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Craig
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 Posted: Mon May 24, 2004 5:55 am Post subject: Ex-Centcom Chief Zinni Blasts Pentagon for War Woes |
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Ex-Centcom Chief Zinni Blasts Pentagon for War Woes
Sun May 23, 9:24 PM ET
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WASHINGTON (Reuters) - Retired Marine General Anthony Zinni, former chief of U.S. Central Command, accused senior Pentagon (news - web sites) officials of failure in executing the Iraq (news - web sites) war and told CBS' "60 Minutes" on Sunday they should resign.
"Somebody has screwed up. And at this level and at this stage, it should be evident to everybody that they've screwed up. And whose heads are rolling on this? That's what bothers me most," Zinni said without naming names.
Zinni, commander-in-chief of the U.S. Central Command from 1997 to 2000, said planning for the Iraq war and its aftermath had been flawed from the start.
Zinni's scathing critique of the Pentagon and its handling of the war in Iraq are included in a new book about his career, co-written by Tom Clancy, called "Battle Ready," CBS reported.
Zinni told "60 Minutes": "I think there was dereliction in insufficient forces being put on the ground and (in not) fully understanding the military dimensions of the plan."
"If you're the secretary of defense and you're responsible for that. If you're responsible for that planning and that execution on the ground.
"If you've assumed responsibility for the other elements, non-military, non-security, political, economic, social and everything else, then you bear responsibility," Zinni said.
Zinni did not refer to the current secretary of defense, Donald Rumsfeld, by name.
Before his retirement in 2000, Zinni drew up invasion plans that called for deploying 300,000 troops, more than double the roughly 140,000 now in Iraq.
"Certainly those in your ranks that foisted this strategy on us that is flawed. Certainly they ought to be gone and replaced," he added.
"If I were the commander of a military organization that delivered this kind of performance to the president, I certainly would tender my resignation. I certainly would expect to be gone," Zinni said.
The four-star Marine general broke ranks with the Bush administration over the war and has since expressed concern about the security situation in Iraq and about what he said was a lack of planning for the postwar era.
Zinni told "60 Minutes" it was time to change course in Iraq. "The course is headed over Niagara Falls. I think it's time to change course a little bit or at least hold somebody responsible for putting you on this course. Because it's been a failure," he said.
He said the United States is now viewed in the region not as an entity that is promising positive Democratic change but as "the modern crusaders, as the modern colonial power in this part of the world."
"60 Minutes" said Rumsfeld and his deputy, Paul Wolfowitz had declined a request to respond to Zinni's remarks. |
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mikest
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Joined: 11 May 2004
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| Posted: Mon May 24, 2004 6:29 am Post subject: |
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From CBS
| Quote: | In the book, Zinni writes: "In the lead up to the Iraq war and its later conduct, I saw at a minimum, true dereliction, negligence and irresponsibility, at worse, lying, incompetence and corruption."
“I think there was dereliction in insufficient forces being put on the ground and fully understanding the military dimensions of the plan. I think there was dereliction in lack of planning,” says Zinni. “The president is owed the finest strategic thinking. He is owed the finest operational planning. He is owed the finest tactical execution on the ground. … He got the latter. He didn’t get the first two.”
Zinni says Iraq was the wrong war at the wrong time - with the wrong strategy. And he was saying it before the U.S. invasion. In the months leading up to the war, while still Middle East envoy, Zinni carried the message to Congress: “This is, in my view, the worst time to take this on. And I don’t feel it needs to be done now.”
But he wasn’t the only former military leader with doubts about the invasion of Iraq. Former General and National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, former Centcom Commander Norman Schwarzkopf, former NATO Commander Wesley Clark, and former Army Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki all voiced their reservations.
Zinni believes this was a war the generals didn’t want – but it was a war the civilians wanted.
“I can't speak for all generals, certainly. But I know we felt that this situation was contained. Saddam was effectively contained. The no-fly, no-drive zones. The sanctions that were imposed on him,” says Zinni.
“Now, at the same time, we had this war on terrorism. We were fighting al Qaeda. We were engaged in Afghanistan. We were looking at 'cells' in 60 countries. We were looking at threats that we were receiving information on and intelligence on. And I think most of the generals felt, let's deal with this one at a time. Let's deal with this threat from terrorism, from al Qaeda.” |
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mikest
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Joined: 11 May 2004
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| Posted: Mon May 24, 2004 6:46 am Post subject: |
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| Quote: | Gen. Joseph P. Hoar (USMC-ret.), a four-star general, was Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command (1991-94), commanding the U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf after the 1991 war. He also served in the Vietnam War, as a battalion and brigade advisor with the Vietnamese Marines. He was interviewed by Jeffrey Steinberg on May 6, 2004.
EIR: You were one of the people who had been critical before the outbreak of fighting, over whether or not the situation warranted going to war. I believe you also had some rather accurate warnings about what might happen, as the war unfolded, especially after the hot phase. What's your thinking on these issues now, in hindsight, as we're over a year past the formal fighting phase?
Hoar: There's small comfort in realizing that perhaps you were closer to reality than the elected and appointed figures in the civilian government. Those of us that have had some experience in the region over the years, and don't necessarily have ulterior motivations, particularly people that know very much about Iraq—and I don't necessarily put myself in that category; specifically, I know a fair amount about the political-military situation in the region, but know enough about Iraq to know that any military operation and any subsequent reconstruction efforts, to include the interjection of democracy, were going to be extremely difficult, and perhaps impossible....
...What was your sense of the neo-con vision of what was going to happen in Iraq?
Hoar: Well I think that there were two problems: The first one was that they created a set of circumstances that didn't exist on the ground, and they were aided and abetted in this process by Ahmed Chalabi, who, to this day, is still on the U.S. government payroll. And Chalabi is a fraud. He was in the early 1990s, when I first came across him. Tony Zinni has spoken out against him, and got in a lot of trouble with [Sen.] Trent Lott [R-Miss.], for fighting to prevent the Congress from giving Chalabi's Iraqi Congress $94 million a few years ago.
Chalabi very quickly realized that the neo-cons wanted to hear certain things, and he obliged them, by giving them information, including planting erroneous intelligence. All of the stories, from dancing in the streets, to the locations of weapons of mass destruction, were all fabrications. And the people in the government bought into this, and there's some evidence that they even cooked the books, with respect to intelligence information, so that they could cherry-pick unrefined information that had come to the United States, through intelligence sources, in order to make the case.
...EIR: Do you see any evidence, from within the particularly neo-conservative circles within the Bush Administration, that there's any sense of lessons learned, any kind of rethinking, as the result of the mess that we're in on the ground right now in Iraq?
Hoar: Well, the military doesn't always get it right. But, one of the things that the military has learned over the years, is that you continually have reviews about how organizations perform. And you have after-action reports, you have critical discussions about what went well, and what went wrong. I see no evidence of anybody in this government going back and looking back at the events of the last couple of years, with an effort to try and determine what went well, and what went wrong.
And, I mean on the ground. I don't mean the 9/11 Commission, and some of these others that are more narrowly focussed. We have had a Congressional committee to look at intelligence....
...Hoar: Well, Jeff, I don't think all is lost. But, we're getting to the point, where it is becoming increasingly more difficult to make the case that our purposes were noble and that the end of this occupation will be a better day for the Iraqis. We have a lot of convincing to do, to convince the Iraqis of our nobility and our honest efforts, with regard to a new Iraq. And, without their belief in our noble efforts, and without their active support, the success of this endeavor is almost certainly doomed to failure.
There are some things that can be done: the UN multinational effort; a serious increase in resources, both in terms of troops on the ground, and also money to help rebuild the country and convince these people that we have their best interests at heart.
But, I think we're running out of time. If something is not done soon, I think it may be irretrievable.
EIR: With some pretty horrifying consequences, both for the region as a whole, and also elsewhere around the planet.
Hoar: Well, and for the reputation of the United States. We are certainly not going to come out of this, with our reputation as a beacon for democracy intact. In fact, it's seriously damaged already. |
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hist/student
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Joined: 09 May 2004
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| Posted: Mon May 24, 2004 10:51 am Post subject: |
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unabashed comprehensive retraction
Last edited by hist/student on Sat Jul 24, 2004 12:58 am; edited 1 time in total |
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Richard
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Joined: 18 May 2004
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Location: Gainesville, FL
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| Posted: Mon May 24, 2004 1:13 pm Post subject: |
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Craig,
Allow me a critique of your post. Cutting-and-pasting some article with no comment of your own adds nothing. In fact, it says more about you as a conversationalist and poster than it does about the subject you post about.
If you want us to read an article, please explain why and then give us a link.
Richard
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Me#1You#10
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Joined: 06 May 2004
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| Posted: Mon May 24, 2004 2:24 pm Post subject: |
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While hawking a current book will never be an enhancement to credibility in the mind of those with a different dog in the hunt, Zinni has both a record of service and stature that must be, at least, honored and respected.
There's a vast predominance of good men and women on both sides of this issue. Let them speak, listen to what they have to say, then either accept it or discount it, or do a little of both.
I'm not all that familiar with Zinni's views, and I found a fairly in-depth Zinni interview published in March, 2001. Might be a good read.
Conversations with History: Institute of International Studies, UC Berkeley
| Quote: | ... Let's talk a little about terrorism, for example. It seems that one of the conundrums as one reviews these events is that as a global power, we're everywhere. And that's a measure of our helping to bring security to the world, on the one hand. But on the other hand, being there makes us a target, that is, the military itself, for terrorist acts to score a point, as opposed to achieving a victory. Is this a problem you have to deal with? How does the military go about dealing with that?
I would just make two points. One, this idea that we're there to bring peace and stability -- I think we ought to be clear that we're there to have peace and stability because it's in our interest. If you lack peace and stability in most parts of the world, it affects our way of life and our economic well being and other things. I mean, this isn't a purely altruistic drill out there.
Secondly, I would say that it isn't just the military, the American military, that's at risk. We had two embassies blown up in my region, in Tanzania and in Kenya. In my region in my time, we had American businessmen killed in Pakistan and Karachi [for] doing business-related things. We've had threats to tourists. We've had tourist targets hit and struck in Egypt, and at the turn of the millennium we had a tremendous terrorist threat against tourists in Jordan that was uncovered. And, obviously, the Jordanians and Pakistanis and others did a great job in dealing and coming to grips with that.
It isn't just the American military that's at risk. And it isn't just Americans. We can harden the American military and resist mightily the ability to attack us; we're just going to pass the attack off to something else, or someone else. And those attacks are not in our interest. We begin to believe or convey this idea to the American military; then the tendency is we can resolve the problem if we withdraw. If we withdraw, these attacks will go somewhere else. And when we withdraw, we will then permit instability and we will feel the effects back here. |
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mikest
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Joined: 11 May 2004
Posts: 377
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| Posted: Mon May 24, 2004 2:57 pm Post subject: |
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| hist/student wrote: | Some how Zinni and CBS neglected to mention Zinni was Powells special envoy to the Mid East in the early days of the admisnistration. His job was to get 'the roadmap' going.
Within a week he had failed completely at his mission and retired soon afterward. The war in Iraq was not part of his brief, just as it was not in Richard Clarks brief.
Not good of him or Clark to opine endlessy on topics not part of their job, yet portrayed by themselves and the media (CBS) as if it were.... Using their uniform to lend credibility to their performance.
Reminds me of Kerry |
Standard Bush procedure.The people who have been working in the region for years don't know anything. Wolfowitz and Feith are the people who know what they're talking about. 3 out of 4 CENTCOM commanders don't know anything about the ME. Chalabi does, and he will be honest with us at all times. |
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Craig
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| Posted: Mon May 24, 2004 4:01 pm Post subject: |
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| Richard wrote: | Craig,
Allow me a critique of your post. Cutting-and-pasting some article with no comment of your own adds nothing. In fact, it says more about you as a conversationalist and poster than it does about the subject you post about.
If you want us to read an article, please explain why and then give us a link.
Richard |
Okay. I will allow it.
You have an opinion. Good for you.
I posted the article. In Usenet groups I always post a link to articles.
I have not found folks here all that cooperative about posting links when asked so I have figured that to be local policy.
I had watched the interview then used a couple keywords and a lot came up in Google > news. |
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hist/student
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Joined: 09 May 2004
Posts: 243
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| Posted: Mon May 24, 2004 4:52 pm Post subject: |
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unabashed comprehensive retraction
Last edited by hist/student on Sat Jul 24, 2004 1:00 am; edited 1 time in total |
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mikest
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Joined: 11 May 2004
Posts: 377
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| Posted: Mon May 24, 2004 5:56 pm Post subject: |
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| Quote: | Mikest, I am pissed about Chalabi. Have been aware he was likely a spook for over ten years. If the Iraqi national congress is all exiles and enemies of Sadaam how was it none of them were assasinated in the past 20 years? Sadaam was big on killing his enemies where ever they were.
On a side note I"ve been saying since the day it happend the anthrax attacks were from Sadaam. A very sophisticated plot (like 9-11) seemingly designed to poison American domestic politics. |
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That's my point. Chalabi had been discedited by state, CIA and many of our allies. Yet the top people in the admin were dead set on making him the leaderof Iraq. On top of that they used his info to discredit many other intel agencies info. And now it looks like, but hasn't been proven yet, someone was giving him highly clasified and sensative info that put our troops at risk. |
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carpro
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Posts: 1176
Location: Texas
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| Posted: Mon May 24, 2004 6:42 pm Post subject: |
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I have a lot of respect for Zinni. Could be the Marine connection. I'm not sure what his complaint is. HIS plans called for an invasion force of 300,000. Marines ALWAYS believe in overwhelming fire superiority. But Saddams army was defeated and the country taken with far fewer troops.
That part is over and done with.
If he's talking about needing 300,000 to maintain control of the country, my only question would be, what would be different about the current situation in Iraq if we had 300,000 there? Where would those troops be and what would they be doing? I don't know the answers, I haven't checked my crystal ball lately.
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"If he believes his 1971 indictment of his country and his fellow veterans was true, then he couldn't possibly be proud of his Vietnam service." |
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mikest
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| Posted: Mon May 24, 2004 6:51 pm Post subject: |
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| As near as I can tell, and obviously this is conjecture, we would be able to have far more forces in the trouble spots. I figure we have plenty of people in the relatively quiet spots so the extra 150,000 could be deployed in the 3-6 trouble spots. That's 25-50,000 more soldiers to quell the unrest in those areas. I think I read somewhere that we had about 3,000 troops around Faluja during the worst part of the fighting there, with a much larger force we may have been able to stop that before it grew too large. |
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carpro
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| Posted: Mon May 24, 2004 7:58 pm Post subject: |
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| mikest wrote: | | As near as I can tell, and obviously this is conjecture, we would be able to have far more forces in the trouble spots. I figure we have plenty of people in the relatively quiet spots so the extra 150,000 could be deployed in the 3-6 trouble spots. That's 25-50,000 more soldiers to quell the unrest in those areas. I think I read somewhere that we had about 3,000 troops around Faluja during the worst part of the fighting there, with a much larger force we may have been able to stop that before it grew too large. |
The Marines replaced one of the Army airborne divisions at Falluja. I'm not sure that the Army ever really decided to clean out that city. To the best of my knowledge, you are correct that the Marines had about 3000 men there to clean out that nest of resistance. They seemed to think they could get the job done and pretty quickly. Overly confident or planning on reinforcements? Don't know. They stopped because, from a political or public relations standpoint, it was going to be a bloody job.
My feeling is that more troops would probably be helpful but not absolutely necessary.
They changed tactics to use local militia to keep the peace. Been pretty quiet since. Something may be working.
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"If he believes his 1971 indictment of his country and his fellow veterans was true, then he couldn't possibly be proud of his Vietnam service." |
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