SwiftVets.com

[NavyChief]

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[Wing Wiper]

Navy Chief: Is there any chance KJW was assigned to Kerry because KJF was in use (or had been used) by someone else? Was there a list maintained somewhere to assign these "codes" to make sure there were not two of the same in use simultaneously? Just a thought.

[NavyChief]

deleted

[IDLE13rebelsMC]

Okay, Chief, lessee if my trivia holds up here. Would have provided this earlier, but my computer went TANGO UNIFORM and lost a lot of text I had to reconstruct.

NC: On each message, the TOR line is in the same type font as the message. Did comms personnel type the whole message? If not, the TOR line was part of the printing of the message?

IDLE: Varies. In Navy message centers in those days, you had regular looking typewriters with fonts similar to if not nearly identical to the teletype fonts. (In fact, the letters were all bold. It was weird typing a letter home WHEN EVERY LETTER IS CAPS. Folks back home got used to it, but initially it struck them as odd, like I was EMPHASIZING EVERYTHING.)

NC: Routing stamps to the top right of messages: 7 different stamps used throughout the messages. KJW shows up on three distinct routing stamps under the chop of 115 and 115.4. It is probable that the COMNAVFORV (Saigon) comms center would have different stamps, but how did 115 and 115.4 chops get on these messages? Could KJW be in both places as 115 and 115.4? My understanding was the 115 - Captain Hoffman was in Cam Ranh Bay and 115.4 - CDR Lonsdale was in An Thoi.

IDLE: You have hand-written “115.4” scribbled on the copy of the message about the mining of PCF-3 (CTE 194.5.4.4 131620Z MAR 69). You also have “Cliff Notes” (e.g., “5 PCFs, 13 March, Song Bay Hap…HF encountered plus MINE,” the latter word underscored. Looks like someone drew a map, too. My guess, this is the briefing officer’s notes (staff ops or someone in that department) who went in to brief Admiral Zumwalt.

For a brief history of Task Force 194 – and a salute to the brilliance of Admiral Zumwalt’s initiative – go to

http://www.ftaclan.com/portal/showthread.php?t=933.

That will explain somewhat the intermeshing of these various operational chains of command.

As to who’s who, I’ll get to that in a second.

NC: Yes, I see the routing indicators. In fact this is the list I've come up with for the messages contained in Kerry's reports…

IDLE: Just keep in mind that those routers are not locked in stone, at least not for mobile commands (e.g., CTFs, CTGs, CTEs and the like).

NC: RHMCSDK - CTG 115.4 and PCFs 50 66, 72, 93, 94 and (USS KRISHNA ARL-3…

IDLE: Yes, the Krishna. My sense is those commands (the Task Group Commander and CO of the USS Krishna and the OiCs and crews of those boats listed (and other boats) are all collocated in Krishna. Alongside Krishna was a berthing barge. I’ve heard Swiftees emphasize that it is pointless, almost laughable, for Mr. Kerry’s supporters to dismiss SwiftVets on the grounds that they didn’t serve on his boat.

First, the boats usually operated in company within *yards* of each other. Second, unless out on a lengthy patrol, the men ate with each other on the same mess decks and slept in the same compartments. I heard one Swiftee say that Mr. Kerry, who bunked inches away, would keep him up nights typing away on a manual typewriter. The Swiftee still marvels: with the limited gear you were allowed to bring, who would bring a bulky heavy typewriter? Anyway, digressing again…

Here’s a posting I found at a blogspot to give you a flavor of life in Krishna:

“First of all, I wish to let you know I'm a US Navy Vietnam veteran. I served as an enlisted man onboard the USS Krishna (ARL 3 from June 1968 to June 1969. The Krishna again deployed for AnThoi, Vietnam in September of 1968 after going through a yard repair period at Yokuska, Japan. It was a repair ship anchored off AnThoi that repaired Swift boats. Along side the Krishna was tied the floating barracks that housed the Swift boat crews and on the other side of the Krishna was tied a barrage used to set the Swift boats on when lifted out to the water for repair. I was in the supply division. The Krishna repaired the boat that came backed from patrol either shot up from encounters with the enemy or had mechanical problems. I was not part of a swift boat crew. They were under a different command.”

In short, they ate the same geedunk, cumshawed with each other, and shared scuttlebutt together.

NC: Again, the chops of 115 on messages and 115.4 on messages puzzle me here. I'm totally with your knowledge of this matter now but what's your thought on this one? Could this have been done when the weenie in the archives was looking for the files for Kerry? I worked in the archives for several months back in the 90's and I remember they were stodgy about making any marks on originals. Perhaps someone after making copies?

IDLE: Seriously doubt anyone wrote on these records – other than the original players on the scene. Archivists limit what you can take with you into the screening rooms, and they watch you like a hawk. Again I think you are seeing someone’s “Cliff Notes” to brief the Admiral orally.

Finally, on task force organization – on who’s who -- this is how the gents themselves recall it. At the time (March 1969),

Commander Task Force 115 was then-Captain Roy Hoffman, United States Navy;

Commander Task Group 115.4 was then-Commander Adrian Lonsdale, United States Coast Guard; and

Commander Task Unit 115.4.7 was then-Lieutenant Commander George Elliott, United States Navy.

The key question is, of course, who is Commander Task Element 194.5.4.4 – the originator of the 13 March message? He is none other than the Officer in Tactical Command (or OTC) of the 5 boat formation in the Bay Hop river. Normally that task devolves to the senior officer present afloat, which would mean Lieutenant (j.g.) Larry Thurlow, United States Navy, but while LTJG Thurlow may well have been OTC, he most assuredly did not write that message.

LTJG Thurlow, you’ll recall, fell overboard that day and was first to jump aboard PCF-3 after the mine detonation, regained control of the boat and led first-aid and damage control efforts. Understandably, LTJG Thurlow was exhausted. The Swiftee officers, particularly at An Thoi, were notorious for skirting paperwork. Many never filed a single spot report, even though they were in fire fights and sampan stops routinely. If someone volunteered to write the report, the attitude was, “Have at it.”

So, if LTJG Thurlow did not write the report, who did? Then-LTJG Jack Chenoweth didn’t, certainly not LTJG Richard Pees (the seriously wounded OiC of PCF-3). That left two possible authors. LTJG Don Droz and LTJG John Kerry.

Readers can decide for themselves between the two possible authors. If you read the 13 March spot report, you can come to only one conclusion:

a. The originator of the message notes that PCF-94 [Kerry] fetched an “MSF advisor who went overboard,” but fails to note that many men went overboard from and were rescued by other boats that day, notably LTJG Thurlow.

b. The originator of the message notes that “PCF-94 [Kerry] and 51 [Thurlow] assisted PCF-3 [Pees]. True *only* in the sense that PCF-94 *towed* PCF-3 after the action was all over – and the originator of the message had already noted the towing a few sentences earlier. Two boats only assisted PCF-3: LTJG Thurlow pulled his PCF-51 alongside PCF-3 to port, and LTJG Chenoweth pulled PCF-23 alongside to starboard. There was no place for any another boat to assist. LTJG Don Droz lay to in the immediate area on the right side of the river – a wise, precautionary move. LTJG Thurlow boarded PCF-3 that was belching "heavy black smo[ke]," regained control (believe she was making bare steerageway) and led first-aid and damage control efforts that saved boat and crew.

c. Once PCF-3 was mined, PCF-94 [Kerry] fled the area and sped down river. There was nowhere near 5000 meters of river left (measuring from the position of mining incident to mouth of the Bay Hop). There was only one OiC who was in a position to experience (or pretend to experience) and then write about heavy automatic and small arms weapons fire “from both banks” which “continued” for “about 5000 meters.”

d. All the living OiCs flatly deny there was any enemy small arms fire. One one OiC reported “two other mine explosions” that all living OiCs also deny.

e. Small arms fire damage to LTJG Thurlow's boat, trotted out as proof of enemy fire in the PCF-3 mining incident, was sustained in a different, earlier action. Likewise, major media have pointed to LTJG Thurlow's own Bronze Star commendation as proof of fire as it contains "enemy fire" or words to that effect. But such awards are often written by those who, like then-LCDR George Elliott, were not present. LCDR Elliott recalls being in An Thoi, not on the boats in the Bay Hop. Hearing of LTJG Thurlow's PCF-3 rescue operation -- unquestionably a "single act of merit" that qualifies for the Bronze Star -- LCDR Elliott did what every right-thinking naval officer has done and will continue to do. Reach for the file and read the report. He trusted -- and we have all trusted -- that the officer making an official report would never knowingly utter a falsehood. ANd, until this day, there was no reason to warrant looking any further than the official incident report. I mean, who would dare make false, official reports?

Answer that question, and you have your man.

That about secures it. Like they used to say, there’s no cure like a SEcure.

Idle

[PO2]

[NavyChief]

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[NavyChief]

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[IDLE13rebelsMC]

NC: Some of these reports have 115 scribbled and others have 115.4. Did the "briefing" officer in Saigon do this or did Hoffman and Lonsdale do this? Or was it a Kerry staffer once they got the records (or Kerry himself). Many of these 115 and 115.4 are from the same handwriting- not all but a majority of them. The ink is very heavy as well; heavier than the normal writing you would expect from that time frame. The writing on the 13 Mar spot is different than the map. The chops may be a non issue but I must either discount them as done much later or include them as part of the process in trying to see the chain of events as far as the traffic.

IDLE: You are looking at a copy of the message as it was received by COMNAVFORV. There is no way that anybody in An Thoi scribbled on it, neither Hoffmann, Lonsdale nor Kerry. You may have had – and probably did have – more than one person make notes on it, because, as you observed, the handwriting/”artwork” looks different. So maybe one guy wrote one thing, another added that list “5 PCFs…”) and maybe another the map (“art work”). Maybe some stuff went on *before* the Admiral was briefed, some maybe later. Maybe the Admiral himself doodled with it, hard to say, but…that was NAVFORV’s people doing the scratching, not An Thoi folks.

NC: If done at that time, then my experience is that if there is a chop on a message with the office symbol - then that person (HOFFMAN or LONSDALE) actually saw the message and were the ones chopping it. To use someone else's chop (unless you had authority as XO or OPS Officer) was a big no no. Still is. You can see how this leads one like myself to believe that these messages were received in different commands. For archival purposes, it is logical to pull files from the largest operational command in theater. The command that would be required to file all that paperwork. But Cam Rahn Bay (Squadron) and An Thoi (Division) also filed messages. In fact, USS KRISHNA was required to file her messages as part of the Ship's Log. When I worked at the POW/MIA office we had to do a lot of research of Vietnam era stuff. The files were in two places: National Archives and Navy Archives. A majority of ship logs and operational logs were at Navy Archives. This would be filed separately than normal ship log because of operational nature. All Naval units were required to retire their records in the National Archives. (NOTE: National Archives is the boss for all the other archives, so National and Naval can be said interchangeably). These files were sent to Naval Archives, Suitland MD.

IDLE: The Navy History (or Historical) Center is the place where this came from. Any Joe Doe can roll in and see it. You can ask for the file for certain dates for “Coastal Division 11,” and you will see, yes, copies of messages (reams of them) that were held by various commands. But the 13 MAR 69 spot report copy that we see today (at johnkerry.com) was a copy from the files of NAVFORV. Think of it this way: neither Commander Lonsdale nor Lieutenant Commander Elliott had no need to doodle a map of the area of operations. They knew it cold. You can just envision someone who was not intimately familiar with the area – maybe even Admiral Zumwalt who had only taken over in the Fall of 1968 – asking “How’s that river run again?” and a staffer taking out a pencil and saying, “Something like this, Admiral.”

NC: Again, if these chops, 115 and 115.4 were done at that time, it says to me that the copies of these messages came from the Cam Rahn Bay and An Thoi filing cabinet. If this is true, than the KJW at the bottom could not have been a comms officer/watch officer/whatever at Saigon and Cam Rahn Bay and An Thoi. The only link then is a comms officer/watch officer on USS KRISHNA (comms guard ship for COSDIV 11 - stationed at AN THOI with APL-21 berthing and messing barge) or the original drafter of the message.
IDLE: Strongly disagree. Those internal routing indicators on the upper right of the 13 MAR 69 message reflect a STAFF, and a big one at that. If you were on a ship, you’d see “OPS.” If that ship was covering for an embarked staff, you’d see “COSDIV11” or some such. You don’t. You see 004 and 005 and such.




NC: Understood. The ship routers would obviously go where the ship went. The land based routers, however probably didn't move in a two month period. My source of info (besides you guys) was a RM1 in COSDIV 11 for that time frame. According to his recollection, the COSDIV 11 comms were based onboard APL-21 (callsign REPROACH). This was where all the comms originated. Unclassified traffic would be sent to BARBADOS at An Thoi NSA and the Classified traffic was sent from the KRISHNA. There was also a Security Detachment that used the same comms center.

IDLE: I would like to get the email addy for that RM1, if you’re agreeable, PM me his email addy.




NC: In Kerry's Tour of Duty, he states he was the OTC for that mission.

IDLE: Amusing. Surprised he didn’t claim he stood in for Elmo Zumwalt. As the once celebrated “historian” Douglas Brinkley admitted to the Washington Post (29 AUG 04), his account about Kerry’s Christmas in Cambodia is now “obviously wrong.”

NC: The 12 and 13 FEB 69 AFTER-ACTION Reports themselves:

Note: 130103Z FEB 69 MARKET TIME SPOT REPORT 1/12/CTE 194.5.4.5/1. Here is the author of the spot report. We know the skippers wrote these as attested by many of the OINCs and Kerry's own words that he often wrote the reports (and embellished them).

IDLE: Right.

NC: So, PCF 50 and 94 go on a mission from 121800 - ?/garbled. This wasn't under the cognizance of COSDIV 11 because it doesn't show up on the Command History for that day. IDLE: I follow, but just because it didn’t appear in COSDIV 11 command history doesn’t mean it didn’t happen on COSDIV 11 turf. Ask any lame-assed junior officer who has written a command history. Onerous, thankless chore that, yeah, sometimes doesn’t include all it should. I mean, when you’re writing those things, you don’t dream that one day 35 years into the future, they will be matters of national debate. Anyway,…

NC: Translate the Hanoi time to zulu

IDLE: Question for you. What time – local Hanoi time – was 140125Z ?

NC: Translate the Hanoi time to zulu (Hanoi minus 7) = 121100Z FEB 69. This message was sent 14 hours after commencement of operations - therefore we know the mission didn't take 14 hours to complete.

IDLE: The period of time covered by the report was 130500 HOTEL to 131800 HOTEL. See para 2 in the sport report.

NC: We also know the message came from USS KRISHNA - RHMCSDK on the RUYVSYD comms circuit???

IDLE: The AUTODIN routing indicator for the originator of the 13 MAR 69 spot report was RUMFSBB, I believe. Check with your RM 1 compadre but I think that’s accurate.

NC: COMNAVFORV, Saigon. We also know by the (4) para that the units involved were 194.5.4 (CDR Lonsdale) embarked, PCF 50, PCF 94 and SEALS team. The location for this mission was RACH GIANG THANH/KINH VINH. Specific points noted are: VS 4404(garbled) and VS 563639.

IDLE: Huh? Lost ya there, Chief. If we’re talking about the 131620Z MAR 69 spot report, see para 4 in that message for units involved. No mention of 194.5.4 being embarked that I see. Remember also that the officers in the chain recall only their TF 115 hats, that the 194 TF organization was relatively new and that they are still sent messages (like this one) to their 115 titles.

NC: ***Does anyone know where we can get a map with coordinates denoted?????******

IDLE: Not me. Haven’t come across charts on the net with grid coordinates. And Dude, we call ‘em CHARTS in the Nav’! (Friendly jab.)

NC: We know the cognizant authority that the message is from was CTE 194.4.4.5.

IDLE: You typo’ed right? Originator is CTE 194.5.4.4.

NC: One of the units info'd is NILO HA TIEN (this is where SEALS were picked up routinely or stationed?)

IDLE: Lost me again. The only NILO as an info addy that I can see is “NILO CA MAU.” Remember, too, that in those days, there was related but separate outfits. UDT and SEAL. Today, all those squids are SEALS, but in those days, they were two outfits.

NC: Kerry was probably on this mission, otherwise why would he put this out on his website?

IDLE: Hope we’re talking about the same message, 131620Z MAR 69. If so, he was OiC of PCF 94.

NC: We can see the chop of 115.4 (CDR Lonsdale) in ink on this one. We also see the routing chop, meaning this is not at the sending end but rather at the receiving end of one of the many addressed units. There are no chops on any of the "routing chop". No marks whatsoever, except for the ink "115.4". This copy posted on his website shows that this message had not gone through the chain of wherever it was pulled. I don't know how the comms center did it back then, but was this a file copy? And the most controversial part of this message is the TOR line. TOR 151330Z/HB/KJW.

I concede it means Time of Receipt. The DTG 151330Z means it was received at the station 60 1/2 hours after sending or the comms center acknowledges receipt 60 1/2 hours after sending. This seems like a long time to me.

IDLE: We must be talking about different messages now.

Note: 132000Z FEB 69 MARKET TIME SPOT REPORT 1/13/CTE 194.5.4.5/2.

IDLE: Okay. *FEBRUARY* not March. I’m with you now.

NC: This report was also sent by CTE 194.5.4.5 from comms center on USS KRISHNA - RHMCSDK on the RUYVSYD COMNAVFORV - Saigon circuit??

IDLE: You are looking at the copy of the message received by COMNAVFORV. Note the AUTODIN routing indicator at the top of the page and, next to “COMNAVFORV,” is: RUYVSYD. Note also that this message, at least as routed by Radio Central, was not marked for “00,” meaning Admiral Zumwalt. Could have got to him, but isn’t marked for him.

NC: This mission was in the RACH GIANG THANH/KINH VINH patrol area. Mission time: 131400 - 1800H. Units involved are only PCF-94. This was a PSYOPS/PAO mission where Kerry is close to the Cambodian border. **see my commentary "Not so Fast There, John Wayne..."** Coordinates denoted in this mission are: VS 4447 to 518565. specific points mentioned: "mission to VS 530553 made thrust up river to VS 518565 where observed man carring rice sacks... conducted chase but he crossed border before capture." The message was sent 14 FEB 0300H, 9 hours after completion of mission. The TOR line: TOR/151320Z/HB/KJW. Message was received or acknowledged 41 1/2 hours after sending.

IDLE: Message RECEIVED some 41 hours after the DTG, yes. Some general observations:

a. Wish we had the grid coordinate chart.

b. Notice the “ZEN” before some addressees. This is not a reference to deep-breathing. It is one of many “Q and Z” signals. Used by Radiomen and Signalmen, they are short-hand for communication things. [Digressing, but it brings back memories…ZUG means negative, and a lot of RMs used to deny something by saying, “ZUGative!” ZUI – your attention invited to. A favorite among Signalmen is ZWC (operator to operator) used to B.S. (e.g., from inbound ship to outbound ship ZWC INT HOTTEST BAR, meant, in essence, “Hey, man, where’s the hottest bar in this town?”)]

c. ZEN means “transmitted by different means.” In this context it means that the originator of the message is collocated with any “TO” or “INFO” addy that has “ZEN” before the name. So, in the message in question, CTU 194.5.4 was located at the same base (or ship) as the originator of the message. Note, too, the “hit” on the routing indicator for that last info addy, CTU 115.4.7 (LCDR Elliott). It comes out “EJN,” right? I will bet that was typed ZEN, but some atmospheric static screwed it up. Speaking of static…

d. Ah, HF Communications. If you signal someone that you are “QRKing 5/5,” that means you are receiving them perfectly. Rare in Southeast Asia, especially at night. .] The most used by radiomen? QSL. It means changing frequencies, and they did it a lot, especiallt in those days. The vagaries of HF communications in the late 60s and early 70s. The static, scatter and atmospherics were such that you’d accumulate backlogs of messages and go down for hours on end. That’s why some of these messages took days to receive, and the COMMO would report to message recipients within the command that such messages were “delayed delivery.”

NC: Note: 140130Z FEB 69 MARKET TIME SPOT REPORT 1/13/CTE 194.5.4.5/1. This report was sent by CTE 194.5.4.5, from comms center on USS KRISHNA - RHMCSDK on the RUYVSYD COMNAVFORV - Saigon circuit?? This mission was in the RACH GIANG THANH/KINH VINH patrol area. NOTE that this is the same day as previous mission but earlier in the day. At 0900 CTE 194.5.4.5 embarked, PCF 50, PCF 94, and ATC 131.9, and SEALS Teams (plural) conduct a raid at VS 478515.

IDLE: Right. Sure wish we knew who’s who in the 194 tast force organization. Notice all the ZEN addies. Lotsa folks collocated.

NC: Intelligence evaluation said VC had dug in and prepared ambush. All units gave the area good prep fire. SEALS Teams were inserted and then ATC 131.9 left to get VNN troops to bring to enemy position. No contact noted, no casualties. Units went as far up as VS 564639 and probably spotted village at VS 530552 (TRA PHO Village) - prime opportunity for PSYOPS/PAO mission which is covered in next message. This message was sent 14 0830H FEB 69. BIG PROBLEM THOUGH: mission hadn't started until 0900H. So how could the message have been sent before the mission even started? Either the mission time was hosed "140900H" (which it is - wrong day) or the comms center put in the wrong DTG (which is not likely). The TOR line: TOR 151330Z/HB/K(garbled). This message was received or acknowledged 36 hours after sending.

IDLE Originator did not include TIME SPAN of operation, just 140900H, as you noted. TOR looks like 151330Z, and the Radioman’s chops are hard to decipher.

NC: Note: 140740Z FEB 69 PSYOPS SPOT REPORT. This message was sent by CTG 115.4 (CDR Lonsdale) to SENAVADV VNN. This one is addressed to several Intell units and CTF 115, CTF 116, CTF 117. This messages is much different than previous MARKET TIME SPOT REPORTs. The units involved are: PCF 50, PCF 94, LT ADAVS and PHC NELSON embarked. Now you have either an Intell guy/Interpreter (prob same thing - poss even one of those "on loan" to CIA and a photographer). This mission is from 1430 to 1630H. If you can believe the previous morning's mission time of 0900, than this fits that they saw, conquered and left. But seeing the TRA PHO village along the way, a new mission was called for PSYOPS and photo-op. The units proceeded to the village (VS 530552) and talked with the Regional Forces Commander and Village Chief. PCFs then presented 125 TET packages for distribution to the people. So between 1630 and 1800H, PCF-94 takes off up/down one of the rivers to VS 518565 (near the Cambodian border). This report has scibbled on it "115.4 [underneath PSYOPS] and then crossed out". Curious? Then lighter ink 115.4. The TOR line: TOR 141330Z/HB/PDJ. This message was received or acknowledged almost 6 hours later. Much faster than the other messages. Another distinguishing thing to note about this particular message is that the mission was the same but it was sent by a different authority: CTE 194.5.4.5 sent the other two messages on the USS KRISHNA comms RHMCSDK to the RUYVSYD COMNAVFORV - Saigon circuit? This message was sent from CTG 115.4 (CDR Lonsdale) on the USS KRISHNA comms RHMCSDK to the RUMUGKE - SENAVADV VNN - Saigon circuit? This last is important because what are the chances that the Vietnamese Navy was using the same comms center as COMNAVFORV in Saigon? If so, would a comms officer/watch officer be chopping messages received in both comms centers? PDJ? These initials show up on other messages not involved with SENAVADV VNN.

IDLE: Note all the ZENs too. Hard to say about the Senior Naval Advisor to the Vietnamese Navy. Interesting to check, if possible. And I am beginning to believe that all these “115.4” notations we see on these messages are simply a way of identifying them for a specific file maintained not by radio central (where messages are always filed by DTG) but by one of the departments/staffs. Like, this message goes in the “115.4” file, not the PsyOps file (crossed out), because PsyOps were going on in plenty of places besides 115.4’s area. That’s my take.

Idle

[GoophyDog]

Just a bit of trivia and perhaps it will help?

Last two letters of the router "AA" - typically denotes a general or universal routing dump. Usually used by ships who have no fixed message drop nor have the routing manuals (BIG bible of who's who). Other portions of the router indicate the type of circuit, and general location ie; which coast the unit comes from or has been assigned. Major note: the router indicates where the message is first introduced into the autodin circuits and in a small part how it was handled. Considering the size of the units and the manpower available it wouldn't surprise me if messages from the boats were passed in another manner before hitting a servicing commcen or radio shack.

DTG - assigned by the sender(RM) upon receipt of the drafted message, not necessarily anything else other than the time the message hit the radio shack for transmssion. Exceptions: Many reports require a specific DTG be assigned. Good examples are wx obs and posreps. Wasn't unusual to "fudge" the dtg to meet those requirements.

The notations 115 and 115.4 could simply be the knowledge of who quick scanned the message for routing/filing purposes. Example: You see the message, look over it briefly and slam a note on it for either who it came from or who it needs to go to which then has bearing on the routing stamp or cross-hatch. The underline could have the same meaning as us using a highlighter now - to bring attention to the salient part of the message.

TOR: Would have to ask some of the RM's from back then to see if these were manual types on receipt. On a non-broadcast (manual) circuit it wouldn't be unusual for the receiver to jump on the tty and slam that in, hence the same font/type pressure since it would be on the same machine. If this is the case, it wouldn't surprise me if there could be typos on the TOR DTG. Keep in mind that the teletypes of that day required the operator to hit a key (LTR or FIG) to shift between letters and numbers. In the case of the one message the operator could have hit a 5 instead of a 4 in a rush to get the TOR done.

The three ships I served on (MODOC, CITRUS, SWEETBRIER- much later than VN), were all manual circuits ie; the operator had to manually establish tty comms with a commcen/radsta, send the message (paper tape), then manually sign-off.

Question: Wouldn't the commander of a CTE most likely be the OINC of a group of boats for a single operation? If such is the case, could the /1 or /2 indicate "actual" or unit within the element?
_________________
Why ask? Because it needs asking.

[NavyChief]

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[sevry]

I was curious where this wound up.

Was it decided that the RI for COMNAVFORV was just standard, in the top line, maybe for confidential and above, or something? And the very top VV line is meaningless?

Was the TO intended to be the recipient, such that the spot report was sent to 115.4 - Lonsdale? and marked-up there at 115.4?

Was the TOR line really produced automatically, or typed by originator, or something added or automated by the receiving station. It follows the closing BT. Would anything follow the closing BT from the sender?

The ZEN1 and ZEN2 stuff in the PCF-94 damage report. What's all that?

Is the time of receipt encoded in that top line with the CCCC?

ZNY is the priority code prefix. But what's ZYO?

Do the (C) indicate again, classified, and (U) unclassified?

Someone wrote "HF" down in the corner?

[NavyChief]

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[sevry]

I'm getting a little of it, piece by piece. ZYO indicates message was sent from ship, basically, or maybe a command boat. It's Commander Coastal Squadron 1. Was that based on the Krishna? or was An Thoi itself considered a mobile base? And ZEN1 indicates courier delivery. And ZEN2 - mail. They mailed it, to those addressees. Hey, Mr. Postman. Maybe that was just procedure in reporting needed repairs? One would have to compare to other damage reports to see.

[Robert McDaniel]

Navy Chief, I still believe that you are on to something, although their appears to be some legitimate questions. Dont worry about the legal ramifications. They cannot stop the truth. We will provide the finances for the SBVFT to tackle any and all of the problems that may arise.

[sevry]