SwiftVets.com

[Paul]

Hi SL:

Thanks for the thoughtful and interesting reply.

I'm also too busy to be spending as much time as I have been in the forum.

As to the "leveling." I don't believe it be temporary as you seem to. Once something such as manufacturing is lost, then it is quite difficult to regain.

If this nation ends up as a population of 'burger flippers' then it will be burger-flippers competing for the jobs with illegal aliens via the new "job line" that the new amnesty program being proposed truly is and which will make it all the worse.

And as we loose the manufacturing, then we loose the ability and the knowledge and the skills associated with it. And the same is true of so-called information technology. I've always been skeptical regarding the claim that the new Information Service Industry would replace manufacturing. Now it's bleeding away also.

To what was mentioned about the size and advantages of the PRC is also the government expenditures in building its new manufacturing base. They are enormous. For just one among many industries, it has built an entire process industry, refining, chemicals, pharmaceuticals. . . in recent years while not a single new grass roots refinery has been built in the US since 1979 and won't be any time soon (most in the industry believe never again. . . ).

India has done the same where refining is concerned and it did it in the 1990s. An extraordinary undertaking and investment.

The world market share once held by US refining has now shrunk to being primarily only our own nation and now THAT is being cut into.

The US industries will not regain what's been lost.

What you describe is unrealistic. As imbalanced as the current world trade and business situation is, manufacturing, tech service industry and so forth will continue to bleed out of the United States and will not be replaced.

Tax cuts are a good thing. However, they are insufficient alone and with the incredible explosion of social spending by this administration, growth of federal bureaucracy, and increase of national debt, the tax cuts will not be permanent and tax increases in the future difficult to avoid. None of this is even being challenged or debated. This is another area where there's now no significant difference between the two major parties.

It’s another reason not dealing with illegal immigration is so bad. That social spending is on the growth of the many entitlement social welfare programs including the proposal to make social security available to illegal aliens euphemistically referred to as “guest workers.” Employers can use the new “job line” to offer wages lower than those currently earned by Americans, and foreign immigrants can receive a greed card to take the position while also being made eligible to apply for US social welfare services. . . It’s a joke. The whole system is a mess. . . It will all combine to have VERY bad consequences, cultural and otherwise.

But, unless there's a change, then the manufacturing being lost, won't be regained once it's gone. And associated skills of our members of our population will decline as well. It's a losing proposition all the way around. . .

And, a helluva burden being created if one is really serious about fighting a war. . .
_________________
Paul

[Paul]

Hi SL:

I need to ask:

Who do you define our current enemies as being or how do you define them? How do you define "losing" for the United States against our current enemies and "victory" over us for them? What do you foresee as a result and consequences of a terrorist victory, and why?

I hear many dire predictions about Victory or defeat, winning or losing in the so-called GWAT and see no few claims of a direct correlation between the present and 1930s National Socialist Germany (which I find absurd), but I've yet to meet any who have thought the dire polemic through to the point of being able to answer these particular questions objectively.

I agree that further attacks like 9-11 are probable.
But I believe so for reasons that I've already given. Your expectation of them in view of your other comments here on Iraq, Immigration, the economy and so forth, surprise me.

Personally I don't share your confidence in such attacks serving to have the effect of propelling the United States to a victory. Only meaning that the converse, a defeat of the United States due to them, is also possible.

In fact, in light of the last three years, then I believe that it's also somewhat likely if a series of such attacks should occur. The likelihood that they may is what disgusts me about the pitiful campaign to date. Kasserine Pass I believe is irrelevant. It was a conventional armor battle. It was a stunning Allied tactical defeat. There were fewer casualties in that defeat than the number murdered on 9-11. It really doesn't bear any other relationship whatsoever to such as Iraq. Time wise, Kasserine Pass was much earlier into the second world war than we are now distant from 9-11.
_________________
Paul

[Paul]

Hi SL:

I am familiar with the meaning of Epistemology, hence my question to you asking how you were using it in the context of what you wrote.

Personally, where modern philisophical systems are concerned, then I find the biggest pain when it comes to learning about or trying to understand particular Philosophical systems to be the profusion of terms and definitions that one must master before learning the methods -- far more than anything like verbosity. Most modern Philosophical systems since Descartes I believe have profound defects. And the more defective the method, the more profusion by that philosopher of those darn unique, and usually highly esoteric, terms and definitiions. Hence the claim of "he's misunderstood" being so common among groupies of a particular philosopher. The kind where an assembly of 600 of them yield 650 defenitions of the philosopher's meaning and intentions. . . Sheesh.

Anyway, even when the results of the methods of the various schools are quite succinct, it's the results themselves often quite questionable due to those particular defects in the methods.

In some ways, I find Marxists almost a relief at times. Given that I reject Marxist philosophy, it’s rare that I agree with the conclusions of someone employing it (such as most present-day feminists). But at least I know how they arrived at their conclusions and what they're based on. Marxist rationalism is weak as a foundation, but not so esoteric and ambiguous as that of Cartesian or even most Phenomenologist methods, of whatever school, not to mention the majority of such as various different modern transcendentalist schools. . . . ug.

Modern philosophers I believe tend to get bogged down when they start trying to develop their new ontologies and ethics by employing whatever new method they've devised, burdened with the usual undefended piece critical to the results they generate. As Etienne Gilson stated quite well regarding so many modern philosophers from Descartes and since: "For indeed, if being is the first principle of human knowledge [and it is], it must be the very first object to be grasped by the human mind; now, if it is, how are we to account for the fact that so many philosophers have been unable to grasp it. Nor is this all. That which comes first in the order of knowledge must of necessity accompany all our representations; now, if it does, how can being both be constantly present to the most common mind, yet prove so elusive that so many very great philosophers have failed to see it? If the ultimate lesson of philosophical experience is that the human mind is blind to the very light in which it is supposed to see both itself and all the rest, what it teaches us is worse than a paradox, it is an absurdity."

Or as a pal put it a bit more plainly regarding the mess started by Descartes, how in the world one can saw of his epistemology from his ontology and then hope to make any sense is beyond him. I agreed.

Anyway, interesting example that you provide. My initial response about the 1600s was "tongue in cheek" so what grew out of that even begfore your reply somewhat surprised me. But, hey, I'm game to take it as it comes and "run with it." And now we seem be "bogged in the 17th century." But at least it's an advance to 1611 or so (if memory serves).

Your explanation I believe tends to mix and blur the distinctions between considerations proper to the natural sciences, metaphysics, and theology, and limits proper to each. Which, I concede is very common these days. However, so did many individuals involved in the example that you cite back in the late 16th / early 17th centuries, did precisely the same thing, so it's a good choice of historical example in many ways.

Not afraid to look into the details of controversies, its one stumbled on years past after a remark by a history professor piqued my curiosity. So, another surprise topic to come up on this forum for me, it's not something that I'm entirely unfamiliar with. So, I'll get back to you on this one.

One thing for sure. I disagree with those who believe there's no practical tie with philosophy and everyday life. They are quite wrong. Ideas have consequences, and quite substantial ones, and profound impact on individuals and societies. Few more directly than those developed via the results of various philosophical schools and methods, no matter how obtuse, obscure or esoteric the methods and terminology may be or appear to be by the majority of us so impacted by the results generated by the philosophical methods.

Again, thanks for the reply. I'll have to get back to you on the 17th century example
_________________
Paul

[USAF66-70]

[sore loser]

Fred - feel free to jump in and welcome

[sore loser]

[sore loser]

[GoophyDog]

[USAF66-70]

Paul & SL & GoophyDog:

I’ve done some quick Internet research on what I think is your (Paul’s) POV, that mere possession alone of WMD by Iraq was not enough to justify invading Iraq. A view held by Zinni, a view I tend to respect (Washington Post 12/23/03 article below).

Wish he and other likeminded had been more vocal b/f we went in. Although I suspect that groupthink would still have held that WMD were slam-dunk, that we had to act; but perhaps we would have planned better for the aftermath? Perhaps Bush should/will fire some of the neocons after election? (I mean Bush being elected in Nov is slam-dunk, right?) The article:


For Vietnam Vet Anthony Zinni, Another War on Shaky Territory
By Thomas E. Ricks, Washington Post Staff Writer, Tuesday, December 23, 2003; Page C01
Anthony C. Zinni's opposition to U.S. policy on Iraq began on the monsoon-ridden afternoon of Nov. 3, 1970. He was lying on a Vietnamese mountainside west of Da Nang, three rounds from an AK-47 assault rifle in his side and back. He could feel his lifeblood seeping into the ground as he slipped in and out of consciousness.
He had plenty of time to think in the following months while recuperating in a military hospital in Hawaii. Among other things, he promised himself that, "If I'm ever in a position to say what I think is right, I will. . . . I don't care what happens to my career."
That time has arrived.
Over the past year, the retired Marine Corps general has become one of the most prominent opponents of Bush administration policy on Iraq, which he now fears is drifting toward disaster.
It is one of the more unusual political journeys to come out of the American experience with Iraq. Zinni still talks like an old-school Marine -- a big-shouldered, weight-lifting, working-class Philadelphian whose father emigrated from Italy's Abruzzi region, and who is fond of quoting the wisdom of his fictitious "Uncle Guido, the plumber." Yet he finds himself in the unaccustomed role of rallying the antiwar camp, attacking the policies of the president and commander in chief whom he had endorsed in the 2000 election.
"Iraq is in serious danger of coming apart because of lack of planning, underestimating the task and buying into a flawed strategy," he says. "The longer we stubbornly resist admitting the mistakes and not altering our approach, the harder it will be to pull this chestnut out of the fire."
Three years ago, Zinni completed a tour as chief of the Central Command, the U.S. military headquarters for the Middle East, during which he oversaw enforcement of the two "no-fly" zones in Iraq and also conducted four days of punishing airstrikes against that country in 1998. He even served briefly as a special envoy to the Middle East, mainly as a favor to his old friend and comrade Secretary of State Colin L. Powell.
Zinni long has worried that there are worse outcomes possible in Iraq than having Saddam Hussein in power -- such as eliminating him in such a way that Iraq will become a new haven for terrorism in the Middle East.
"I think a weakened, fragmented, chaotic Iraq, which could happen if this isn't done carefully, is more dangerous in the long run than a contained Saddam is now," he told reporters in 1998. "I don't think these questions have been thought through or answered." It was a warning for which Iraq hawks such as Paul D. Wolfowitz, then an academic and now the No. 2 official at the Pentagon, attacked him in print at the time.
Now, five years later, Zinni fears it is an outcome toward which U.S.-occupied Iraq may be drifting. Nor does he think the capture of Hussein is likely to make much difference, beyond boosting U.S. troop morale and providing closure for his victims. "Since we've failed thus far to capitalize" on opportunities in Iraq, he says, "I don't have confidence we will do it now. I believe the only way it will work now is for the Iraqis themselves to somehow take charge and turn things around. Our policy, strategy, tactics, et cetera, are still screwed up."
'Where's the Threat?'

Anthony Zinni's passage from obedient general to outspoken opponent began in earnest in the unlikeliest of locations, the national convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars. He was there in Nashville in August 2002 to receive the group's Dwight D. Eisenhower Distinguished Service Award, recognition for his 35 years in the Marine Corps.
Vice President Cheney was also there, delivering a speech on foreign policy. Sitting on the stage behind the vice president, Zinni grew increasingly puzzled. He had endorsed Bush and Cheney two years earlier, just after he retired from his last military post, as chief of the U.S. Central Command, which oversees operations in Iraq.
"I think he ran on a moderate ticket, and that's my leaning -- I'm kind of a Lugar-Hagel-Powell guy," he says, listing three Republicans associated with centrist foreign policy positions.
He was alarmed that day to hear Cheney make the argument for attacking Iraq on grounds that Zinni found questionable at best:
"Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction," Cheney said. "There is no doubt that he is amassing them to use against our friends, against our allies, and against us."
Cheney's certitude bewildered Zinni. As chief of the Central Command, Zinni had been immersed in U.S. intelligence about Iraq. He was all too familiar with the intelligence analysts' doubts about Iraq's programs to acquire weapons of mass destruction, or WMD. "In my time at Centcom, I watched the intelligence, and never -- not once -- did it say, 'He has WMD.' "
Though retired for nearly two years, Zinni says, he remained current on the intelligence through his consulting with the CIA and the military. "I did consulting work for the agency, right up to the beginning of the war. I never saw anything. I'd say to analysts, 'Where's the threat?' " Their response, he recalls, was, "Silence."
Zinni's concern deepened as Cheney pressed on that day at the Opryland Hotel. "Time is not on our side," the vice president said. "The risks of inaction are far greater than the risks of action."
Zinni's conclusion as he slowly walked off the stage that day was that the Bush administration was determined to go to war. A moment later, he had another, equally chilling thought: "These guys don't understand what they are getting into."
Unheeded Advice

This retired Marine commander is hardly a late-life convert to pacifism. "I'm not saying there aren't parts of the world that don't need their ass kicked," he says, sitting in a hotel lobby in Pentagon City, wearing an open-necked blue shirt. Even at the age of 60, he remains an avid weight-lifter and is still a solid, square-faced slab of a man. "Afghanistan was the right thing to do," he adds, referring to the U.S. invasion there in 2001 to oust the Taliban regime and its allies in the al Qaeda terrorist organization.
But he didn't see any need to invade Iraq. He didn't think Hussein was much of a worry anymore. "He was contained," he says. "It was a pain in the ass, but he was contained. He had a deteriorated military. He wasn't a threat to the region."
But didn't his old friend Colin Powell also describe Hussein as a threat? Zinni dismisses that. "He's trying to be the good soldier, and I respect him for that." Zinni no longer does any work for the State Department.
Zinni's concern deepened at a Senate hearing in February, just six weeks before the war began. As he awaited his turn to testify, he listened to Pentagon and State Department officials talk vaguely about the "uncertainties" of a postwar Iraq. He began to think they were doing the wrong thing the wrong way. "I was listening to the panel, and I realized, 'These guys don't have a clue.' "
That wasn't a casual judgment. Zinni had started thinking about how the United States might handle Iraq if Hussein's government collapsed after Operation Desert Fox, the four days of airstrikes that he oversaw in December 1998, in which he targeted presidential palaces, Baath Party headquarters, intelligence facilities, military command posts and barracks, and factories that might build missiles that could deliver weapons of mass destruction.
In the wake of those attacks on about 100 major targets, intelligence reports came in that Hussein's government had been shaken by the short campaign. "After the strike, we heard from countries with diplomatic missions in there [Baghdad] that the regime was paralyzed, and that there was a kind of defiance in the streets," he recalls.
So early in 1999 he ordered that plans be devised for the possibility of the U.S. military having to occupy Iraq. Under the code name "Desert Crossing," the resulting document called for a nationwide civilian occupation authority, with offices in each of Iraq's 18 provinces. That plan contrasts sharply, he notes, with the reality of the Coalition Provisional Authority, the U.S. occupation power, which for months this year had almost no presence outside Baghdad -- an absence that some Army generals say has increased their burden in Iraq.
Listening to the administration officials testify that day, Zinni began to suspect that his careful plans had been disregarded. Concerned, he later called a general at Central Command's headquarters in Tampa and asked, "Are you guys looking at Desert Crossing?" The answer, he recalls, was, "What's that?"
The more he listened to Wolfowitz and other administration officials talk about Iraq, the more Zinni became convinced that interventionist "neoconservative" ideologues were plunging the nation into a war in a part of the world they didn't understand. "The more I saw, the more I thought that this was the product of the neocons who didn't understand the region and were going to create havoc there. These were dilettantes from Washington think tanks who never had an idea that worked on the ground."
And the more he dwelled on this, the more he began to believe that U.S. soldiers would wind up paying for the mistakes of Washington policymakers. And that took him back to that bloody day in the sodden Que Son mountains in Vietnam.
A Familiar Chill

Even now, decades later, Vietnam remains a painful subject for him. "I only went to the Wall once, and it was very difficult," he says, talking about his sole visit to the Vietnam Veterans Memorial on the Mall. "I was walking down past the names of my men," he recalls. "My buddies, my troops -- just walking down that Wall was hard, and I couldn't go back."
Now he feels his nation -- and a new generation of his soldiers -- have been led down a similar path.
"Obviously there are differences" between Vietnam and Iraq, he says. "Every situation is unique." But in his bones, he feels the same chill. "It feels the same. I hear the same things -- about [administration charges about] not telling the good news, about cooking up a rationale for getting into the war." He sees both conflicts as beginning with deception by the U.S. government, drawing a parallel between how the Johnson administration handled the beginning of the Vietnam War and how the Bush administration touted the threat presented by Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. "I think the American people were conned into this," he says. Referring to the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin incident, in which the Johnson administration claimed that U.S. Navy ships had been subjected to an unprovoked attack by North Vietnam, he says, "The Gulf of Tonkin and the case for WMD and terrorism is synonymous in my mind."
Likewise, he says, the goal of transforming the Middle East by imposing democracy by force reminds him of the "domino theory" in the 1960s that the United States had to win in Vietnam to prevent the rest of Southeast Asia from falling into communist hands.
And that brings him back to Wolfowitz and his neoconservative allies as the root of the problem. "I don't know where the neocons came from -- that wasn't the platform they ran on," he says. "Somehow, the neocons captured the president. They captured the vice president."
He is especially irked that, as he sees it, no senior officials have taken responsibility for their incorrect assessment of the threat posed by Iraq. "What I don't understand is that the bill of goods the neocons sold him has been proven false, yet heads haven't rolled," he says. "Where is the accountability? I think some fairly senior people at the Pentagon ought to go." Who? "That's up to the president."
Zinni has picked his shots carefully -- a speech here, a "Nightline" segment or interview there. "My contemporaries, our feelings and sensitivities were forged on the battlefields of Vietnam, where we heard the garbage and the lies, and we saw the sacrifice," he said at a talk to hundreds of Marine and Navy officers and others at a Crystal City hotel ballroom in September. "I ask you, is it happening again?" The speech, part of a forum sponsored by the U.S. Naval Institute and the Marine Corps Association, received prolonged applause, with many officers standing.
Zinni says that he hasn't received a single negative response from military people about the stance he has taken. "I was surprised by the number of uniformed guys, all ranks, who said, 'You're speaking for us. Keep on keeping on.' "
Even home in Williamsburg, he has been surprised at the reaction. "I mean, I live in a very conservative Republican community, and people were saying, 'You're right.' "
But Zinni vows that he has learned a lesson. Reminded that he endorsed Bush in 2000, he says, "I'm not going to do anything political again -- ever. I made that mistake one time."
Staff researcher Lucy Shackelford contributed to this article.

USAF, 66-70, Fred H.

[Hanger]

I purchased the Movie, "THE HANOI HILTON" at Wal-Mart a few weeks ago because it was on sale for $5.99. I recall seeing the movie on television many years ago. I had a chance to watch the movie yesterday and now it the movie, more than ever is relevant to the anti-war actives of John Kerry during the Vietnam War and how the POW's were tortured many times due to the actions of John Kerry, Jane Fonda and their friends in the media.

If you have an opportunity I recommend highly that you see this movie and let others get to see just a glimpse of what the POW's went through while held prisoner by the Communist North Vietnamese.

The video is available from Amazon and other online video stores.

From website: "Shot in the Dark" http://www.shotinthedark.info/

"In 1987, Lionel Chetwynd's excellent Hanoi Hilton received widely-mixed reviews (many of them politically-motivated). Worse, its distributor essentially sat on the movie, under pressure from Hollywood leftists, for its treatment of Jane Fonda. The movie depicted life at North Vietnam's Hoa Lo prison accurately - but it changed the last names of the prisoners, and of their visitors, including Jane Fonda. An actress who represents Fonda ("Paula") does everything Fonda is said to have done while in the Hilton. That was one of several stories that Hollywood didn't want told (that and, of course, the moral of the story; the men survived because of their military training and warrior ethic). "Hanoi Hilton" was buried, received a tiny theatrical release, and is hard to find on video today. (Do it if you can - it's an excellent movie)."
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

On the back of the box there is the following endorsement from President Ronald Reagan:

"Every American should see this powerful and moving film as a tribute to our POW's."

President Ronald Reagan

Hanoi Hilton (1987)

Genre(s): POW/MIA, Vietnam War

Cast: Michael Moriarty, Paul LeMat, Jeffrey Jones, Lawrence Pressman, Stephen Davies, David Soul, Rick Fitts, Aki Aleong, Gloria Carlin; DIRECTED BY: Lionel Chetwynd; WRITTEN BY: Lionel Chetwynd. PRODUCER: Cannon Films.

Review: A brutal drama about the sufferings of American POWs in Vietnamese prison camps. Non-stop torture, filth, and degradation.

From Amazon.com website:

Editorial Reviews
Description
A true story about American soldiers interned in North Vietnam during the years 1964 through 1973, and their struggle to survive within the infamous prison complex they dubbed the Hanoi Hilton.

COMMUNISM WAS EVIL, EVIL, EVIL, June 7, 2004
Reviewer: Steven R. Travers (CALIFORNIA) -

One lonely conservative voice has been trying to shout out from the "wilderness" for years. Lionel Chetwynd is a writer/producer who made "The Hanoi Hilton", which actually described the North Vietnamese as the evil torturers they were. The "Hilton" was the moniker given the infamous prison camp where American POW's were kept while Jane Fonda was flirting with our enemies. Liberal film reviewers criticized it. Do not believe them. It is good stuff.

The Hanoi Hilton, January 18, 2004
Reviewer: Thomas A. Silvia (Jackson, TN United States) - See all my reviews

I was in the Air Force during the war and have over 100 combat missions. This is the most accurate presentation of the war that is available. It is a story that needed telling and still needs to be told. It describes the situation of the American prisoners in Vietnam in an accurate and truthful manner. Everyone should see it.

The Hanoi Hilton, April 25, 2001
Reviewer: Marie T. Cei "mcei" (USA) - See all my reviews

This movie shows what terrible hardships these prisoners had to endure. I had the privilege to talk to one of the wives of these heroes and she confirmed a lot of events shown in this movie. Also stated that she was not allowed to even mention that her husband was shot down for six-months. Tell her that this movie was "too long and over emotional"!! Most Americans just did not want to face reality during this sad time in our Country's history. I was there during 1966-1968 and in Saigon 1970. --This text refers to the VHS Tape edition

Internet Movie Database
User Comments:

Cyborg3k
Galveston, TX

Date: 14 March 2000
Summary: The Libs Hate This One

While this doesn't have the action of 'Rambo' or the surrealism of 'Apocalypse Now', or 'Full Metal Jacket', it does hit dead-on as the most realistic of the Vietnam movies yet.

Most especially, it accurately contrasts the quiet heroism of the POWs with the hypocrisy of the Hollywood Left, and their comrades in the news media; so much in fact, that it is really pretty amazing this film ever got made at all.

Hollywood hated this film. You can see a typical Hollywierdo review of this movie, where it is referred to as "Right-wing ********." Go to: http://www.ruthlessreviews.com/80saction/hanoihilton.html
_________________
Can Tho Tet Survivor

[jalexson]

[sore loser]

[quote="jalexson"]

[Ordie_rat]

[quote="sore loser"]

[clipper]

The only monuments to the Fonda, Kerry crowd are in Hanoi.

CLP
RVN 70-72

[john h]