam on a routine basis. I truthfully and accurately reported those
assessments to my superiors. At times, my candidness during congressional
hearings here in Washington, D.C. resulted in my being denied a re-entry
visa to return Vietnam from those hearings, and it was only intervention
by your prestigious body that enabled me to resume my duties in Hanoi.
Today I do not have to be concerned about how my remarks will be received
by my superiors here in the U.S. Government, or by the Communist Party
in Hanoi. Hopefully, I have provided some insight concerning how our political
process can be manipulated by foreign entities. I am optimistic that this
information, as well as information to be provided by witnesses involved
in other aspects of the U.S.-Vietnam relationship, will help your Committee
convince our leadership that profit must not come before principle in the
development of commercial ties with the Vietnam.

Organizations lobbying for increased financial benefits to Vietnam, especially
Overseas Private Investment Corporation insurance are well aware that the
Communist Party of Vietnam, not the government of Vietnam runs that country.
They are clamoring for your Committee to move ahead in U.S.-Vietnam relations.
They are telling the families of the missing men that they should trust
the Communist Party to provide an honest accounting. They are telling the
Vietnamese people that they should trust the Communist Party in future
progress for human rights. Mr Chairman, if these lobbyists have so much
trust in the Communist Party of Vietnam, then why do they need government
sponsored insurance such as OPIC to protect their investments?

You may recall that during the Proselytizing Department's campaign to rapidly
normalize relations while feigning improvement on POW/MIA accounting and
human rights glib statements such as "its the economy stupid," and "Vietnam
is not a war, its a country" were often attributed to a number of government
officials and members of Congress returning from fact finding missions
to Vietnam. I hope your Committee will agree that statements such as "its
the missing servicemen and human rights stupid," and "Vietnam is not a
war, its a socialist republic" are far more appropriate statements to make.

That concludes my testimony, I greatly appreciate the opportunity to testify
before your distinguished Committee.
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Bostonian
Seaman Apprentice


Joined: 14 Aug 2004
Posts: 81

PostPosted: Wed Aug 25, 2004 9:13 pm    Post subject: Reply with quote

I have to say, I don't know what to believe here.

I do know that I have no reason to believe John Kerry's assurances on this subject.
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kmudd
Master Chief Petty Officer


Joined: 16 Aug 2004
Posts: 825

PostPosted: Wed Aug 25, 2004 9:17 pm    Post subject: Reply with quote

This part is really bad.


In 1991 the U.S. Senate established the Senate Select Committee for POW/MIA
Affairs. The Chairman of this Committee, Senator John Kerry appointed his
Legislative Assistant, Ms Francis Zwenig, as the Chief of Staff for the
Committee. During the life of the Committee Senator Kerry worked most closely
with Representative Douglas "Pete', Peterson to authorize funding for the
new, expanded effort to account for missing American servicemen in Vietnam.
As a result of these joint efforts, in January 1992 the Joint Task Force-Full
Accounting was formed by the U.S. Pacific Command. In order to gain acceptance
of the new plan in Vietnam Senator Kerry also coordinated his efforts with
fellow committee member, Senator John McCain (R, AZ).

In implementing Senator Kerry-and Representative Peterson's plan, Ms Zwenig
worked closely with Ms Virginia Foote, the President of the U.S./Vietnam
Trade Council, Allen "Gunner" Kent, former Commander-in-Chief of the Veterans
of Foreign Wars (VFW), and Mr Kenneth Steadman, at that time the Director
of National Security of the VFW. As the Committee moved toward adjournment
it became increasingly obvious that rather than account for missing American
servicemen, the primary goal of the Committee was to remove the POW/MIA
issue from the path of U.S./Vietnam relations.

Members of the Committee pledged to continue to monitor the issue, but
in reality only Senator Bob Smith kept his promise to the MIA family members
and veterans here at home.

During the time that key members of the POW/MIA Select Committee maneuvered
to remove the Trade Embargo, large scale investors in Asia, who would ultimately
become large scale campaign contributors in America began to support the
activities of members of the Committee designed to create investment opportunities
in Vietnam. In 1992, with a one-on-one limousine ride, Presidential candidate
Bill Clinton began his relationship with Mr James Riady, a citizen of Indonesia
and resident alien of the United States. Mr Riady is the son of Mochtar
Riady who heads the multi-billion dollar Lippo Group. Acting on behalf
of the Lippo Group Mr Riady formed a partnership with Mr Jackson Stephens,
Chairman of Stephens Investment Inc., in order to purchase the Worthen
Bank in Little Rock, AR. Mr Riady was subsequently installed as the director
of the bank. Mr Riady then used his position to contribute or loan some
$700,000.00 to President Clinton's campaign. Family friends and business
partners of the Riadys, Ariel and Soraya Wiriadinata, also contributed
$425,000.00 to the Clinton campaign. Rather than explain the source of
these monies by testifying in congressional hearings, the Wiriadinatas
have since returned to Jakarta, Indonesia.
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